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# Daily Report
## Supplement

# Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-051-S
Thursday
16 March 1995

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# Central Eurasia
## SUPPLEMENT

*FBIS-SOV-95-051-S* *16 March 1995*

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## *Future of North Atlantic Solidarity Questioned

*954Q0141A Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 95 (signed to press 6 Dec 94) pp 3-18*

[Article by Anatoliy Ivanovich Utkin, doctor of historical sciences, leading scientific associate, ISKRAN: "U.S. Policy in the North Atlantic Sector"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpts] The opinion concerning the need to strengthen the inter-Atlantic ties and the solidarity of the countries of developed capitalism is based in the U.S. ruling circles on a definitely pessimistic perception of the future, in which one can see the growing influence of the developing countries, the worsening of the positions of the bourgeois democracies, and the retreat of the West to defensive lines. Only a union with Western Europe, its apologists propose, can help to strengthen such international organizations that are headed by the West as the IMF, the World Bank, OECD, and GATT.

The arguments by supporters of reliance on Western Europe and on a coalition strategy are rather simple. In the year when NATO was created, the United States produced more than half the world's gross product. Currently it produces approximately 20 percent—approximately the same amount as in Western Europe. Divided, the United States has a contractor that is equal in strength. United, the United States and Western European own the worldwide "controlling block." Meanwhile the sphere of influence of Western Europe is increasing. With the inclusion into the YeES [European Economic Union] of the seven EFTA countries, the market of the European Union came to 380 million persons. It now accounts for 40 percent of world trade. [passage omitted]

### Insolvency of Alantism

Recent decades have changed America's demographic map. The new regions such as the South and the West achieved unprecedented economic and political growth, and that lowered the importance of the old pro-Atlantic regions of the East and the Midwest. Immigration from Latin America and Asia also contributed to a change in the country's political face. The fundamental values of American culture are no longer being formed by those Yankees whose family tree goes back to Britain. The notorious Protestant ethic, which demands honest, stubborn labor, sacrifice, and mutual aid with one's neighbors is being sensed less and less in the variegated new country. The population's mobility has intensified.

The end of the Cold War, as it were, lifted the screen from the real American and West European contradictions, revealed them, and threw light on their disunifying importance. Apart from everything else, a new generation is entering life, a generation for which the previous inseparability of the bonds with Europe no longer seems axiomatic at all.

On the other hand, even in the new world there is arising another Europe, which, for the first time since 1914, does not have any ideological barriers within itself. Obviously there is a lot of explosive material there, but it is of a different quality from what prevailed in 1945-1991. The number of Europeans who are adherents of Atlantism is rapidly decreasing. The transnational postwar "American camp" lost the meaning of its existence.

For Americans this is a new and frequently unexpected and unpleasant reality. Americans are sickened by the reality of small-scale nationalistic trading, and by the conversion for many countries (especially in the East) of ethnography into a higher value. The cacophony of incipient democracy also does not evoke delight. History and geography have returned to the American evaluation of their transatlantic policy.

The new tendencies predominated in the region of the North Atlantic: the chief one among them is self-concentration, turning toward domestic problems and the search for a path of accelerated economic development. C. Bertram, the former director of the London Strategic Research Institute, comes to the conclusion that "for both regions—America and Western Europe—God's gift of a common threat that made it possible to reconcile different interests has disappeared"[13]. In both places there has been a noticeable shifting of the focus of public interest in the direction of domestic problems. This is a situational shift, but a deep structural one.

Several factors will act in favor of weakening America's positions in the European sector, primarily such a simple and fundamental fact as that the United States is a non-European power. Yes, the United States does have large interests and large influence in Europe, but an even larger American interest lies in repairing its own house. The material processes are disuniting the former allies.

Currently the Americans look with mixed emotions at the processes that are swallowing up Europe. Their own self-identification occurred precisely in comparison with the Old World, and now it is not really so simple for them to get rid of the previous sense of superiority. "The transatlantic relations that dominated during the postwar period, which were based on the existence of a common enemy and a weak Europe that learns its lessons of democracy from the more experienced America, has ended. The new relations will be based on a greater sense of equality"[14].

Carnegie Foundation associate D. Walker assumes that the United States is becoming only one of the players on the international scene, and it will treat its allies, and primarily a united Europe, less and less frequently from a position of power. This process is irreversible[15].

On the whole, Americans now are interested considerably less than they used to be in what is happening in Western Europe. On their part, the West Europeans manifest no delight with America and also no hate of

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America, but, rather, apathy and a definite indifference, with periodic outbursts of indignation with regard to America's arrogance and trade contradictions.

All the basic structures that link the United States and Western Europe are currently in a critical state. NATO is attempting to work out a policy with respect to the new countries, but actually it cannot adapt to the fact that it is not the Yalta Understandings, but the borders of the EU [European Union], that currently divide Europe.

The OECD that links both regions does not facilitate the problem of liberalizing the foreign ties, but throws into sharp contrast the problems of selfish Western protectionism. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe did not really become a new guarantor of security, and the consensus rule, apart from everything else, is hindering its conversion into an effective mechanism.

The basis that was built 40 years ago does not meet present-day requirements. The United States no longer views Europe as a leading partner, but primarily as a trade competitor.

There has been a constant buildup of a trend that has doubts of a development of a future Europe as a comrade in arms and ally, which development is favorable for the United States.

In a considerable number of modern studies, many of which are being created in "nontraditional" centers, it is asserted that the Atlantic community is a myth of the past, and the best that the United States can count on in the transatlantic sector is the slowing down of the self-assertion of Western Europe, its moderation in defending its own interests.

A point of view that opposes the Atlantic one is based on the inevitability of the distancing of the two regions from one another. Moreover, that distancing will definitely not occur in the way that the Atlantists always feared, not as a result of the loss of America's interest in Europe, but because of the fact that Big Europe—from Lisbon to Vladivostok—which has been undergoing the most serious changes during the recent half-century, has lost its need for American guardianship.

Opponents of orientation on Western Europe emphasize the fall of its relative weight among the developed capitalist countries during the past 15 years, and the lagging behind of that region in the sphere of the scientific-technical revolution with respect to the two other centers of economic rivalry in the Western world—Japan and the United States.

This tendency inevitably gives rise to rather gloomy statements for that region. The prediction for the year 2000: Western Europe, staggered by the low level of development, high unemployment, and imposing isolation, will inevitably become politically weaker, will lose a considerable share of interest in the outside world, will take the path of protectionism, and will become engaged in a search for markets depending upon it and for reliable sources of raw materials. Catching up with the United States and Japan is a long and very difficult task for Europe, and possibly Europe will not be up to that task. Also, NATO may be preserved, but it will lose its former importance. Imperatives of an economic nature and economic pressure may force the European Union to change its political course, "without changing its shingle," without officially rejecting its Atlantic affiliation.

In the opinion of a considerable number of Americans, the only time when the West European sector was attractive for the United States was in 1950-1973, when the rapid growth of the West European economy attracted a considerable amount of American capital. It was precisely to there, apparently, that the world's economic center shifted. During the subsequent period, the slowing down of the growth of the European economy sharply weakened the attractiveness of the West European region for the United States. It is necessary to isolate three factors here. The first is the scientific-technical lag; the second is investment weakness; and the third is unemployment.

The action of the first factor is linked with the fact that the share of the YeES in the high-tech market has fallen. In 1970 its share was more than 50 percent of high-tech commodities, and currently it is 35 percent. Since that time, Japan's share has increased from 13 to 25 percent, and the U.S. share from 32 to 37 percent. As a result, for example, the largest producer of integrated microschemes in Western Europe, the Phillips company, currently occupies only the eleventh place in the world; and SNI-Honeywell-Bull, the first West European company with respect to the production of electronic-computer technology, is in tenth place. Western Europe has dropped to third place in the production of machine tools with digital program control. The largest West European company with regard to the production of robots, ACEA (Sweden), is only barely in the group of the ten largest producers of that kind of output. What one observes is the substantial losses by Western Europe of its positions in the production of commodities with high technological complexity.

The second factor of an objective nature operates as a consequence of the change in the investment situation in inter-Atlantic relations. Without going back too far in history, we might recall that, prior to World War I, the United States was a field for the application of massive West European investments. Then the tendency changed, and over the course of approximately 70 years the United States was the largest investor, and Western European became America's debtor. And now, in the mid-1990's, a new turn is occurring. Capital is rushing from a Western Europe that is staggering from economic stagnation, and moving in a transatlantic direction, contributing to the growth not of its own economy, but the American one.

There has been an exceptionally important change in the investment climate of the West: the United States has

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changed over from the position of the main world investor to the position of the largest debtor. For the first time since 1914, the United States has proven to be more in debt to foreigners than they are to the United States. And that occurred largely because of the change in the role of Western Europe; it ceased to be a powerful magnet for transnational corporations of American origin, and at the same time Europe directed the funds from its own TNK [transnational corporations] into the American market. This is obvious evidence of the weakening of the West European economy, which, during the post-1973 period that has been so complicated for the West, lost its incentive for development to a greater degree than the Japanese and American economies did.

The third factor of West European weakness is the unprecedented unemployment during the postwar period. The increase in unemployment has been occurring against a background of an overall change in the ratio of manpower in favor of the United States. In 1970 the YeES had 20 million more jobs than the United States did, but during the years that have passed Europe has not been creating, but losing jobs.

In 1993 unemployment in the EU was 11.5 percent; in the United States, 7 percent; and in Japan, 2.5 percent. During a three-year period (1991-1993) Western Europe eliminated all those jobs that it had created during the relatively favorable years of 1985-1990. Researchers assume that what lies ahead for Western Europe are three to five years of serious reorganizing of the domestic economic structure, the resolution of the problem of the high cost of manpower, the large deficits in the national budgets, and payment for German unification. They do not expect a return of high growth rates until at least 1995.

These economic results in Western Europe during the 1990's gave justification for rather pessimistic forecasts. The organizing of economic cooperation and development predetermined that, with the preservation of the current tendencies, Western Europe will increasingly become a supplier of food products, raw materials, and commodities from the traditional branches of the processing industry for other regions of the world.

In the United States this weakening of the West European region has taken away the arguments of those who, for 40 years in a row, have been asserting that Western Europe is the largest concentration of economic resources, and that the United States, if it does not want to lose the key to world might, must control that tremendous force. An increasingly large number of American experts note that, as Western Europe increasingly reveals its small ability to compete with the United States and Japan, the East European market will acquire growing attractiveness for Western Europe. Because it is precisely here that the commodities that have been rejected in the American and Japanese market will be accepted eagerly and gratefully. That will lead to a kind of rejection by the EU of its global claims, and its locking onto a comparatively second-rate market.

The relative weakening of Europe (against a background of the relative successes of Southeast Asia) has struck a blow at the ideology of Atlantism.

**Factors Against Atlantism**

Opponents of the Atlantic priority in U.S. foreign policy make their conclusions from the economic lag that has occurred in Western Europe, and emphasize the importance of the following factors.

The first factor is the difference in the geostrategic position of the continental United States, which is protected by oceans, and Western Europe, which is situated on a promontory of Eurasia. One can speak here not so much about strategic vulnerability, as about the state of being provided with resources. The United States and Europe are changing their understanding of the degree of foreign threat. In both regions there exists a difference for such macroproblems as the level of reserves of raw materials for energy purposes that are located within the confines of reach for the West. S. Cohen, a professor at Princeton University, considers it to be impossible to create a West European superpower in view of the lack of territorial depth (Western Europe geographically is still a small promontory of Eurasia), and that "could be corrected" only in the event of including North Africa in the West European center[16].

The Europeans, on their part, for the first time in many decades are aware of a new kind of geopolitical reality—they all live on a small peninsula of Eurasia and are obliged to find a definite degree of mutual understanding among themselves. America is becoming less critically important, and its importance in the future will decrease even more. Europe today is not an arena for competition between the two superpowers. It is a densely populated territory of 40 countries that are doomed, by geography and history, to live next to one another.

In Europe many are already convinced of the irreversibility of the close union between Europe and America. D. Pinto, former editor in chief of the PAN-EUROPEAN REVIEW, assumes that the "mutual distancing of Europe and America will continue even in the event of the most pessimistic scenario of yet another European catastrophe, that has been engendered by the nationalistic whirlwind in Eastern Europe; in this instance, both halves of Europe will be so engaged with the resolution of this problem that the question of inter-Atlantic relations will prove to be absolutely peripheral. In any case the monolithic blocs both in the East and in the West have ceased their existence"[17].

The second factor touches upon the membership in the Atlantic bloc. That bloc is becoming a key one. What the Americans really fear is that "the disappearing military threat in the East will destroy the traditional military foundation of NATO, and the internal political requirements of disarmament will lead the joint military programs to an insignificant level"[18].

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The allies are beginning to express doubts. F. Segan, chairman of the French National Assembly, thinks that "NATO has already outlived itself. The separation of America has begun—the number of American troops deployed in Europe is being reduced to approximately 100,000 persons. In the final analysis American public opinion will demand the return of the soldiers to their homeland and the leaving of Europe to itself. Europe must grow up sufficiently to be able to worry about its own security"[19]. In Treverton's opinion, NATO no longer will be able to serve as the keystone of American policy in Europe"[20].

As a result, beginning with President Bush, America has been leaving Europe. In September 1991 Mr. Bush proclaimed there sharp reductions in American nuclear arms. With the consent of NATO, the United States will destroy all its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Instead of the current 3500 nuclear warheads, there will remain a few hundred nuclear bombs that can be delivered by aviation. Then there followed the decision to reduce the conventional armed forces. President Clinton has set a limit of 100,000 American military personnel in Europe.

Other questions that are taking on increasing importance are: does the deployment in Europe of even a considerably reduced contingent (up to 100,000) of American soldiers correspond to American interests? The old arguments that American divisions are "dissuading" the East from seizing the region have already loss their meaning.

Taking into consideration the deficit in the U.S. payment balance, many American political experts come to the conclusion that the "excess tension" in Europe is not dictated by genuine American interests. Where should one begin the reduction of the excessive regional pledges? Well, of course, with the sectors and regions that have their own material bases for strengthening the combined might of the West, and primarily with Western Europe. Apart from everything else, there the allies have lost the previous loyalty and, by taking advantage of American aid and support, they are pursuing their own selfish national goals.

Also, in the United States notice has been taken of the exceptionally high cost of maintaining the contingent of American troops in Europe. Every serviceman costs the United States almost $150,000 a year, at a time when the amount of money spent per serviceman in the French Army is approximately $80,000; a soldier in the West German army, approximately $60,000; and in the English army, $50,000. This difference has caused debates with regard to what the Americans consider to be an unjust share of the military expenses. In the 1992 fiscal year, the United States spent 6.5 percent of the VNP [gross national product] for military purposes; England, 5.4; France, 4.2; and West Germany, 3.4 percent. Those computations accompany the search for means to reduce the deficit in the federal budget and to reduce the colossal U.S. state debt. One would scarcely think it desirable to rely on the sense of history in the American political real-life situation. The dominant motif in the present-day United States is to restore the domestic base of American might, and to strengthen the American economic base. And that motif has begun to oppose the strategy of maintaining NATO. The tendency began to manifest itself even before the arrival of President Clinton in the White House. As early as February 1992, in the main NATO forums, the West Europeans directed attention to the new link between the NATO pledges and the requirements of the economic concessions that manifested themselves clearly in the position of the American delegations[21]. It was then, in the summer of 1992, that there arose in the United States a powerful campaign for the more extensive reduction of American troops in Europe.

American critics are a long way from simply predicting the rapid union of the two halves of Europe after the end of the Cold War. But the broad historical tendency that contains within itself such factors as the settlement of the intra-German relations, the definite lack of desire of Western Europe to support the United States in the developing countries (we might recall the position of Italy in Somali), the economic contradictions, the striving of the West European companies to participate in the Eastern markets, etc., objectively leads to the gradual disconnection of two lines in the North Atlantic union. At such time the West European line is taking on a self-sufficient nature; attempts to correct that line verbally are naive; and the following of that line is dangerous.

In the United States it is not precluded that one or several countries (primarily Greece, Spain, or Turkey) will decide to prohibit the United States from using their military bases. Properly speaking, Spain and Greece have already taken that path, and Turkey, in the light of the events in Bosnia, is close to doing so. One cannot exclude the substantial reduction of military expenses by several major West European countries. Something else that is probable is the ban on the use of their air space in the event of a crisis in the Balkans, in the Middle East, or in the Persian Gulf area. As a result of these processes, "imperfections" in NATO have been revealed. The evaluation of the importance of the North Atlantic alliance in the United States has changed in the mind of even its staunchest supporters. Whereas, during the first decades, the rationality of the existence of NATO was explained by the "Eastern threat," currently complete disorder reigns concerning this question.

Currently it is secretly, as well as openly, recognized that in many relations NATO, as a military alliance existing out of necessity, has outlived its political usefulness, and that Washington's increased activity in the NATO sector means only the drainage of American resources, that activity does not strengthen the overall positions of the United States in the world, and weakens the United States proper as a center of power. The policy of relying upon Europe, and of superinvolvement in European

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affairs, should be considered tribute to long-established tradition, a victim of inertia, and the result of lobbyism and the American capital that is linked with Europe. The NATO bloc, essentially speaking, is only an obstacle for the more efficient and effective application of American power in the world.

One cannot preclude the possibility that within the next few years such organizations as the European Commission, the Council of Europe, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will become more important for Europe than NATO is.

"It has become absolutely clear," G. Treverton asserts, "that NATO has not been coping with the problems of Europe's security, with explosions such as those that are occurring in Yugoslavia. And it is just as clear that NATO in its present-day form cannot serve as a basis for implementing America's role in Europe as it had for the past 40 years"[22].

At the same time in the United States there is an especially negative attitude toward Western Europe's own military construction. When, in the spring of 1991, the Europeans attempted to increase the role of the West European Union (by inviting into it Denmark and Greece), Washington sent Brussels a note the sense of which lay in the fact that Western Europe should not do anything that could weaken NATO. The Americans already do not like the fact that the ZES [West European Union] could make decisions in the military area on its own, independent of the United States. They are afraid of being drawn into the conflicts that the new Western Europe might begin on its own initiative. And the fact that President Bush, on the eve of the Maastricht summit meeting of the EU leaders, defined the West European Union as a European buttress of NATO definitely did not please everyone in the United States.

In Treverton's opinion, "the fulcrum in American policy must be the rejection of ambivalence with respect to West Europe's own military construction. They will start moving along their own path anyway"[23]to attempt to preserve NATO, but to recognize disintegration as the objective course of historic development.

Already the Persian Gulf War demonstrated that there exists a financial limit to the scope of American actions on the world scene. If the United States could not act there by relying on its own efforts, then that designated its limit. It is at that point that the sunset of the superpower begins. And if it is necessary to "share the burden," then it is also necessary to share the controlling world functions. Until when is Europe supposed to send its soldiers to the other end of the world without any guarantees of controlling their fate? The Italian prime minister called such actions "taxation without representation," recalling the reasons why, in their day, the thirteen North American colonies broke away from the British crown.

The United States can no loner hope that the Europeans will readily agree to keep on this soil an American mobile contingent that is ready to rush to any crisis spot. What if the U.S. position at such time does not coincide with Europe's interests?

It is reasonable to assume that the U.S. idea of security will differ considerably from the European one. Brussels foresees riots on the part of the East European nationalists, and how, in this instance, can the Americans help? Problems will arise in the European capitals as a consequence of the emigration from North Africa and Eastern Europe. How can the United States help there? The problems of Europe's security will have less and less to do with the United States. For the EU, giobal self-determination means, essentially speaking, the separation of the European position from the American one. But it is practically inevitable that every desire by Washington to prevent that self-determination will be perceived as an attempt to undermine West European growth.

The third factor is based on the growth of the independence of Western Europe on the international scene.

In Europe's economy and in its internal cultural ties much is occurring that has nothing to do with America. Russia is finding a friend in Turkey. Scandinavia is becoming closer to the Baltic countries. Germany and Austria are unusually popular in the two northern republics of former Yugoslavia. What does all of this have to do with America? Geography celebrates the triumph over ideology. Even the return of the emigres from the United States and Canada to Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine does not serve at all the creation of new ties, but is, as it were, the restoration of a natural condition.

The growth of a West European center will make much more difficult the finding of unity in the alliance, Pond assumes. "It will be much more difficult to restrain a strengthened Western Europe at the beginning of the next century, when the ECU will inevitably replace the dollar as the chief worldwide reserve currency, and when the United States will no longer be able to impose new 'taxes' on the European holders of dollars by means of inflating it"[24]. That tribute to realism encourages deeper reflections on the future of the West European policy of the United States. A simplified picture of the world leads to errors and contradictions, and that had an effect, in particular, on the approach to Yugoslavia in 1992-1994.

This is not only a matter of the separatism of the YeES—the Americans have been noting the slowing down of the process of the integration of the European Union. Disappointed with the EU, such a leader of it as West Germany might start taking a separate course. The separation of Western Europe makes possible various unexpected turns, each of which (by virtue of the exclusive activation and participation of the United States) contains danger for them.

In the past two decades differences have been discerned in the perception of the basic world events. They also

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existed previously (for example, the attitude toward the KPR [Chinese People's Republic] in the 1950's and 1960's), but were not revealed until after the end of the Cold War. When the West European metropolitan centers cast away their liberated colonies, the United States attempted to assume the task of controlling those regions. There occurred a noticeable shifting and regionalization of the interests of Western Europe, which had gone deeper into its own regional integration, and simultaneously the globalization of the interests of the United States, which had taken over, in such regions as the Near East, the previous functions of the West Europeans. Among the United States and its West European allies, there arose diverging perspectives with regard to questions of transferring technology, the structure of accounting rates, and trade policy, and contradictions in foreign policy, for example, with respect to the former Yugoslavia.

What is becoming an increasingly obvious rule is the fact that the Americans do not have any more rights to invade European affairs than the Europeans have to invade American ones.

In Europe all the vitally important questions are linked with the political-economic (rather than military) sphere and are referred to the Brussels agencies of the European Union, where the United States (unlike NATO) does not have the voting right. Thus the United States is increasingly becoming a witness to, rather than a participant in, the events. Washington's attempt to bring its positions closer to those of Brussels is perceived by Europeans as a hidden maneuver to obtain the controlling positions in the overall European agencies, as an encroachment upon the fully empowered representation in the central European headquarters. President Bush's agreement concerning semiannual meetings with the President of the European Council was perceived in Europe as an attempt by Washington to return to the previous positions of domination. But if the American undertake "valid" actions with respect to the EU as a new economic superpower, that will inevitably limit the sphere of freedom of actions for the United States on the world scene, and that is something that the United States is definitely not accustomed to.

THE NEW REPUBLIC magazine suggests that American policy must be changed, that it is necessary "to depart from the policy of unconditional support of (West European) integration in favor of creating an open European market and those defense structures that are closely linked with the United States. This can mean the attempt to undermine the Franco-German axis within the EU, which supports agricultural protectionism and acts against the inclusion in the EU of the new East European democracies. So be it. The calm state of relations between the United States and the EU has ended"[25].

The growing contradiction between the economic interests of the EU and the NATO military obligations of most of members of the union is a reality of our times. Moreover: the European Union to a considerable degree has already opposed itself to the United States in the world economy.

The Americans note the danger of the increasingly powerful ideology of industrial autarchy in Western Europe, and the intentions to strengthen the West European economic positions: the creation of an independent air-space industry, the production of computers, and the development of a military industry and advanced technology. The United States is coming to the conclusion that relying upon the West European region promotes the growth of competitors (economic and, possibly, also political).

The fourth factor is the difference in the approach to the developing countries and to Eastern Europe. We might recall that Western Europe sells the developing countries 60 percent more commodities than the United States does, and buys 73 percent more. The West European investments in the third world have caught up with and surpassed the American ones. The EU is obviously attempting to occupy a special place in the third world, and its line in it is not always parallel to the American one. D. Walker notes the arrogance of the Europeans "who compare the life-giving force of their continent with the decline of America not only as a world power, but also as an attractive example for imitation"[26].It is obvious that the West European countries have developed their own approach to ties with Eastern Europe, the Arab world, and the African continent.

The new countries are showing interest in German federalism, the French presidential system, British parliamentarism, and Scandinavian social democracy. For the first time, all of Europe is less interested in Jefferson and Lincoln, representatives of a different cultural and political milieu. The era when the future political leaders of Europe obtained (or completed) their education in American universities is becoming a thing of the past. Free elections, a free press, an independent court system, and a system of constitutional checks and balances are currently viewed in Europe as part of European political culture, rather than as some kind of borrowing from America.

The fifth factor lies in the fact that individual countries in Western Europe are creating their own powerful military-industrial base. The major West European countries are refusing to be simple consumers of Americana weapons. Hypothetically the problem could have been resolved by setting up a genuinely bilateral movement (it is proposed, for example, to sell the West Europeans F-15 and F-16 aircraft, and to buy MPKA and Alpha-Jet aircraft from them). But, practically speaking, this is not happening: he Pentagon does not agree to buy other people's technology. In this area the potential for separation by the end of the twentieth century is increasing. As it retreats in the economic sphere, Western Europe is building up its own power in

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the area of military strategy. We have in mind the development of the strategic forces of England and France. For some period of time those forces were in a static conditio, and development here occurred gradually. However, during the past decade the military-strategic might of the two countries has increased, and that made it possible for certain American specialists to talk about the arising of a "third superpower."

There has been talk of a program for modernizing the strategic forces, which will cost France $30 billion, and England approximately $20 billion. From a level of approximately 300 warheads, that can be launched by ground- and sea-based missiles, England and France will reach, by the mid-1990's, a level of no less than 1200 strategic nuclear warheads. In the 1990's the British fleet of atomic submarines is installing on four British-built Chevalin submarines a Trident-II missile system that was purchased from the Americans. The number of warheads is increasing by a factor of 4-5; the range is doubling; there is an increase in precision; and the areas that are patrolled by these ships are expanding.

France is replacing its 18 fixed strategic missiles with single warheads by new mobile CM mobile missiles with MIRVed warheads. Seven atomic submarines are being equipped with M-4 missiles, each with six warheads, and this will enable them to deploy at sea 592 strategic warheads, that can be launched from a more remote distance and that reach their targets more rapidly and are less vulnerable. The French air forces are taking on as standard equipment the new Mirage-2000-H strategic bomber. As a result of this growth of strategic potential, Western Europe will soon possess a considerably more powerful nuclear triad, and this is under conditions when the United States and Russia are reducing their strategic potentials.

The sixth factor: among specialists there is becoming an increasingly strong conviction that the constantly growing force on the international scene will be nationalism, which might become an obstacle in implementing closer Atlantic unity. The nationalism that was muffled by the bipolar world is again becoming a very influential force in international relations.

Historian D. Fromkin is convinced that "the process of fragmentarization of European society demonstrates how the conflict will develop between nations that are living next to one another; between the majority and the minority; between the local and brought-in manpower; and between neighboring countries. If this process continues, it will most likely lead to the formation of unions among the local forces that are threatened by a common enemy: the multiplication of factors in the power balances. These balances will be unstable, inasmuch as their changes are unpredictable and too complicated, because their numerous participants will prove to be drawn into several games... The time of troubles will come, and there will arise a need for unifiers who are capable of turning the forces of history: an Alexander or a Muhammed." In Europe there will arise a choice between a European Germany or a German Europe"[27].

For anxious Americans the chief question is, what kind of structure predominates in Europe—the idea of a "single European house," which idea is based on the Helsinki Process, or the idea of an "Atlantic house" that is built on the foundation of a renewed NATO? If the NATO military structure is abolished, what will replace it? Sooner or later new threats to security will arise, and the lack of the previous guaranteed system may have the most serious effect.

**Divergence of Regions**

The turning of Washington inward appears to be inevitable. No strategy will prove to be effective if the American president, like his Japanese and West European partners, is unable to consolidate the entrepreneurs, workers, consumers, and public opinion to achieve the new social understanding that every group of the population must make its own contribution and must make its own sacrifice for the sake of improving the level of accumulation, increasing the investments and labor productivity, guaranteeing quality control, and raising the educational level in the name of winning the technological engagements with the Japanese and West European rivals.

American protectionism is on the ascendancy, and the first to feel it (alongside of Japan) will be Europe. The requirement to reduce agricultural subsidies to the EU will be increasingly perceived as a manifestation of selfish, imperial thinking.

It is logical to assume that the branches of American companies in Europe will encroach on a share of the $500 billion of governmental contracts that are issued annually in Europe. At the same time it is difficult to imagine that the European governments, when issuing these production orders, will ignore their favorites and give a share to the Americans. The conversion of the EU by the end of the century into a single currency union will raise the question of which of the currencies—the ECU or the dollar—is the world's chief reserve currency.

Proceeding from the factors and hypotheses, critics of the Atlantic turn being taken by American policy conclude that the geopolitical interests of the United States would be more greatly promoted not by the current military-political guardianship of the European region, but by a definite "liberation" from the European pledges, the weakening of the dependency upon the "grimaces" of European evolution. Under the influence of what has been occurring in the 1990's there has formed an incomparably more "carefully weighed" attitude toward the importance of Western Europe to the United States.

The Atlantists and their imitators are gradually losing the exclusive positions that used to belong to them in the U.S. political scene and in American political science. It

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would be an exaggeration to depict this process as a massive turning away from Europe, as the simple renunciation of the solid political, economic, and military ties with the West European region. But it is necessary to indicate the considerable turning point in the U.S. ruling elite in their view of America's place in the world of the future. Previously the pro-Atlantic strategists saw it in the creation of an "Atlantic Community"—the first stage in all the other combinations. Currently the very question of institutionalizing the ties with Western Europe has been practically dismissed and, among the alternative versions of development until the year 2000 (and beyond), there is a telling lack of any that would propose a certain kind of North Atlantic state principle. Those who are planning the U.S. foreign-policy course see a rather large number of different paths ahead of them, but not this one—it has lost its attractiveness.

In the final analysis, NATO apparently will still continue to exist for a certain period of time, but the loss of a common goal, the asymmetry in the bloc, and the disunification of the interests will lead to the further weakening of the attractiveness that the West European region has as a U. S. global ally.

Three scenarios for future U.S. policy in the West European sector appear to be most probable.

The first presupposes the continuation of the role in NATO. The psychological incentives here are understandable. The United States is accustomed to leadership in the bloc, and inertia and the attraction to the familiar is leading the United States along a well-trodden path. The Clinton administration, willingly or unwillingly, has started along that path. But the emphasis on large-scale crisis reaction has led to a contradiction with the task of settlement (for example, in former Yugoslavia). The failure in assimilating the new role, in preserving an alliance without an enemy and without a definite goal, makes it possible to say that the military alliance that was created by the Cold War has not adapted to the new appeals of European security. That is what largely explains the lack of desire by the West Europeans to follow behind the United States. This, then, makes the United States less of a participant in determining the European future. Even such a conservative senator as S. Nunn currently considers it to be necessary to reduce the American contingent in Europe to 75,000 servicemen. The Clinton administration has stopped, for the time being, at 100,000 American military.

The second scenario presupposes the rejection of the efforts to play a considerably more modest role in NATO, and the Europeans will rise to the NATO command Olympus. An honest broker, rather than a leader, Washington helps its allies, but does not lead them. At least that is not isolationism, but it is no longer hegemony in the block.

"By demonstrating caution and the necessary art," the political experts from the University of Pittsburg write, "the Clinton administration can maintain cooperation with a Western Europe that will defend its short-term and long-term interests, without at such time putting too heavy a burden on the American economy"[28].

But this kind of role—the role of an "equal"—is traditionally difficult for the United States.

The third scenario is that the United States leaves the European system and occupies what is to a definite degree a confrontational position. It demonstrates the customary approach taken by pioneers, the rapid adaptation to the new circumstances. If there is no enemy and no threat, the country retreats to its shores. Those who are in favor of the first-priority turning toward domestic needs will heartily applaud this. Europe and Japan will be seen primarily as rivals, and then as partners. America (according to the proponents of this approach) needs a summons, without which a pluralistic society is ineffective. The result will be "aggressive mercantilism." Psychologically this is a very probable course. If the EU and Japan do not need the United States to guarantee their security, then the United States does not need them for economic growth.

When it came to power, the Clinton administration attempted to reinforce the technological supremacy over Western Europe, and that was promoted by massive investments into research and technology. President Clinton presented this task to the nation on 22 February 1993. Currently the level of aid to research in the United States is higher than in the West European countries.

The tragedy may lie in the fact that "Atlantis" will be lost, and the paradise of independence will not be found. Currently people in the United States are subjecting to skeptical analysis even the modest (from the point of view of attaining Atlantic leadership) trilateralistic scenarios for isolating, among the West European countries, the preferable partners or favorites. On the contrary, in the 1990's the Americans, it would appear, are reopening for themselves new sectors in world politics, new systems of regional priorities.

This is a very important factor. If the majority of the experts who are analyzing the future alternatives for the world configuration have currently practically refused to consider (as being unrealistic) the alternatives for rapprochement with Western Europe, this, first of all, means that the United States conceives of its future as being separate from the largest reservoir of economic and other might—the West European region; secondly, this turn of events means the reviving of the previous competing schemes (continental alliance with the confines of North America; the unity of the Western Hemisphere; etc.) and coming out ahead of the new alternatives for economic and political development in an alliance with the rapidly growing Pacific Ocean region.

According to an evaluation that is "centrist" for present-day American political experts, the West European region is given an importance that vacillates, with regard to individual indicators, to "importance that affects the

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basic interests of the United States. The "survival" of the United States is not mentioned as being dependent upon that region, as used to be situation during the first 20 postwar years.

Clinton and his political entourage came to power by opening criticizing the concentration of the Bush administration on foreign policy, which, in their opinion, acted to the detriment of the inner strength of the United States. Clinton's coming to power became a blow at the northeastern establishment with its traditional Atlantism and faith that it is absolutely necessary for the United States to proceed in its foreign policy from interests held in common with Western Europe. To a definite degree Clinton has shifted the balance. For him the only thing that has become absolute is America's faith in itself. America's overseas allies, however, have become a partner that is valuable, but that is too frequently contradictory and vacillating. Clinton and his entourage consider the position of Western Europe in the course of the U.S. war in the Persian Gulf, and in the process of developing a policy with respect to the East European countries and the developing countries, to be a position that does not coincide in certain aspects with the interests of the United States.

**Footnotes**

[Footnotes 1-12 are in the omitted passage.].

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19. DER SPIEGEL, 24 February 1994, p. 31.

20. Treverton, G., *Op. cit.*, p. 110.

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26. Walker, D., *Op. cit.*, pp. 128-129.

27. Fromkin, D., "The Coming Millennium. World Politics in the Twenty-First Century," WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Spring 1993, p. 3.

28. Williams, Ph., Hammond, P., Brenner, M., "Atlantis Lost, Paradise Regained? The United States and Western Europe After the Cold War," INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, January 1993, p. 17.

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## Political Issues

### *Yeltsin's State of Union Speech Analyzed

*954F1715A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 8, 24 Feb-2 Mar 95 p 3*

[Article by Stepan Kiselev, MN deputy editor-in-chief: "Elections in Doubt as Yeltsin Government Lurches"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In his annual message to the Federal Assembly, Boris Yeltsin promised regular presidential elections in 15 months. Today, according to sociologists, 72 percent of voters do not trust him.

Boris Yeltsin, according to his press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov, has said that he is not going to run for a second term. This decision, as expressed by Kostikov, gives the president "a free hand to maneuver and enables him not to think about his rating."

The president's decision not to run in the elections is well known. It was new on June 4, 1992, when the communique of the presidential press center, circulated by the ITAR-TASS news agency, was quoted by practically all mass communication media. Much has changed since then.

#### Bankruptcy

In the past two years President Boris Yeltsin really has had a rather "free hand in maneuvering" and has indeed "not bothered about his rating." In 1991, starting with an excellent capital base of public support, Boris Yeltsin has wasted it like a playboy who has squandered his unexpected inheritance.

In November 1992 the president "surrendered" Gaidar (Yeltsin's rating shrank to 33 percent), a year later he dismissed the Russian parliament with tanks (fell to 2[illegible] percent), conducted the Berlin brass band (22 percent), "over-slept" and missed a meeting with the Irish prime minister (18 percent) and, lastly, reduced the capital of Chechnya to ruins, having slandered the Russian press in the process (8 percent). According to all democratic yardsticks, Yeltsin today is politically bankrupt, and his creditors are preparing to present the unpaid promissory notes: according to polls, as many as 72 percent of Russian voters do not trust the president.

Yeltsin's scorn for public opinion, which hardly means anything in regular politics but becomes a crucial factor during election campaigns, may be explained by three reasons:

1. The president has given up his political future as a bad job and does not indeed intend to run for re-election;

2. The president has given up his reputation as a democrat as a bad job and intends to become a Kremlin occupant for a long time to come without any elections whatsoever.

3. And, lastly, the president is absolutely confident in the finesse of his courtiers who are capable of so masterminding and conducting the presidential elections that his victory will be a foregone conclusion.

To answer the question of which of these explanations is correct and, accordingly, how events will unfold before June 1996, one needs to remember one specific feature of democracy, that political system to which the president has always vowed his allegiance.

#### Continuity

It is not at all accidental that in his annual message to the Federal Assembly, Yeltsin noted the need for continuity. Indeed, in an era of instability and nascent statehood, it is the continuity of authority at its upper echelons alone that may guarantee the respectable consistency of Russian politics. But the whole trouble is that the democratic procedure of elections is exactly what does not guarantee this very continuity. In this one can see the weakness of democracy—as history prompts us, fascists may come to replace liberals. But therein also lies its strength—the periodic rotation of authorities, as evidenced by the same history, protects the state and society against decay.

What did the present [sic] mean when he spoke about the continuity of authority? It may be presumed he meant the fidelity of Russia's would-be rulers to the political course which has been shaped in 1991-96. However, many analysts have already noted on repeated occasions that no clearly formulated political and economic course along which Yeltsin is leading the country exists. Moreover, a political suicide alone could come to democratic elections with a promise "faithfully to follow the cause of Boris Nikolayevich" and keep alive the existing order of things.

Therefore lurking behind Yeltsin's words about the continuity of authority was most likely not a concern for "fidelity to the course," but alarm over the safety of the ruling elite and the inviolability of its interests. There is every reason to draw this conclusion.

#### Sacrifice

Representatives from the top echelon of authority, after their political career ends, often happen to find themselves on the dock. Or even on the scaffold. To prove this point, let's not talk about Ceausescu, Zhivkov and Honecker, let me just cite the closest analogy. Almost immediately after Leonid Kuchma replaced Leonid Kravchuk as president, Ukraine's former Prime Minister Yefim Zvyagilsky was stripped of parliamentary immunity and charged with corruption. Everyone believes the ex-premier will land behind bars.

If a ruler not connected in any way with the existing regime comes to the Kremlin, Russia will not be insured against this kind of event either. Several politicians, who for one or another reason have severed with the ruling elite, have already violated the vow of silence and hinted

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to society what kind of morals prevails in the corridors of Russian power. The president's former press secretary Pavel Voshchanov, the former procurator general Alexei Kazannik, the former ministers Nikolai Fyodorov, Sergei Glazyev, Ella Pamfilova and Boris Fyodorov, and the former vice-president Alexander Rutskoi have with a different degree of openness and for different reasons testified to the regime's self-interest bordering on crime. Society has already long (and evidently not without a reason) been suspecting the Russian authorities of corruption, and if these suspicions are well-founded, even if to the slightest degree, the authorities will in no case permit a "sharp change of the course."

"What Russia needs is not elections, but stability," Vladimir Shumeiko, speaker of the upper chamber of parliament, said a mere three days after the president had promised to hold elections in keeping with the Constitution. Shumeiko's personal reasons are apparent: if the voters say "no" to the ruling elite, it is not ruled out that he will again have to prove that he was not involved in a number of shady deals.

**Succession to the Throne**

Incidentally, corruption is not the most pressing problem among those which have confronted the authorities with the need for "continuity." Graft is a case which is hard to prove, all the more so since all the compromising materials may disappear during the "change in course."

The problem has been aggravated by the Chechen war. It may be followed by a "Chechen tribunal," and rather serious charges may be brought against all the architects of the Caucasian war. This kind of plot in history can only be avoided one way—by preventing the advent of an "alien" to power and employing all means to ensure victory at the elections for a politician who will take over all the sins of the present-day ruling elite and all of its commitments. But this will no longer be the "continuity of power" in the democratic meaning of this term. This will be succession to the throne where the crown prince, linked by blood and property to the now-ruling elite, will ensure after his coronation fidelity to the latter, not to an abstract "course."

However, Yeltsin's tragedy consists in the fact that he has not been able to prepare a crown prince during the time of his presidency. For some time this role could be claimed by Yegor Gaidar, who is popular among the intelligentsia, who has for a long time vowed his fidelity to the president and who "for the sake of saving Russia" has failed to notice putrid spots on the body of the regime. And it is the rivers of blood in Chechnya alone that have made Gaidar regain his eyesight. So the role of crown prince is now vacant. It has been rumored that it is being claimed by Sergei Shakhrai, Andrei Kozyrev and Vladimir Shumeiko. However, at the democratic elections when the electors will take account of the candidate's part in the Chechen war, their chances will be slight.

And still the elite has not grown so strong in the past four years to defy the opposition's ambitions and ignore world public opinion, so that there will still be a need to hold presidential elections.

**Return**

Thus, the problem which will confront the authorities in the next 15 months may be formulated as follows: to carry out elections, but not to give the electors the right to make a choice. Not to repeat the mistakes made by their Communist predecessors who in 1989 and 1991 were unable to assure "continuity" and permitted aliens to get hold of the levers of controlling the country. This task is very complicated and can be fulfilled with the observance of the apparent rules of propriety.

The State Duma has already passed in the first reading the draft law on the election of the president. That is, the draft law which was written by Yeltsin's lawyers and in his favor. Or in favor of the candidate who will ensure the "continuity" of authority, and it is not so important whether it is going to be Yeltsin himself or anyone else. In any case the draft law's demand on the collection of two million signatures in support for the presidential nominee, if it becomes a norm of the law, will be an insurmountable barrier in the way of any independent candidate. If, however, this norm has not been signed into law by the State Duma, the regime has in the reserve a new system of electronic elections about which the newspaper *Izvestia* wrote recently. Controlled by special services, this system, as experts assert, is not protected against likely riggings, and the elections held with its help will turn into a shell game in which, as everyone knows, victory always goes to whoever manipulates the balls.

We are returning into the past. For 70 years Soviet citizens used to go to the polls from time to time to cast their ballots for the most stable political system. One day the system failed and the continuity of power was disrupted. Now the lessons have been drawn, and work on errors has been done.

## Need To Join Council of Europe Questioned

*954F1716A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 8, 24 Feb-2 Mar 95 p 5*

[Article by Alexander Pikayev, political scientist, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences: "Russian Rebuffed by Council"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Council of Europe's (CE) decision to delay the Russia's introduction into the organization caused different responses in Russia. *MN* presents an opinion that is not shared by the editorial staff but that meets the views of a considerable part of the country's political elite.

Although the CE's decision to delay admission of Russia to this organization has caused some disappointment, on the whole Moscow has faced it rather calmly. However,

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almost at the same time another event occurred in Strasbourg, one that really might affect Russia's attitude toward the CE and international organizations in general.

The official admission of Latvia to the CE gives Russia occasion to change its position toward this organization.

The Council's welcome for Latvia occurred simultaneously with approval in the former Soviet republic of the law on citizenship. As is known, the law envisages immediate naturalization of natives of the Baltic republics. The overwhelming majority of 750,000 Russian-speaking non-citizens are, therefore, virtually deprived of any chances to enjoy full rights of a Latvian citizen in this century. How does this correspond to what the CE says about its human rights priorities?

The CE's decision inflicts a hard blow to the delicate stability in the Baltic region. The decision might well be understood as encouragement for a national policy which most probably will increase discrimination against the Russian minority. I can remind readers of a precedent: after Estonia was "admitted to Europe" it also passed amendments to the law on citizenship infringing upon the rights of the Russian population.

Consequently, the hopes of Baltic Russians that Estonia's and Latvia's desire to join the commonwealth of Western countries would establish high European standards in this part of the continent have been dashed. Likewise Russia's hopes have been dashed that the CE would help influence the Baltic countries. On the contrary, the atmosphere of relations between Moscow and the states in the region considerably worsened after their admission to Europe had given the new Europeans occasion to speak on violation of human rights in a semi-Asian Russia.

The errors committed by the Russian authorities during preparations for admission to the Council are also the reasons for a new failure in foreign policy. First of all, it is not clear why Russia is so interested in this admission.

Many Russian human rights campaigners are used to applying to the West and they still sincerely believe that international institutions rely on democratic values in their activities. The admission of Estonia and Latvia, as well as a prospective acceptance by the Council of Croatia and Moldavia indicates that in reality these organizations also have other motives. Certain countries use international organizations to strengthen their influence and to protect their own interests. Perhaps Russia also has to have its political interests as top priority when it considers joining these organizations.

The CE is the largest European organization in which the United States does not take part and where many post-communist countries participate. This suggests a specific alignment of forces inside it. As the most influential power in the absence of the United States and Russia, Germany assumes a more and more active role in the organization. Bonn is apparently moving to use the Council to recreate its former sphere of influence in Central Europe. This depends upon the Scandinavian countries and Austria, which also have interests in the Baltic region and the Balkans. These countries take advantage of the emotional anti-Russian mood of East European politicians, who are striving to make up for decades of humiliation that East European states suffered when they formed a part of the Soviet bloc.

Maybe this is why the CE is more loyal to the prospective participants of the German sphere of influence than to those of Russia's?

Would admission of Russia change the balance of forces? Yes, to some extent. However, one should not hope for a considerable breakthrough. The CE was founded in 1949 by a group of West European countries owing to a community of cultural and civil values. This, however, did not prevent Turkey, where even now the situation with human rights is hardly better than in Russia, from joining the organization. In many respects the CE was created as an alternative to Soviet influence on the continent.

Even in case Russia is adopted, it will remain "under examination" owing to the Chechen crisis, as well as to other troubles with human rights which could take years to solve. Under the circumstances Moscow can hardly reckon that from inside the Council it could have drawn further attention to the problems of the Russian minority in the Baltic region. And Russia's membership in the Council could only attract Russia itself as well as the Russians in the Baltic states away from a search for more effective political methods of fighting for civil rights.

The admission of Russia would mean turning the organization into a truly European one. The question arises: is Russia interested in strengthening an organization with an obviously unfavorable balance of forces? Perhaps it would be better to stay outside the Council to make it remain the least influential union of European countries?

The CE is to some degree a failed organization. In the 1950s it failed to become a forum where economic and military-political questions could be discussed, making way for NATO and European Economic Community (EEC). Later it was forced to give up its original name—the European Council—when a body of the same name was created within the EEC. In the 1970s the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe little by little intercepted the initiative from the CE even in humanitarian field. Why should we interfere in the natural run of things?

### *Duma Approval of Unconstitutional Decree Examined

*954F1452 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 3*

[Article by Aleksey Kirpichnikov, under "Mass Media" rubric: "First Branch Takes Defense of Fourth From Second Away From Third: Mikhail Poltoranin Enters New Operating Space"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] As we know, the Russian Constitution imposes substantial limits on the representative branch, and specifically, the State Duma, to influence current policy. The lower chamber can adopt resolutions only on seven [as published] issues: the initiation of a president's impeachment, confidence in the government, the approval of an appointment to prime minister, the appointment and dismissal of a human rights commissioner or Tsentrobank, the appointment and dismissal of Accounting Chamber chairpeople, and the declaration of amnesty.

Of course, this situation does not suit the deputies at all, and they have come up with several methods to overcome their legislative impotency. The most visible of these is the adoption of amendments to the Constitution that would give the Federal Assembly the ability to control the executive branch in one or another area—military, informational, etc. Visibility, however, gives rise to a small probability of realization in these areas. Approval of such amendments requires a two-thirds vote in the lower chamber and three-fourths in the upper chamber; this is difficult to achieve. As far as the Federation Council is concerned—taking into consideration the number of senators coming to the capital from the regions—achieving this vote is practically impossible.

The other methods have to do with the fact that the "Yeltsin Constitution" was adopted, like most serious domestic decisions (except, specifically, Stalin's Constitution), in some haste. As a result, there are disjointed places in the carelessly bound armor of the articles of the Fundamental Law which evoke a natural desire to "press" through them with the sharpened chisel of any constitutionally legal decision.

The most famous awl was stuck into the so-called "Isakov's hole," named in honor of Vladimir Isakov, chairman of the Duma committee on legislature who discovered it at the very beginning. Professor Isakov found that the lower chamber can conduct one or another of its legal aspirations in the form of laws, the passage of which requires—with a hypothetical presidential veto—two-thirds of the members of both the Duma and the Federation Council. Here, the law has the right to regulate anything in the world, and of course once it is valid, it is mandatory for any government organ. It is understandable that parliament could not pull the covers over itself too openly—everyone still remembers the fate of the Supreme Soviet and the threat of being accused of violating the principle of the division of power, which, in fact, was not a matter of much concern or much of a burden for the "representatives," not to mention the "executives,"—at least until recently when the Constitutional Court began functioning.

Three days before its first assembly, the State Duma created one more precedent in the practice of overcoming its insufficient powers. Last Friday it adopted a resolution on a problem that has absolutely nothing to do with the seven subjects of its authority listed above: on observation of Article 29 of the Constitution—on freedom of thought and speech. It is noteworthy that the Duma's legal directorate, which in making recommendations usually does not stand in the way of the deputies' juridical exercises, this time insistently advised that they limit themselves to an announcement or an appeal, or merely take into consideration the document submitted to the legislators by the Committee on Informational Policy and Communications.

The lower chamber, however, made its own decision—largely thanks to the persistence of Committee Chairman Mikhail Poltoranin, who insisted on the high genre of a resolution, and not a rank and file appeal-declaration, not to mention some protocol note. This, of course, places the executive branch under no obligation whatsoever, although it does declare the fidelity of the Duma, its information committee, and its chairman to the defense of their fundamental freedoms as well as demonstrating the courses of action for the latter two in the near future.

The fact of the matter is that Mr. Poltoranin and his committee have fulfilled their minimum program for the Duma's development and adoption of four parts of the first information packet: amendments to the law on the mass media and to the laws on the treatment of state organs of government, on state support for the mass media and on television and radio broadcasting, which under the title "On Television Broadcasting and Radio Broadcasting" is in its third reading; that is, on the whole it was approved yesterday by the lower chamber and sent to the Federation Council (for details about the document, see SEGODNYA on January 26).

If it is rejected by the Federation Council or vetoed by the president, the Duma can still return to the last text of the "Poltoranin" packet, but then it will either ratify compromised versions of disputed points, or—again, taking into consideration the current disposition of forces in lower chamber—most likely will insist on its own text with a two-thirds vote.

Today, the fate of the other parts of the packet is this: the president has signed the law "On the Procedure for Treatment of the Activities of the Organs of State Government in the State Mass Media," the Federation Council has rejected the draft law "On State Support for the Mass Media and Film Publication," and the president has published two decrees that regulate privileges for journalists and the institution of state contracting, but they do not implement the National Foundation for the Development of the Mass Media that has been conceived of by deputies. Finally, the most important amendment to the law on the mass media, which forbids government organs from founding periodicals, is not functioning because two-thirds of the Duma members overruled the Federation Council but stumbled on the presidential veto. Sooner or later, the lower chamber will accumulate a two-thirds vote on this issue again (such an

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attempt was made on February 8, but due to the deputies' well-known lack of confidence after the death of their colleague, Sergey Skorochkin, it failed), but to receive the combination of votes necessary to overcome Boris Yeltsin's veto in the upper chamber, which has already come out against the idea once,—is impossible.

All the same, in executing its minimum program—the Duma's development and adoption of the texts for an entire informational packet—Mr. Poltoranin and his committee have reached a new operational space and, imbued with the almost absolute support of their colleagues, they have in mind new, much more ambitious, goals, a fact to which the unconstitutional resolution on observance of Article 29 of the Constitution testifies.

Its adoption was accompanied with a rather strategic commentary by Mr. Poltoranin. The committee chairman observed that the inequality of the various branches of government was a consequence of total inequality and the "cowboy principle—whoever gets it first," and that it could be entirely overcome only through approval of the appropriate amendments to the current Constitution, which, like the passage of all normative acts concerning the mass media, is extremely difficult.

Mr. Poltoranin noted today's tendencies in the subdepartmental sphere: the number of mass media sources is declining, and it is the independent media declining fastest Besides the aforementioned virtual impenetrability of the laws (but "penetrability!"—emphasized Mr. Poltoranin), the monopoly on power, displayed in various ways including a monopoly on paper, and the lack of a coordinated information policy for state organs interfere.

Mr. Poltoranin actually strengthened his concept of the basic principles for the currently lacking coordinated information policy in the Duma resolution on observation of Article 29. There are four of these principles: the preservation of a single information space (specifically, the "objective illumination" in the mass media of various political forces, including those in the representative organs of government), the creation of a legal base (including demonopolization and destatization), the creation of an economic base, and mechanisms for the legal regulation of relations between society, the state, and the mass media (broadening journalists' rights on the one hand and measures against "abuse of freedom of speech" on the other).

There are five points in the practical portion of the resolution, alone. Two of these—addressed to the president and the government—"advocate" accelerated development of the law "On the Right to Information" and the elimination of monopolization in the mass media in accordance with the statutes of Article 29 of the Constitution. The Duma (that is, the committee on information) uses another two points to instruct the committee (that is, itself) to develop effectively a normative base for raising the status of the local (rayon and city) press and the next new packet of information documents. This is the packet which, obviously, will assure that the committee can operate to the limits of deputy powers, and that must provide for the legal guarantees of compliance with freedom of thought and speech. Naturally, its content will be based on the four high principles set out earlier. Finally, the fifth point proposes that Artur Chilingarov, vice speaker, along with the Directorate for Presidential Affairs (sic!), resolve issues concerning financing the creation of the State Duma's television and radio complex.

In answering his colleagues' questions, Mr. Poltoranin was extremely critical of the actions of his non-Duma opponents, so in his words, in 1994, Sergey Filatov's and the presidential administration's ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI "gobbled up" 11.7 billion rubles with a subscription circulation of 73 thousand, while SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA took only 40 million, with 163 thousand subscribers. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, with municipal property on Pushkin Square at its disposal, is able to lease that out, and so on. Mr. Poltoranin noted that when it comes time for his committee to approve the budget, it will vote against all subsidies for newspapers because "they end up in the wrong hands, anyway," and that a law should be adopted on state support for the mass media.

The Duma's head of information policy has accused television and radio of lacking in reciprocal communications "between us and you and Russian society." In compliance with the only "Poltoranin" law on the illumination of state organs that bears the president's signature, television companies are obligated to air information about the work of deputies. Although the Duma members are themselves to blame to a certain degree for the bad job done by faction press secretaries, the basic tragedy lies in the fact that television and radio companies are shirking their duty.

So, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, manager of "Ostankino," at first agreed that the programs prepared by parliament should be broadcast but then didn't give them any air time. Mr. Poltoranin threatened that if the Duma did not receive its 15 minutes a day, then it would take 30 or 60, and generally strongly "ran over" the "architect of reconstruction" and the Federation Television and Radio Broadcast Service that he runs, which "practices banditry with its licenses" and, in the speaker's mind, should be replaced as soon as possible by a Federal Commission whose creation should be provided for by the law "On Television and Radio Broadcasting."

The Duma—and Mr. Poltoranin, to a somewhat lesser extent—also attacked the newly formed "Public Television," created some time "after a shot of liquor." Although the situation concerning the deputies' suspension of its starting time has not been approved (and it would be interesting to see the consequences of the only point of the unconstitutional resolution on compliance with the Constitution that "directs" the executive

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branch), it has all the same become clear that the Duma Council has already instructed the committees on property and information to examine the "taken" first channel.

In some contradiction to the oft-repeated theses that television and radio companies are ignoring the objective programs prepared in the bowels of the Duma about itself, Mr. Poltoranin stated that there is nobody to broadcast them because no special technical service has been created. Using this logic, the last point of the resolution becomes clear—on the financing of the lower' chamber's television and radio complex.

Viktor Cheremukhin, head of the Duma press center, told us about it. The complex will be located on the 12th floor of the building on Okhotnyi Ryad. Its total cost will be one-sixth of the Duma's annual budget for 1994 (178 billion rubles). All the savings gained at the expense of salaries for the lower chamber's apparatus will be directed toward the complex. Today, 80 percent of the supplies have already been paid for, and if the last two contracts for $2.5 million are paid, then the complex will begin operating on 1 April.

In the words of Mr. Cheremukhin, all of the planning was done by Duma specialists and was executed in record time—three months—and if it hadn't been for that, the complex would have cost the Duma's entire annual budget.

The question of the studio in the White House that is now being used by the government and occasionally leased out was touched upon. Its high cost makes it difficult for parliament to lease its former property: 1.5 million rubles for one minute of production and air time. True, Mr. Poltoranin has proposed taking not just 30-60 minutes away from Aleksandr Yakovlev, but taking his apparatus (but not the building) away from the government. With the prospect of his own complex's imminent opening, however, it was decided not to ignite yet another conflict but to utilize internal sources more actively.

These sources include: the planned capacity of the television and radio complex is one hour of daily broadcast. Cassette recordings for distribution to local television studios are provided. The complex holds a television studio, two stages, video-editing and lighting systems, equipment rooms, and a radio studio. It will be possible to go directly on the air from the Duma studio. All plenary assemblies (and more) will be recorded and, as Mr. Poltoranin says, will be preserved for history and posterity in a "film library."

Within the complex a public council will be created. Now the complex's artistic staff is being formed, and, in the words of Mr. Cheremukhin, there is no end to the number of applicants. According to the press service manager, however, they are not getting high-class professionals because of the low salaries. We add that attributed to the unfortunate artistic fate is the recall of "The Parliament Hour," but that will be for history and posterity to say.

## *Draft Concept of Information Security Presented

*954F1451A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 4*

[Article by Ilya Bulavinov and Natalya Kalashnikova: "Information Should Be Secure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **In December 1995, the Russian SB [Security Council] is planning to consider a new concept of national security. The process of organizing its components, which, according to the creators' design, should encompass everything—from policy to ecology—is in full swing. In January, KD familiarized the readers with the draft, already prepared for approval, of the concept of economic security. Today, KD presents the draft of the concept of information security, which the SB plans to consider at its March meeting. The commentary is by Ilya Bulavinov and Natalya Kalashnikova.**

### Knowledge Is Power!

The historic unprecedentedness of the formulation proposed by the SB—over a dozen departments have been drawn into its preparation—rouses respect: for the first time, the state has attended to determining its strategic interests, the real and potential threats to security in the sphere of information, right down to the problems of shaping a new national ideology. The work of the SB has already proved to be a blessing, because the former, Soviet concept of "information security" looked painfully simple: you could classify anything you liked as secret. Any junior official could easily draw a curtain of secrecy over sometimes totally innocent documents, which was, by the way, always encouraged by the boss: because knowledge of something that was not accessible to the man-in-the-street also constituted the strength of the Soviet party-authorized positions.

The whole hierarchy of secrecy was based on instructions written in the 1930's-1950's. Materials "for official use" (DSP)—nothing special, faded little brochures with truisms, for example, about life on the other side of the "curtain." "Elitist" theses belonged here, for example, on social sciences: socialism, for instance, even European socialism, must not be severely criticized. Here, you can go through Western historiography (they are slandering here, they said!)—but this was only "for a narrow circle." Then followed something a bit more serious—the stamp, "secret," and even "top secret." The space for an official's fantasy was simply unlimited here—since the instructions (not a law!) were always ready at hand. Total secrecy served as a reliable means of ideological struggle. The abolition of typewriter registration was followed by instructions on restricting the use of copy machines—so that Xeroxing and self-publishing would not be indulged in to excess.

The chaos was easily explained: until recently, the idea of a "state secret" was not regulated by any law. By the way, this idea is not in the concept prepared by the SB, which is about information security in general. Although the

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developers assert that they wrote the document on the basis of the "presumption of openness"—there is none of this concept in the text. The claim to comprehensiveness should, apparently, "compensate" for the understatement in it, which is often obviously intentional. The concept itself aspires to the role of a methodological basis for drawing up a set of normative-legal and organizational-methodological documents regulating activity in the sphere of information security for the organs of state authority and enterprises with all forms of ownership. That is, it is the basic document, not only for following a policy in the sphere of information, but also for creating laws and new instructions. In a word, it stimulates the freedom of creation, because many of the passages in the text can be interpreted in different ways, depending on taste, party affiliation and measures of responsibility. In that order, by the way.

**Why Is It Necessary?**

As follows from the text, "it is through the information medium that national security is threatened in various spheres of state activity." The authors note that, in the traditional confrontation of "political opponents," the significance of the information-psychological influence is great; the state's economic potential is to a great extent determined by the volume of information resources and the level of the information infrastructure. The vulnerability of the economic structures stems from the lack of authenticity, lateness and illegal use of economic information. In the military sphere, the outcome of armed combat depends on the quality of the information and the level of development of the information technology for reconnaissance, radioelectronic warfare and control of the troops and high-precision weapons. That is, in knowledge, there is again strength.

Farther on in the text there follows a passage which is at first glance unexpected, but fully characteristic of this document: "In the sphere of spiritual life, the danger arises of the development in society of an aggressive consumer ideology, total commercialization of culture and the spread of ideas of violence and intolerance. These threats and the protection against them, as well as the affirmation of moral values, are realized in the information medium, and particularly through the media of mass information and shaping of public opinion." In other words, both danger and an enemy are at hand!

It is not only internal problems that annoy security, however, it is the external ones as well. Along with the "information expansion of the United States and other developed countries, which carry out global monitoring of world political, economic, military, ecological and other procedures and of information distributed in order to obtain unilateral advantages," it points out "Russia's striving toward close cooperation with foreign countries and the process of reform, based on maximum openness of the parties." That is, either Russia is over-zealously striving to "maximum openness," and this very "liberte" must be abbreviated, or something must be set off against the unquenchable "thirst for unilateral advantages." The way out of this dilemma, from a purely "informational" standpoint, was simply not prescribed in the document. There is, it is true, a quotation from another document—on economic security: we must follow a moderate protectionist policy and protect domestic producers.

In general, among the economic factors which in some way or another affect information security, the authors name the transition to the market, and the appearance of commercial structures—information producers and consumers—and the inclusion of information products in the system of trade relations, and cooperation with foreign countries in developing Russia's information infrastructure. The market factor is not included among the "threats," and the exclusion of information products from the "system of trade relations" is hardly a threat to entrepreneurs for the time being. Although, if you want to, of course, you can look at this problem in a different way (see the passage on "thirst for unilateral advantages").

**How This Is To Be Done**

The authors paint their evaluation of the state of information security in gloomy hues: it "does not correspond to the vitally important needs of the individual, society or the state," which has many adverse consequences. In the opinion of the authors of the concept, it is the "weak provision of the organs of state authority and administration with full, accurate and up-to-date information that hampers substantiated decision-making." Among entrepreneurs, matters are worse—the lack of development of information relations in the business sphere "is inhibiting the establishment of a civilized market," and the lack of a "mechanism to include information resources in economic turnover" is leading to serious economic losses. Finally, the failure to ensure the rights of the citizens to information and the manipulation of information are arousing inadequate reaction from the population, and in a number of cases are leading to political instability in society. That is, the same old internal enemy—the SMI [mass information media].

True, there are objective reasons for this problem: the authors cite the constitutional personal rights of the citizens, which are sometimes not observed properly. Indeed, information protection in general in our country lacks system, and its coordination on the all-state scale is extremely poor, for which departmental separateness in ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of information and the weak monitoring of export of domestic science-intensive technology, arms and military technology are to blame.

**Where Is the Way Out?**

The developers seemingly display no aspirations toward stiffer state regulation in the sphere of disseminating

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information technology. For example, the greatest dangers, in their opinion, "for the democratic development of the country," are: "unilateral political orientation of the SMI under pressure from the state organs, the dominating political forces and individual groups, including the criminal structures"; the lack of a mechanism which obliges the organs of state authority to provide regular information on its activity; the obstacles, on the part of the state, to implementation of the lawful and equal rights of different political forces, including opposition forces, to use the SMI controlled by the state; the politicizing of the system of forming public opinion, which leads to distortion of the true situations (falsification or biased interpretation of the results of polls or referendums)."

Indeed, state regulation is not always in the economy's favor: now statistics let it down, and now other sources, "which give rise to distorted information on commercial activity," and information on the foreign economic activity of the state and commercial structures is in general in a bad way. Not to mention defense. Wherever you look, it is hopeless: things are bad with information resources and information security in the Ministry of Defense and on the General Staff and at Main Headquarters like those of the armed forces and the troops. This has already been verified by practical experience—the complicated situation with Chechnya.

The way out does not even lie so much in toughening state regulation as a self-sufficient goal, even though the role of the nation's ideologist is handed, or rather, returned to the state. The text simply says that the country needs "open proclamation of an official state ideology, acceptable to most of the people, and taking into consideration the cultural and historical traditions of the multi-ethnic country." The main thing, however, is still the mechanism and methods for implementing this state regulation. Of paramount importance here, in the opinion of the SB, is the "development and implementation of civilized, democratic forms and methods of influencing the SMI, for the purpose of shaping and disseminating spiritual values which meet the national interests of the country, cultivating a sense of civic and patriotic duty and protecting against harmful or unfriendly propaganda."

The views of the present Russian authorities on the role of the SMI, including those from the standpoint of national security, are well known. They even threaten to fire the chairman of the television company, and liquidate the company itself. Or to deprive of licenses those who do not correctly understand their role in "ensuring the wholeness of the country." It has become so customary, however, to accuse of self-interested support those commercial structures whose activity, in the opinion of certain state departments, does not contribute to "political stability," that no one takes offense anymore. Now the main thing. "A system of forming public awareness (world view, political views, moral values, etc.) which is based on SMI" is among the objects of information security. It is clear that in itself this formulation gives state structures, whose jurisdiction includes security, weighty bases for activating work with these disobedient SMI.

**And if No Vigilance Is Displayed?**

The consequences of a loss of information vigilance, in the opinion of the SB, may be the undermining of Russia's prestige in the world arena and problems related to making political, economic and other decisions within the country, which will affect social stability. In a word, it will be bad for both the state and the individual—conflicts and strikes will start.

So now there is a guide for action. On the whole, the document, although it deserves criticism, is fully digestible—unlike the instructions from the days of "building the bases of socialism." Western experts often used to say that the 1936 USSR constitution was almost democratic, with respect to its content. So the matter lies—with the interpreters. With those most enterprising officials, for whom this concept will also become the "methodological basis for working out a set of normative-legal and organizational-methodological documents."

[Box, p 4]

**Basic Principles of Ensuring Information Security**

- Restriction of access to information is an exception from the general principle of openness of information and is implemented only on the basis of legislation
- Responsibility for safeguarding information, its classification as secret and its declassification is personified
- Access to any information, as well as limitations introduced on access, are implemented on the basis of the legally determined rights of ownership of this information
- The state formulates the normative-legal basis regulating the right, duty and responsibility of all components functioning in the sphere of information
- Legal and physical persons who gather, amass and process personal data and confidential information bear responsibility before the law for their safeguarding and use
- The state ensures, by legal means, the protection of society against false, distorted and unauthentic information arriving through the mass information media
- The state monitors the creation and use of means of protecting information through their obligatory certification and licensing of activity in the sphere of information protection
- The state follows a protectionist policy with respect to domestic producers of means of dissemination of information and protection of information, and carries out measures to protect the domestic market from unqualified means of dissemination of information and information products

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- The state assists in granting citizens access to world information resources and global information networks.
- The state will strive to give up the use of foreign information technology for organs of state authority and administration as competitive domestic technology and means of disseminating information are developed
- The state formulates the Federal Program of Information Security, which combines the forces of state organizations and commercial structures in creating a unified system of information security for Russia
- The state makes every effort to counteract the information expansion of the United States and other developed countries, and supports the internationalization of global information networks and systems

[Box, p 4]

**Evaluation of the State of Information Security**

- The level of information security does not meet the vitally important needs of the individual, society and the state
- The poor provision of the organs of state authority and the administration with complete, reliable and timely information makes substantiated decision-making more difficult
- There is no provision for the rights of the citizens to information
- Manipulation of information causes the inadequate reaction of the population and leads to political instability in society
- Scientific and production collectives are being destroyed, and a mass exodus of the highest qualified personnel to commercial structures is observed
- The lagging behind of domestic information technology makes it necessary to resort to purchasing unprotected imported technology, as the result of which there is heightened probability of unsanctioned access to data bases, and the dependence on foreign producers of computer and telecommunications technology and information products is increasing
- We have at hand the lack of a system for protecting data and poor coordination of measures to protect information, departmental separateness, and poor monitoring of the export of science-intensive technology and samples of arms and military equipment.

## *Federation Council Refuses To Work on Changing Criminal Code

*954E0628A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Mar 95 p 4*

[Article by Aleksandr Linkov: "How the Word Is Echoed in the Law—Decree of the Council of the Federation of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly on the Results of the Work of the Reconciliation Commission on the Federal Law 'On Making Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Criminal Code'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Having reviewed the results of the work of the reconciliation commission on the Federal Law 'On Making Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Criminal Code' adopted by the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly on 10 November 1994 and rejected by the Council of the Federation on 17 November 1994, and in accordance with Article 110 of the Rules of the Council of the Federation, first convocation, the Council of the Federation **decrees** the following:

"Refuse to participate in the work of the reconciliation commission on the Federal Law 'On Making Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Criminal Code.'

"Chairman of the Council of the Federation of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, V. F. Shumeyko

"Moscow 8 February 1995 No 343-I SF"

**Afterword to the Document**

The existence of disagreements between deputies of the upper and lower chambers of parliament regarding draft laws prepared is not news. The Council of the Federation has already rejected legal enactments adopted in the State Duma more than once. But one other interesting detail has appeared in interrelations between senators and Duma representatives: the former have refused to participate in a reconciliation commission's work. Just what spurred them to such a surprising step?

"On 17 November of last year, the Council of the Federation rejected the Federal Law 'On Making Amendments and Additions to the RSFSR Criminal Code,' which had been adopted by the State Duma," the chairman of the SF [Council of the Federation] Committee on Constitutional Legislation and Judicial-Legal Questions, Issa Kostoyev, tells us, "and right at that point the proposal was made to form a reconciliation commission to work out the disagreements which had arisen. Colleagues from the lower chamber of parliament did not object. For our part, deputies Anatoliy Fedoseyev and Leonid Korotkov became part of the commission. But even its work did not reach any common denominator."

So just what was the spark which caused the whole thing to go up in flames? According to the chairman of the committee, there was an irreconcilable dispute surrounding the first and second points of Article 1 of the law under discussion. Thus, the Duma representatives suggested replacing the word "juvenile" ["maloletniy"] with "minor" ["nesovershennoletniy"] in Point 5 of Article 39 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. From the viewpoint of an ordinary citizen, which most people are, the dispute is not worth a brass nickel: what will change from switching these words?! But the jurists hold a different opinion: there would be change, and even quite a bit. The point is that Article 39 of the RSFSR Criminal Code talks about circumstances aggravating accountability for a crime committed. As members of the Council of the Federation believe, replacing the one word with the other will distort the substantive meaning

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of existing law and lead to a huge, unjustified increase in the number of crimes committed with aggravating circumstances.

The members of the commission did not reach mutual agreement on adding a third part to Article 112 of the RSFSR Criminal Code either. The essence of it is increasing the criminal accountability of parents of minors, teachers, or persons who have been charged with the duty of caring for the minor for intentional bodily injury or assault. The punishment is deprivation of freedom for a term of 1-3 years.

As representatives of the upper chamber believed, the actions envisioned by this Article do not present a heightened social danger. Consequently, toughening accountability is unwise. Moreover, Article 113 of the Criminal Code sets milder punishment for a similar but significantly dangerous offense (systematic administration of beatings and other actions in the nature of torture). A paradox may arise: papa, having tried all methods of indoctrination on his backward son, has decided to beat the passion for cigarettes out of him by the people's method: a belt on the behind. If he shows a slight excess of zeal, it is altogether possible charges may be brought against him. And the punishment will be harsher than for torturing a minor.

In order to deflect any suspicion of prejudice or excessive captiousness, the members of the Council of the Federation sent the Duma law to the General Procurator's Office and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation for expert studies. The responses received were roughly the same: the position of the Council of the Federation deputies is correct. And members of the reconciliation commission from the upper chamber did not intend to change it. That was how it all ended. In February the Council of the Federation adopted a decree which in fact recalled its representatives from the commission, since it did not seem possible to work out the disagreement.

And what about the State Duma? The parliamentarians of this chamber have a way to achieve their goal: defeat the veto of their senator colleagues by a two-thirds vote and afterward send the law to the president to sign.

### *Problem of Finding Qualified State Employees Detailed

*954E0628B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 mar 95 p 2*

[Article by Semen Korobenkov: "An Official Is Also a Person: We Cannot Do Without the Government Administrators Apparat While the State Exists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Soon the numbers of the executive and clerical "fraternity" will rise sharply even in Russia. This is already apparent today, even to the eye unaided by statistics, from the rapidly increasing number of banks, insurance companies, exchanges, and intermediary and legal offices. Each commercial point, even a small one, needs an accounting office, while "offices" need a manager and employees. But we are not talking about them. We refer only to chosen people, government officials.

While the state exists, there is also the need for people to administer state property, a need for government officials. We do not need to seek the former, but we still need to create officials for the new state apparat. In different countries the army of government officials is formed in different ways. In our country the principle of selecting cadres "like yourself" used to predominate and still remains. The joke about the three periods Russia has undergone in the past—the pre-Peter period, the Peter period, and the Dnepropeter period—had a real basis.

Unfortunately, both then and now no real system existed or exists for selecting and training state apparat cadres such as Japan has, for example. This state with a modern market economy had 5 million specialists of the state apparat, government officials and employees, 3-4 years ago. Japan's experience in this matter merits telling in more detail, especially the selection and training of cadres of government officials who have privileges there which we have never even dreamed of! They serve for life: the keep their job and salary even if the particular ministry is eliminated. They cannot be replaced. They have a large pension after old-age retirement and many other privileges.

It is best to study the system for the shaping of a government official in this country using the example of the ministry of finance, where a post is considered most prestigious. There are 225,000 people working in the central apparat and prefectural agencies of the ministry of finance, including about 25,000 government officials. There are 2,000 government officials employed directly in the central apparat. For comparison, about 1,500 people work in Russia's Ministry of Finance, and by Japanese standards only 300 of them can be considered government officials (of course without even a hint of the privileges of Japanese government officials). Open competitive hiring for posts of ministry officials is organized largely from graduates of Tokyo University. This is done not by the ministry itself, but rather by the state cadres administration under the prime minister, based on a system of "state competitive exams for entering service in the state apparat." It is important that the hiring is done not simply for a ministry but rather for state service represented by this ministry.

The career of a "new recruit" in the ministry begins with a tour of duty in its agencies. The first 4 years of duty "rotate in a circle," spending some time in all the main and prominent agencies of the ministry during this time. During these years he studies the functions of the agencies in practice and establishes an acquaintance with all the officials and employees. Anyone who has had the opportunity to be an "apparatchik" knows how important this is in everyday work. In the fifth year, when the trainee is already 27 or 28 years old, he is sent to the

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periphery for 2 years—to one of the ministry's agencies in a prefecture. Then he is brought back to the central apparat and appointed vice director. This is not a post but a rank. At this time he gains experience with relations between "his" ministry and other ministries and in formulating draft decisions. But the work does not end here: in 2-3 years he is again sent to the periphery. After 2 years of duty there, when the official is already 33 or 34 years old, he returns to the central apparat in one of two ranks: senior vice director or advisor. In the course of 1 year he acquires the rank of director. Then, depending on his personal qualities, he is given the rank of deputy general director, and then—general director. He becomes the head of an agency in this rank. The height of the career is permanent deputy minister.

We have never had anything like that. As our cadre workers see it, a person who has entered the government official track might remain in some position, but if he continued to move, it would only be forward and upward. Even a short-term drop on the official ladder would always put them on guard.

Of course, Japan's state apparat, especially its elite, have brilliant minds, hard-working cadres, and people who are simply benevolent toward visitors. But even they are frequently criticized by the public. There has never been and probably never will be a shortage of that in any country, since government officials personify state power—the power of force. But in our country we used to talk most often not of government officials but of "party apparatchiks," since the party itself was the state's main power structure and in many respects to blame for the flaws of state government. In recruiting cadres for its apparat based on the "like you" principle, the party transferred the blame to the organs of state government too. It reminds me of the episode involving the appointment of one of the RSFSR ministers. Clearly the best of two candidates was not chosen. Objectively, the rejected candidate unquestionably possessed higher professional and purely human qualities; but he did not receive the support of the general secretary, who said that no one could handle such a minister there (that is, in the party Central Committee). That was how the choice was made in favor of the "convenient" one, who, it was supposed, could handle nothing by himself.

The result of this poor excuse for a cadre policy is well-known—it led to the complete collapse of the former state-party power.

People frequently say that Russia will not survive another civil war. But will it survive yet another collapse of the state system? Indeed, at this time cadres are also being selected on a "like you" basis under cover of all kinds of "provisional" committees and commissions, and new politicians are doing it on the basis of personal, clan, and other relationships. We cannot speak of any lofty business and moral qualities of these "cadres." A self-seeking politician who has become a leader is unable to create an efficient state apparat. He should not even be allowed near this task. This is a matter of great state importance, and under no circumstances should it be out of the state's hands. The state rather than the latest "boss" should guarantee government officials and employees their protection during the next change in political power.

According to certain data, the present state apparat has proven to be corrupt, notable for embezzlement of public funds and abuses of official position. By past experience we can assume that there is a great deal of slander here, but where there is smoke there is fire. However, we must certainly not consider it normal either that employees of the state apparat become a second-rate if not a third-rate group of "administrators" in terms of labor payment and other material support.

I have recently been meeting a fellow who 6 months ago transferred from the Ministry of Finance to some commercial organization—he boasts that he now makes as much as the manager of a Ministry of Finance department and all his deputies taken together. I suggested that it was quite a bit, and he added: "Not counting bonuses and the rest." So there it is; he got into the Ministry, clearly by protection, worked there about 2 years, and along the way did not even learn how to make up business papers, and now his salary "without bonuses and the rest" is more than three times a minister's salary. You can, of course, object that this money is not from the state treasury, but you can hardly consider a state capable of effectiveness with such a state of affairs. If you listen to some, they are simply suffocating under the burden of taxes, but they throw their money around in a way the luckiest Klondike prospector would never dream of. But the main thing is, for what and for the sake of what?

A government official does not need so very much. Above all he needs the state's protection from the arbitrariness of leaders of the government, ministries, departments, and their structural subdivisions who replace one another. Secondly, there should be normal advancement on the job. For it is a real insult to keep a person in the very same "chair" for decades. And finally. Now, when "leveling" has come to an end, establish an adequate "maintenance" level for them and a good state pension for the future.

That is precisely how things are organized in most civilized countries whose model Russia's new state system is copying. In order to maintain the "purity" of the ranks of government officials and employees, we must cut off any possibility of combining government service with commercial activity, and in addition introduce an income tax declaration. Every official and perhaps every employee of the state apparat should declare his income and his real and other property. We must make sure that any person on such a lofty official ladder goes no lower than a constant desire to help both the poor and the rich, and in their own evaluation of their tireless work expect no more than the reciprocal

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good will of the "visiting petitioners" and a good reputation among people. The state should give them everything else.

### *Recently Arrested Aleksey Vedenkin Profiled

*954F1622 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 95 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Aleksey Chelnokov: "Who Is He, Brigadenfuhrer Vedenkin? Convinced Fascist, Adventurist, Voluntary Gunman or Figurehead"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Finally, Aleksey Vedenkin was able to inform the world himself that he is a nazi. Convinced, prepared to fire a bullet into the nape of the neck of a hated democrat (if, of course, he comes to power). True, he has paid—for now—with his arrest, for that instant of triumph, given to him by the Russian television's broadcast "Newspaper Stories." Honestly speaking, however,it is hard to believe that it will all end with harsh words.**

The day after the television broadcast, IZVESTIYA had already written about this "gray cardinal" of our domestic nazis and "Zhirinovskiy's financial genius."

About his irrational bluff that goes like this: "90 percent of the mid-and upper-level special service personnel are our people." Or: "When, having organized Zhirinovskiy's visit to Europe, we arrived, millionaires, billionaires were constantly buzzing around us like flies..."

Vedenkin could also talk about the fact, for example, that all the special service personnel, to a man from ensign to general,—were SSOs. Or, he could have demonstrated the shah's deed of ownership to all the oil wells in the Sudan. Nothing would have set off such a scandal as his threat to "personally shoot" Sergey Kovalev, RF commissioner on human rights, and Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the Duma Committee on Defense.

The State Duma, of course, immediately adopted all the measures necessary to prevent some passerby from shooting the people's elected officials. It was proposed that Aleksey Ilyushenko, acting general procurator of the RF, "give a legal evaluation" of the nazi's escapades...

While the hero himself does his time, we will look at the road he has travelled over 30 years: "From the KGB to the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. A Nazi's Career"—was how the milestones of Vedenkin's life were noted in an article by Igor Baranovskiy, a MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent, who published in the September edition a comprehensive journalistic investigation, with many biographical details of the man accused in the scandal. Now, certain other details have been discovered.

A. I. Vedenkin was born in 1965 in the Moscow suburb of Kaliningrad. Talk of his service in the Naval Forces and even more about his participation in naval counterintelligence is idle fancy. For his active service, he toiled with the railroad troops on the Baykal-Amur Mainline.

His career first took flight in 1984, when he exchanged his pick for a striped baton. He worked as a militiaman for three years in Moscow's patrol-post service, but he was fired from the State Administration of Internal Affairs [GUVD] for "committing actions that discredit the title of militia employee."

It did not get through to him; in 1989, the Moscow procuracy initiated proceedings against him in accordance with article 147 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (fraud).

A year later, he wormed himself into a group of former GUVD employees who at the time were engaged in creating the "Center for Investigation and Criminal Search," later renamed the "security service" [SB]. (The SB was a part of the "Moskoviya" corporation under the Moscow mayor's office and the Frunze Komsomol organization in the Republic of Kyrzyzstan.)

In August 1991 the SB concluded an agreement on protection for the complex of buildings on Staraya Ploshchad. It is possible that Vedenkin's fate here took a decisive turn: he was appointed deputy commandant of the complex, managing, specifically, the press-reproduction bureau.

His executive post gave him the yearned-for black Volga with flashing lights, entry to the Kremlin, and sincere conversations with former CPSU Central Committee apparatchiks and Nikolay Kruchina, the party affairs administration head, himself. There is information about the fact that Vedenkin, while participating in the elimination of the CPSU Central Committee archives, stole several of Hitler's personal documents.

Again he hit a roadblock: the Moscow procurator initiated a criminal case against him in compliance with articles 194 and 196 ("forgery of KGB, procuracy, Ministry of Defense certificates, conferring upon oneself a military title").

The contacts acquired at the end of 1991—a time of headlong flights and shattering falls—kept him afloat better than a life jacket. Vedenkin went to work at the Foundation for the Development of International University, becoming one of the founders of the scandalously well-known Argus security service. Then he became engaged in the security issues of the "Vozrozhdeniye" joint stock company [AO] (one of its founders was the Union of Russian Industrialists and Entrepreneurs) and collected dossiers on highly-placed people in the president's circle.

The "Vozrozhdeniye" AO gave Vedenkin access to Western businessmen. In March 1993 he went to the Northern Caucasus, where he met with Dudayev's people and also conducted negotiations on the joint

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development of a precious metal deposit in Kabardino-Balkariya with an Austrian firm.

After the events of October 1993 when he went West, he made himself out as Rutskoy's successor in the "Vozrozhdeniye" AO. Thanks to this, he founded about 10 firms in Germany, Italy, Holland, and Switzerland.

Actually, it remains uncertain whom Vedenkin should thank for his success in the cornfield of commerce. He ran from the White House, accompanied by Barkashov and the representatives of the "Kazan" criminal group. In Brest, the company became part of a dark tale: a serious crime was committed, after which Barkashov returned to Moscow, and Vedenkin left for Poland with the bandits.

Indisputably, Vedenkin should be considered an extraordinary personality, as he has risen above the average domestic nazi, who in the best case scenario would be producing missiles or [word illegible]. When need be, obliging, when necessary, insolent, he has planned his commercial show carefully.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA published a scandalous "interview" with him on its first page, bringing his "representative" to the editorial offices. The "Oblik" studio (Russian Television) immediately gave Vedenkin air time and, what was obviously most important, a chance to go to jail. Then later, he could appear in a sensational court trial, where journalists from all over the world would gather.

And it is easy to predict the outcome of the "case."

Vedenkin is charged with a series of articles of the RF Criminal Code, including the sadly notorious article 74, which stipulates liability for "igniting inter-ethnic strife." An insoluble task remains for the prosecution: to prove that the interviewee had the "deliberate intention" to drive a wedge between peoples.

My sole intention was to shoot Yushenkov and Kovalev, the defendant will state to the high court, and only if nazism were to come to power in Russia. Then he will ask a disheartening question: Can it be true that nobody present feels that fascism will be victorious?

Applause, flowers, Vedenkin is carried out on people's shoulders to his "Mercedes," and the sponsors rush to transfer their convertible currency into his accounts in Western banks.

This story is so sad, so absurd. The government, in its erratic attempts to deal with growing nazi tendencies, is essentially provoking them. Several years have passed since that time in our collective memory when Konstantin Ostashvili was convicted on Article 74. This was the only time, and it was because the "Pamyatnik" said passionately to the court that he wouldn't mind shaving the hated Jews.

Twice, criminal proceedings have been initiated according to that article against the "patriarch" of the Petersburg nazis, Viktor Bezverkhiy, and twice the court has acquitted him. But doesn't this single sentence, taken from his magazine VOLKHE: "On yiddism, besides a mortal battle to full and unconditional capitulation, there is nothing left to say," eclipse all of Vedenkin's anti-human "intellectualism?"

And how did the investigation into the case of the nazi group "Vervolf", which left two killed, end? The ringleader, who stated in an interview that they had committed a series of "serious terrorist acts," is now only being charged with "under-reporting" the crimes he committed.

And the story about Zhirinovskiy, who sued IZVESTIYA after it found his sentiments to be fascist, and won?

...The procuracy tirelessly prosecutes cases concerning "fascist thugs," but there is no law that has made a clear distinction of what fascism is, where its danger lies, and what actions can be taken toward it (it seems as if for most judges fascism is just Auschwitz and the Gestapo).

For now, there is no law. Remember the words of Khlestakov: "The State Council, itself, fears me."

Bull's eye.

### Approach to Human Rights 'Hypocritical'

*954F1714A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 8, 24 Feb-2 Mar 95 pp 1-2*

[Article by Sergei Kovalev, RF commissioner for human rights: "Power Needs Morals"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Freedom of speech, independent mass media and human rights are the criteria by which the West assesses the situation in Russia.

The Russian authorities cannot fail to take "European standards" into consideration. Therefore, among other things, I was entrusted to officially represent Russia in Geneva at the regular session of the UN human rights commission. The delegation also included well-known human rights activist Vyacheslav Bakhmin. In this way official Moscow demonstrates to the West its pluralism and adherence to democratic principles. Although Moscow does not agree with Kovalev on everything, it is said that he is in Geneva and will address the session.

At the press conference in Geneva I spoke of the attempts to use human rights activists as a political cover. Later, journalists pointed out that my statement was perceived as yet another indication of instability in Russia. If this is the true state of affairs, what can be done? Russia does not have a well-considered policy on many major problems. State decisions are often made based on the combination of circumstances and under the impact of absurd ambitions, intrigues and departmental interests. The main role is played by secondary

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and even semi-decent factors, but not by a sensible analysis of the situation and serious, well-founded forecasts.

In so doing the right hand often does not know what the left is doing. The authorities allowed me to visit Strasbourg, Bonn and Geneva to look good in the eyes of the world public. However, prior to that they did not allow me to fly to Mozdok, in the presence of representatives of the same world public. Such "non-coordination" is inevitable when the policy is determined by a combination of the petty interests of some "statesmen," and not by well-thought-out state priorities.

The authorities demonstrate a similar inconsistency with regard to the mass media, at times shaking a finger at them, at times giving praise. Of course, to maintain the image of a democratic power, authorities would like to have free press. However, it would be free only to the extent that it would help "release some steam" from the overheated public boiler. There is still hope that our press will manage to retain its independence, despite the grave financial conditions in which it works. This hope is based on the fact that the right to speak and write freely did not come from above; it came through much suffering. In speaking of glasnost, the only thing that the "fathers of perestroika" wanted was to open the valve halfway. Their successors act in a similar manner, allowing human rights activists to travel abroad.

We are well aware of the fact that sometimes the authorities try to use human rights activists for unseemly aims. However, we also understand that our "officially sanctioned" participation in international functions is needed by other politicians. There are those in the country's administration who are sincerely trying to change the realities in Russia by introducing standards of law and morality. While some of them need us only as a cover, others feel that it is essential to convince the West that there are sound forces in Russia and that it is possible to deal with them. In fact, our domestic policy greatly depends on relations between Russia and the world community. Today Russian authorities will not risk being absolutely insensitive to the reaction of the world community.

There is of course another position to be taken, such as refusing any form of cooperation with the authorities who unleashed the barbarous war in Chechnya. However, if we refuse, what will happen next? We have no other authorities. In order to be able to somehow influence the adopted state decisions, it is necessary to cooperate with them and support their every action directed at peaceful settlement of the conflict, just like any peaceful initiative of the opposing side. By refusing to cooperate with the authorities, we simply leave them free to act.

I see no other more "radical" way of influencing the situation. Of course, if half a million Muscovites had come to Manezhnaya Square, as in 1991 in connection with the events in the Baltic republics, this would be a serious argument. However, who will be able to stir up the population today? Russian citizens, taught by their bitter experience, will say: "Once again politicians are engaged in their power struggle and are calling upon us to help them."

A true struggle has been launched in connection with the "Chechen campaign." However, it is not a struggle for power, but rather against it; against the attributes with which the present power has become surrounded, against the deceptions of officials, against allowing dishonorable people to make decisions. These are society's natural demands to the authorities in a normal civilized state. Still we shall have to fight for them and the greater the number of independent public organizations making not political, but moral and legal claims to the authorities, the greater the chances for victory.

## *Classification Procedures for Archive Documents Outlined

### *Text of Decree

*954E0621A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Mar 95 p 16*

[Russian Federation Government Decree No 170, issued 20 February 1995: "On Establishment of Procedure for Declassification of and Extension of Classification Limits on USSR Government Archival Documents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Government of the Russian Federation hereby decrees:

1. approval of the appended Statute on procedure for declassification of and extension of classification limits on USSR Government archival documents.

2. that the State Technical Commission under the President of the Russian Federation shall in conjunction with the Russian State Archive Service organize a systematic procedure for review of USSR Government archival documents for the purpose of their declassification or extension of their established classification limits.

3. that the State Technical Commission under the President of the Russian Federation shall submit an annual report to the Government of the Russian Federation regarding its compliance with this decree.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, Chairman, Government of the Russian Federation

### *Text of Statute on Procedures

*954E0621B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Mar 95 p 16*

[Statute: "On Procedure for Declassification of and Extension of Classification Limits on USSR Government Archival Documents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. This Statute on procedure for declassification of and extension of classification limits

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on USSR Government archival documents is based upon the Russian Federation law "On State Secrecy" and the Fundamentals of Russian Federation Legislation on Russian Federation Archival Material and Archives and defines procedure for the declassification of or extension of classification limits on (subsequently to be referred to as "declassification") USSR Government documents housed in Russian Federation archival institutions.

2. This Statute defines USSR Government documents as archival documents of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and their permanent bodies, as well as the Committee for Operational Management of the USSR Economy and the Interstate Economic Committee.

3. A decision to declassify USSR Government documents must be made by the Interagency Commission for the Protection of State Secrets (subsequently to be referred to as "the Interagency Commission").

4. In order to support decision making regarding declassification of USSR Government documents the Interagency Commission shall establish an interagency group of experts on declassification of and extension of classification limits on USSR Government documents (subsequently to be referred to as "the Interagency Group of Experts").

5. The Interagency Group of Experts shall include representatives of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federation Federal Counterintelligence Service, the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information under the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice, the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Industry, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics, the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Russian State Archive Service and the central apparatus of the State Technical Commission under the President of the Russian Federation, as well as representatives of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration and the Russian Federation Government Apparatus, by agreement.

The composition of the Interagency Group of Experts shall be confirmed by the chairman of the Interagency Commission in consultation with the aforementioned ministries and agencies.

The Interagency Group of Experts shall be headed by the deputy chairman of the Interagency Commission.

6. Depending upon the subject of the documents slated for declassification, the Interagency Group of Experts may bring in specialists from other Russian Federation ministries and agencies, the heads of which are authorized to classify information as state secrets.

7. Members of the Interagency Group of Experts, as well as additional specialists brought in to assess documents, shall perform their work without compensation.

8. The Interagency Commission shall organize its work relative to declassification of files and documents created during the existence of the USSR Government and housed in Russian Federation archival institutions:

—systematically with regard to documents for which the time limit on classification has expired;

—in compliance with edicts, directives and orders from the President of the Russian Federation and decrees, directives and orders from the Government of the Russian Federation pertaining to information support for organs of state authority and the conducting of socially significant events;

—in compliance with orders from the Chief of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration or the Chief of the Russian Federation Government Apparatus in connection with requests from the head of the Russian State Archive Service or users of archival materials regarding publication, research, exhibits or other projects.

9. The directors of Russian Federation archival institutions which house secret USSR Government documents shall present to the Russian State Archive Service annual proposals regarding the contents of an overall annual plan for declassification of the aforementioned documents.

The overall annual plan for declassification of USSR Government documents shall be reviewed by the Interagency Commission and approved by its chairman.

10. The directors of the Russian Federation Presidential Archive, the Russian Federation Government Archive and the Russian Federation State Archive shall in the cases enumerated in Point 8 of this Statute:

—present to the Interagency Commission information regarding secret documents subject to declassification (reference materials, lists and overviews);

—ensure that the members of the members of the Interagency Group of Experts and additional specialists who have been brought in are familiarized with the original files (or documents) at their place of storage or with copies which substitute for them (microfilms, microfiches or photocopies).

The members of the Interagency Group of Experts and the additional specialists brought in by them shall review the files (or documents) submitted for declassification page by page.

11. Based on the results of expert assessments of USSR Government documents submitted for declassification,

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the members of the Interagency Group of Experts and the additional specialists brought in by them shall compile detailed findings.

A finding must include a list of the files (or documents) reviewed and conclusions regarding the appropriateness of declassifying them (either fully or partially), removing the secrecy classifications attached to them, or extending the time limit on their classification. If necessary a finding shall also include recommendations regarding further use of the declassified documents.

12. Findings by the members of the Interagency Group of Experts and outside specialists brought in by them shall be reported at a session of the Interagency Group of Experts for the purpose of drafting a coordinated draft decision on declassification of USSR Government documents.

13. A draft decision by the Interagency Group of Experts must be reviewed by the Interagency Commission and approved by its chairman.

14. A decision by the Interagency Commission shall be sent to the Russian State Archive Service and the head of the archival institution that submitted the documents for the commission's review. This decision is then binding on all archival institutions in the Russian Federation which house USSR Government documents and shall serve as a basis for the removal (or reduction) of secrecy levels assigned to those documents and for appropriate changes in record keeping relative to them.

15. Declassification of archival documents which were created during the period of existence of USSR ministries and agencies and which are part of USSR Government materials shall be carried out on recommendation from the Interagency Commission by the legal successors to the creators of those materials, i.e. by Russian Federation ministries and agencies, the heads of which are authorized to classify information as state secrets.

16. A decision to declassify archival documents which are part of USSR Government materials and were created during the period of existence of USSR ministries and agencies which were subsequently eliminated and have no legal successors shall be made by the Interagency Commission.

17. Decisions to declassify documents created by the USSR Government and the CPSU shall be made jointly by the Commission for the Declassification of Documents Created by the CPSU and the Interagency Commission meeting in joint session.

18. Declassification of USSR Government documents which contain information regarding citizens' personal lives or their personal data shall be carried out in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation law "On Investigative Activity in the Russian Federation," the Fundamentals of Russian Federation Legislation on Russian Archival Materials and Archives, and other legislative acts.

19. Lists of declassified USSR Government documents shall be published in the Archival Information Bulletin and distributed to Russian Federation archival institutions.

**Footnote * In compliance with Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 614, issue on 30 March 1994, the functions of the Interagency Commission were temporarily assigned to the State Technical Commission under the President of the Russian Federation.**

## Federal Assembly

### *Leader of 'Women of Russia' on Faction's Position

*954E0646A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 7 Mar 95 pp 1,2*

[Interview with Yekaterina Lakhova, chairman of the State Duma faction, "Women of Russia," conducted by Nadezhda Shevchenko: "Yes, I Was Not at the Farm!... Compliment and Objection to Yekaterina Lakhova"]

**[FBIS Translated Text] She looks wonderful in a red jacket... She is also stunning in a bright yellow one... Ceremonious in white... Delightful in apricot... Always with a fine hairstyle, smart in appearance, elegant, business-like, and invariably feminine. And therefore, as I asked my first question of the chairman of the State Duma faction, "Women of Russia," Ye. Lakhova, I simply could not resist giving her a compliment...**

[Correspondent] Yekaterina Filippovna, your knowing how to look and dress cannot help but delight one. But at the same time, this image of the grand-dame—pardon my frankness!—is such a contrast, so different from today's position of women in Russia. Have you ever noticed this inconsistency?

[Lakhova] And what, in your opinion, constitutes this grand-dame? You tell me, so that I may argument it...

[Correspondent] Even your hairstyle... These leather sofas...

[Lakhova] Well, the hairstyle has always been my weakness. I hope you will understand me. And then, in dealing with people every day, I simply cannot be unkempt...

[Correspondent] I am not saying you should go around in tarpaulin boots. But when the authorities in the country live one way, and the people another, I personally do not trust such authorities. How about you?

[Lakhova] Do these leather sofas bother you? Why, you should have seen how we lived in the CEMA [Council for Economic Mutual Assistance] building... And when we worked in the hotel suites? Just imagine, parliament—in a hotel! Why, this is unheard of in any country of the world! We would come to work at 8:30 in the morning,

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and have to wait for them to bring the keys to unlock the rooms. And when we moved here? Why, our heels sunk into the floor!

[Correspondent] I am not speaking specifically about the Duma, but about power in general. Take the law on guarantees and benefits to "state persons," for example. Why, this is a shame, a disgrace—to grab so much for oneself, taking the very last things away from the people! And what about the blinding light in the Federation Council, those marble halls with carpet runners? Or our politicians wearing English coats? Undoubtedly, protocol obliges them to do so. But perhaps moral laws should oblige them even more, or at least shame. The authorities should not live like this, when the people live as they do...

[Lakhova] We too, our faction, has spoken out against this law. I agree with you, that it could have been postponed, adopted when things got a little easier for the people. But, on the other hand, a state employee must be independent, so that he cannot be corrupted.

[Correspondent] But it is not guarantees and interior decorations which give power to the authorities...

[Lakhova] Power also should not be belittled, humiliated, or poverty-stricken! But in order to truly judge a person, as the saying goes, one must eat a pound of salt with him. For example, I was indignant when your newspaper christened me, as a "100 percent pro-Yeltsinist." And they also tied Lakhova in with the command of Burbulis, Gaydar and Poltoranin...

[Correspondent] You considered this opinion of a colleage as an attack, as an insult?

[Lakhova] Not only to me, but to the entire faction. Because we are not "pro-Yeltsin" and not pro-government. We are by ourselves! Sometimes it happens that the president proposes one thing, and we vote for something entirely different. Or, on the contrary: He imposes a veto on a law, and we override it. We are not with the right and not with the left, because in both places there are many extremes, there is extremism. And they wrote about me: Lakhova spoke out against Grachev, but she should have spoken out against the supreme commander-in-chief! But even before the Chechen events, we had many complaints against Grachev. And on Chechnya we immediately adopted 7 announcements and appeals. And, even back in the Fall, we sharply criticized the Chernomyrdin government: Yerin, Nechayev, Chubays—we "publicized" them all by name and said that they should resign.

[Correspondent] And they listened to you, they left? Why, in our country, as the dramatist Viktor Rozov said, there is a dictatorship of a peculiar type: One can say whatever one likes. They will still do what they want. Does this not upset you?

[Lakhova] Yes, it does!

[Correspondent] And does it give rise to desperation?

[Lakhova] It does. That is why we say: Wake up, women! Things will not get better if we wait for politics to address the family, the child, and mankind in general.

[Correspondent] What do you mean by, "wake up, women?" I too am a woman of Russia. And, can you tell me, how should I wake up?

[Lakhova] I will tell you. Today there are many problems. And they are different for different women. Yesterday I met with a woman from Vorkuta who heads up an association of families whose husbands have lost their lives in industrial accidents. Another association, also in Vorkuta, has united single women. A third is for those whose children are invalids. And they lobby and push through their problems.

[Correspondent] But you are evading the answer to my question...

[Lakhova] Why? I am telling you specifically. I do not know what problem you have...

[Correspondent] Why, the same as that of most women of Russia: I am not sure that my child will receive an education or medical treatment, or that my wages will be enough to buy milk. Why is there a "Women of Russia" faction in parliament but we, the women, do not feel this?

[Lakhova] Well, excuse me, but... Those women who want to do indeed feel our presence. However, there is an electorate which opposes us. And we even know what kind of women oppose us.

[Correspondent] And which ones have felt your presence?

[Lakhova] Just read our mail and the newspaper publications. Some women are uniting, setting tasks, and resolving them. After all, one can go out into the streets and beat on pots and pans, or one can approach a problem constructively, not with outstretched hand. The "Kvant" association has united 400 families in Moscow. And we are working with them.

[Correspondent] And what has the faction done for women of the village?

[Lakhova] You say: For women of the village... Housing, public health and education are today being privatized, including in rural areas? And we are opposed to this. Or the agrarians are lobbying for some question: For example, financial, a special tax—we support them, and that means that we are also supporting the women of the village. We have adopted a law on international adoptions, on alimony...

[Correspondent] And how about liberated prices, for example, from which Russian women are suffering most of all? Could your faction, for example, pose the question to the Duma and somehow bridle them, put some

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controls on them, perhaps? After all, they are stifling not only the economy, but our children. I am convinced that all women of Russia would be very grateful to you for such a law.

[Lakhova] Of course, we can present a list of fixed prices. But I am afraid that we will not get the 226 decisive votes. Well, the communists and agrarians would support us, but "Choice of Russia" would not, and as for the Zhirinovskiy followers—I doubt it. That is why we say: Wake up! There must be more of us, women.

[Correspondent] In other words, you want us to more actively engage in politics?

[Lakhova] Yes! Politics too! Is the family not politics? Or the child? 53 percent of Russia's residents are women. Yet politics have always been run by men, as Yelena Bonner said, by the indicator of sex. That is where our troubles stem from today: The high infant mortality rate, and we are second in the world in the number of abortions.

[Correspondent] And here, Yekaterina Filippovna, I greatly disagree with you!

[Lakhova] I remember, as long as I worked in the oblast health department, and simply as a pediatrician, it was always the same: New equipment comes in, and where is it sent? To the adult clinics, or to the special hospitals. Or they have collected the documents on children's nutrition for the last 20 years, and so what? Has even one decision been fulfilled? And the currency also by-passed the children: First it would go to the production line for making margarine, then somewhere else. All our lives we have said: All the best for our children. Yet at the same time, politics was childless. And did they know their rights? No! They were violated, and we kept quiet...

[Correspondent] Well, now we know, except that there are no rights...

[Lakhova] And what rights did you used to have?

[Correspondent] The right to education, for example. To free medical services. And in spite of that same "childless" politics, our children could go to summer camps to relax. And the women gave birth. And the schools were built for the children, the clinics were opened. And, I might add, under the leadership of men. Yet today they have suddenly remembered the indicator of sex...

[Lakhova] Yes! And we, "Women of Russia," are against having only the "men's clubs" making the decisions...

[Correspondent] And you are trying to tell me that Gaydar opted for liberated prices because... he did not know life! Why, you could fill all the halls of power with women, but if our policy continues to be anti-popular, no different-sex majority will save us!

[Lakhova] Not a majority! We are saying, at least a third! A third of women in the place where decisions are made to determine how society lives. Take the Scandinavian countries, where there is a high living standard. They have already proven this. In Sweden there are 43 percent women in parliament, in Finland—41. But in our country—11! Just look at how many burdens the women of the village carry on their shoulders. Yet the lists of the Agrarian Party do not contain a single woman. And we feel a great debt to the women of the village. Urban women are more active. Mothers with many children have united. Soldiers' mothers have united. Mothers of invalids also. Farmers' wives have united. Yet the women's movement in the rural areas is still at a low level.

I also told Lapshin: Develop a women's movement within your party. I understand: The sowing, the grain—that is important. But I remember how on one farm in Buryatiya the, the manager would not let the dairymaid take her maternity leave unless she found a replacement, saying—"but who will tend to the cows?" The udders of the cows were more important to him...

[Correspondent] Yekaterina Filippovna! You cited this fact 2 years ago in your interview with SELSKAYA ZHIZN! And then, why should Lapshin develop a women's movement? After all, you are the faction of women of Russia—take it upon yourselves to develop it! It is interesting, what was your last meeting with rural women about? Do you remember?

[Lakhina] The faction has branches in 13 regions. We travel a lot. Before the new year, we met with women farmers. And recently we went to Tula Oblast and presented the results of the Year of the Family. But that time I did not visit the farm in Tula.

[Correspondent] And how about the time before that?

[Lakhina] And the time before that too. You are always trying to trip me up somehow: "When will we do something for the rural women? You have a faction, but we women live worse than we did before." Now I will go to Bryansk Oblast. The women from the rural areas will ask me questions, and we will be able to have an excellent discussion with them...

[Correspondent] And what do you mean by the words, "excellent discussion?"

[Lakhina] When the women will be able to ask us all the questions which they cannot ask when they see us on the television screens, as grand-dames sitting on leather sofas. When we, as women, can sit side by side and look into each other's eyes.

[Correspondent] Then may I also ask you? You have said that you went to Tula Oblast to present the results of the Year of the Family. But did we have such a year?

[Lakhina] I cannot believe you did not know about it. They knew and know about this in many regions.

[Correspondent] It is interesting, how was this Year felt in Russia? With what results?

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[Lakhina] Why, with no results... You yourself can see how the reforms are going.

[Correspondent] I remember the great hope with which you spoke in your interview 2 years ago about the Russian Supreme Soviet's decree on benefits for rural women, which you were able to prepare and push through thanks to your committee. It is interesting, has it been implemented?

[Lakhina] Why, today in our country laws are not being implemented, let alone decrees!

[Correspondent] And how, in your opinion, can we explain the following paradox: The more laws we have—the more lawlessness there is...

[Lakhina] Perhaps because society has not become accustomed to living by the laws? Recently on television they showed interviews with women in the street: "Have you read the constitution, do you know it?" They laugh. No, we are not interested in politics at all. Oh, Lord—what kind of politics is this? I asked a teacher: Do they study human rights in your school? It turns out, only for an hour, in the 9th grade. Yet people are not getting their wages for months at a time, and when a woman is hired for work she is made to promise in the contract that she will not take maternity leave for a certain specified time. And why do we not file suit in court, why do we not make demands? The children's writer Uspenskiy expressed the Declaration of Rights of the Child in a manner which is easily understood...

[Correspondent] Yet the president has issued an edict on mandatory teaching of the Constitution in school. But what is the teacher to tell the children? That, according to this constitution, they have taken away their rights, and all power in the country has been usurped in favor of the presidential branch? And we must believe that, until the judicial branch in our country becomes equal to the executive, the people will continue to throw the comment at the Duma: "Who needs your laws..."

[Lakhina] The same may be said also of the prosecutor's office, which must implement oversight and control. In Samara Oblast, for example, they have privatized the diagnostic center. By what right? On the basis of what law? And in the subjects of the federation they do not question this, and there is total indifference on the part of the government. For a year now, our faction has waged a struggle with Minister of Public Health Nechayev. We have told everything to the president, presented all the materials, reported to Chernomyrdin. We have submitted the data to the tax police. The president's control commission on verification worked for one day, and Nechayev will not let it work a second. And what can we do? There is much that is unclear for us too.

[Correspondent] Well... But you advise women: File suit in court, demand, learn your rights, wake up, finally... And do our women in the village have time to sleep? Let alone to unite into associations or clubs, to lobby for their interests, as you said? And then what are the deputies for? If we all go into politics—who will give birth to the babies, who will mix the dough and milk the cows—who will do the women's work?

[Lakhina] Well, well, well... And who said, let women engage in their own work? What is their work, who said this?

[Correspondent] I did, Yekaterina Filippovna. Well, at least I did...

## Regional Affairs

### *Semenov's Appointment, Chechnya Political Situation

*954E0602A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 24 Feb 95 p 2*

[Article by Pavel Anokhin: "Personnel in Chechen Politics and Freeze-Frames of the Chechen Tragedy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the question of power looms large in Groznyy, including who will find himself among the ruling elite of this republic of "temperaments and characters." There are many people who yearn to bring "peace and national accord" to Chechnya. Who will be the lucky one?

In previous years the secret springs of the selection and advancement of national leaders on the republics' political stage lay hidden somewhere in the Politburo. This is the fourth year that this semisecret "revolutionary" body has no longer existed, but the personnel "bank" that it created in the national formations, diluted by people who were advanced during the transitional period, is practically the sole source of local leaders both for voters and for those who make recommendations from the federal center. In many respects this indisputable fact, no matter how one regards it, determines the nature of the upcoming changes in Chechnya.

#### Coming Full Circle

The appointment of Nikolay Semenov to the office of head of the territorial administration of federal bodies of executive authority in Chechnya—with great powers, moreover—was a surprise, not just for political neophytes. The assignment of pacifying rebellious Chechnya was given to a person over 60 years old. Why would that be done?

If one delves more deeply into his biography, the secret is revealed. For 10 years, from 1975 to 1985, Nikolay Semenov headed the Groznyy City CPSU Committee. Subsequent milestones in his party career led to the Central Committee of the Kirghiz Communist Party, where he spent four years in charge of construction, transportation, communications and trade, and to the CPSU Central Committee, where from 1989 to 1991 he was head of the Central Asia and Kazakhstan sector.

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"Are you a member of the Communist Party?" a ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent asked the new viceroy in Chechnya. He replied without a trace of embarrassment: "I am not now, but I am a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." Incidentally, Nikolay Ivanovich quite willingly emphasizes his nomenklatura origin.

If the wise reader links the main pivotal years in Nikolay Semenov's party career with his official duties, he will immediately realize that the appointment of the former nomenklatura Communist to the role of virtually the main ruler of Chechnya is perfectly natural and signals a return to power of the old ruling elite.

In the capital of Chechnya, this is even more evident. On 6 September 1991, the first thing that Dudayev's supporters did after breaking into the House of Political Enlightenment where the republic Supreme Soviet was meeting was to throw V. Kutsenko, head of the Groznyy City CPSU Committee, out the window, thereby attesting both to their hatred of the former regime and to their own victory. The present assumption of power in Groznyy by the dead man's former fellow party member brings everything full circle.

That is only one side of the story though. The other side is that Nikolay Semenov knows the oil industry well, and according to people in the know, the whole conflagration in Groznyy broke out over oil, the oil spigot that pours out petrodollars. Salambek Khadzhiyev, head of Chechnya's Government of Popular Revival, stressed in an interview with IZVESTIYA that the Russian Army was fighting not only against D. Dudayev but also "against that part of the Russian mafia whose interests extend to the Chechen Republic." According to him, despite everything, oil had been arriving regularly in Chechnya, and that was very advantageous to someone in Moscow.

"I cannot yet calculate exactly, but from 1991 through 1994 Russia sent Dudayev between 20 and 30 million tonnes of petroleum," says Salambek Khadzhiyev. "After being refined, about 50 percent of it—at the most—returned. There are subtleties here involving payment, which could either be delayed or could settle in the necessary banks. There are a lot of schemes in this business for making big money." Evidently, knowing about those schemes amounts to yet another job for Salambek Khadzhiyev, the first deputy Chechen viceroy.

The oil savvy of the new Chechen leadership's top people did not take long to manifest itself: Nikolay Semenov has already announced that the oil fields may begin production in the near future and that the tour-of-duty method should be organized there. On the other hand, in his opinion, restoring the social sphere and housing will prove to be a prolonged and difficult job. Have the priorities been chosen?

When accepting a given office, many politicians like to announce their team. Upon whom and what does Nikolay Semenov intend to rely? In answering such questions, he evasively talks about his experience, knowledge of local traditions, and the extensive business ties he has in Groznyy. Judging from the first reaction, the appointment of Nikolay Semenov suits many of the republic's political forces—of course, with the exception of D. Dudayev, with whom the viceroy in Chechnya does not even intend to establish any contacts. Some people are impressed by Nikolay Semenov's desire to hold talks with all of Chechnya's influential political leaders, while others are impressed by his Russian origin, which they say will reduce interclan rivalry. Still others are impressed by his association with the Soviet party system. We shall wait and see.

### Who Calls the Shots

If Nikolay Semenov's emergence in the game of political patience in present-day Chechnya is to some extent understandable, other "healthy forces" that have presently entered the arena raise questions. To what extent can, say, Beslan Gantemirov, the "commander-in-chief of the united forces," accuse D. Dudayev of involvement in the "petrodollar mafia?" Every child in the city knows that he has a grudge against Dzhokhar Dudayev because the latter fired him as mayor of Groznyy—thereby depriving him of the opportunity to allocate official positions and, at the same time, of access to those same "petrodollars."

What sort of "healthy forces" operated under the leadership of field commander Ruslan Labazanov, who, in speaking of himself, clarifies a point: "I was not a criminal, only a suspect. I was imprisoned in Krasnodar under Article 218 and was released early. To say that I was a criminal and murderer, a court decision is needed..." It is also noteworthy that this innocent victim founded a party whose main goal is "the redistribution of property." It would be interesting to know: to whose benefit?

What sort of "anarchy" and "unconstitutionality" in the actions of Dzhokhar Dudayev can Umar Avturkhanov, head of the administration of Nadterechnyy Rayon and chairman of the Chechen Republic Provisional Council, speak of, when he initially acted in concert with the general, then "saw the light" and just as readily went to fight against the "usurper." How much trust can one accord a politician who promised, along with his supporters, to give practical assistance to federal troops in restoring constitutional order and then in the hour of crisis failed to honor his word?

Does the professor-"peacemaker" Ruslan Khasbulatov have any moral right to speak of the usurpation of power by Gen. D. Dudayev and of the illegality and criminality of his regime, when Khasbulatov, as acting chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, actively assisted him in pursuing those ends? When, on 6 September 1991, a group of Dudayev demonstrators took by storm the House of Political Enlightenment where the Supreme Soviet of Checheno-Ingushetia was meeting under the chairmanship of Doku Zavgayev, first secretary of the

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republic CPSU committee, and broke that body up, thereby overthrowing the Soviet regime in the republic, Ruslan Imranovich saw the action that had been carried out as no less than a "popular uprising against the dictatorship of the party bureaucracy."

At that time Ruslan Khasbulatov was calling Dzhokhar Dudayev himself a "democrat with a fairly sober assessment of the present situation in the republic and of its prospects." What, after that, caused a falling-out between the chief victorious democrats? Everything is simple and familiar to the point of banality: they did not share power. Power in Russia in no way means concern for the people; it means wealth and glory and esteem and privileges. Power and profit have always gone hand in hand in Russia. Ruslan Imranovich very much wanted to rule in Moscow and to have Groznyy as his feudal domain, but Dzhokhar Musayevich proved to be nobody's fool when it comes to power.

Evidently the smell of power is intoxicating, clouding both the reason and the conscience. Otherwise, is it conceivable that a person of sound moral character would dare to say that Ruslan Khasbulatov "is fulfilling his moral duty to the Chechen people. In the fall of 1991 the Russian leadership, including Khasbulatov, made a political mistake that objectively contributed to the assumption of power by former Soviet General D. Dudayev, a dangerous adventurer and mentally ill person. Now, drawing on his public prestige, Khasbulatov considers it his civic duty to promote the establishment of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic"?

Those are the revelations of Umar Avturkhanov, who is now actively laying claim to the role of "national leader." Even Doku Zavgayev, the "godfather of leaders," who is an even greater expert in the flexibility of ideas and principles, could not bring himself to utter such words. Exiled from Groznyy, he was taken in and set up in Moscow, becoming the ally of all those who were fighting the D. Dudayev regime. Nonetheless, in assessing the role of Ruslan Khasbulatov in the present situation, Doku Zavgayev calls for "a realistic view of his goals and objectives, his methods and the circle of people with whom he operates. Yesterday he was flooding Moscow's embankments with blood and compromising Russian statehood. Remember who greeted him at Lefortovo—thieves and criminals. That is his social base. There were no scholars there, nor was Makhmud Esambayev there."

Do you feel the level of statesmanlike thinking, the concern for the people? Literally on the eve of the entrance of federal troops into Chechnya, Doku Zavgayev, the last chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Checheno-Ingushetia and leader of that republic's CPSU committee, noted bitterly: "There are no democratic foundations in Chechnya. If there were any, it was before September 1991; then they were destroyed. National thieves, armed with slogans that were acceptable for that period, destroyed those foundations. Until the bloody Dudayev regime is swept away, the people will be unable to have their say. Any forces acting against Dudayev will lead to an improvement of the situation in the republic."

Evidently, that is how Ruslan Khasbulatov also perceives "Dudayevism" now. Doku Zavgayev, however, need not rejoice; those are nearly the same words that the acting chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet used to stigmatize his regime in 1991, calling it "Zavgayevism;" "that Supreme Soviet and its chairman used 'sovereignty' for their own selfish purposes, shutting the republic off from further democratization and preserving their own power. The former rulers had such a tight grip on their offices that they were prepared to put the republic's entire population under the gun."

Now that's "letting 'em have it." When the Chechen opposition started to launch military raids, some Moscow politicians rubbed their hands together with satisfaction, thinking they would pit Vaynakh leaders against one another and succeed in using them to solve the problem. Today one feels like saying: it was not we who pitted them against one another but they who pitted us against the Chechens, the Ingush, the Ossetians, and the Abkhaz, and pitted Russians against Russians, pushing us toward civil war. Before heedlessly criticizing the Kremlin today for a "bloody slaughter," let us remember how it all started, and what an effort the sons of the Chechen people made to fan the fire that had almost died out, in striving for "democracy and constitutional order."

One can say that they have already achieved a great deal. Umar Avturkhanov was recently appointed, along with Salambek Khadzhiyev, first deputy head of the territorial administration of federal bodies of executive authority in Chechnya. Beslan Gantemirov has become simply Nikolay Semenov's deputy and been restored to office as mayor of Groznyy.

In the end, however, the people themselves must solve the problem of their leaders, but one simply cannot shake off the depressing question: can it be that present-day Chechens, who have enriched the world with Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov and Aslanbek Sherilov, Tashtemir Eldarkhanov and Makhmud Esambayev, have been given worthy sons capable of fulfilling the role of spiritual leader of the people? Why are the shots being called by those who are so accustomed to immorality and cynicism in politics that they do not even attempt to hide it?

Can the answer be that many true believers simply have not listened to the words of Allah, which he speaks in nearly every other verse of the Koran: "kalalan mata zakkuran"—"too little do you reflect"?

### Bull in the Bullfight

To show portraits of politicians in the Chechen gallery and not mention Dzhokhar Dudayev would be useless. A ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent happened to be

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the first journalist to interview him immediately after the events of 6 September 1991. The general's excitable disposition and far-reaching intentions had already manifested themselves clearly at that time. Here are a few fragments from Dzhokhar Dudayev's answers to questions:

"... We are starting to build our state from scratch, and during the transitional period we need political bulls who are prepared to break through the barriers to freedom. I am prepared to perform that role. ...

"An autonomous republic is not a state; it is a colony. Today we should really build our own state and not just proclaim sovereignty. ...

"For the transitional period, the only RSFSR laws that are in effect in our republic are those that do not contradict us. In drafting our own legislative acts, we are taking the Georgian and Lithuanian versions as our guide. ...

"Not a single USSR or RSFSR law on land is acceptable to us. We have our own traditions, and the land in Checheno-Ingushetia will belong only to Chechens and Ingush. ...

"Chechens will henceforth serve on their own territory. From time immemorial our boys have been trained since childhood to defend the homeland and bear arms. The right to bear arms was taken away from Chechens in 1921, but we are now restoring it. Arms are the guarantor of security. Life itself has compelled Chechens to defend themselves from administration, from violence. ..."

Now many political scientists and specialists on ethnic matters are claiming that in 1991-1992 the Chechen problem could have been settled peacefully to Russia's advantage by "recognizing" the general. Who knows? Had Ruslan Khasbulatov not been a member of the ruling nucleus at that time, maybe that could have happened, and events in Chechnya would have taken an entirely different course. It is worth reflecting on why the peace missions from Moscow to Groznyy consistently managed to fan the hotbed of tension rather than to dampen it.

Why did Russian deputies approve the overthrow of Checheno-Ingushetia's Supreme Soviet but condemn D. Dudayev's ignoring of the republic's Provisional Supreme Council, which had been formed at the insistence of R. Khasbulatov by the Supreme Soviet that had "dissolved itself?" Why were any more or less successful contacts and talks between the federal authority and Groznyy's official circles during all those years invariably broken off by the Chechen opposition in Moscow?

As if answering the questions that have been raised, State Duma Deputy Anatoliy Golov (Yabloko faction), chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Russia, noted: "The Chechen crisis showed the real power of individual political forces and clans. The war party has won in Chechnya, but there is no military solution to the problem. For three years we believed that everything would resolve itself in Chechnya; we put our hopes in negotiations, but certain Chechen clans successfully thwarted them. Consequently, if they are so powerful that they can determine the federal center's policy toward a component of Russia, the situation is very dangerous. It turns out that both Duma factions and political parties are relatively powerless and can do nothing, but the clans have power."

Did the federal authorities make any attempts to effectively solve the problem of D. Dudayev during the initial stage of the crisis? Yes and no. As we recall, no criminal charges were brought against him, but attempts were made to cut the Gordian knot by force. All these attempts proved ineffective and gave the impression of being more of the same. Thus, at 8:45 on 8 November 1991 a secret, encrypted message arrived in Groznyy from Moscow with orders to immediately begin liberating the buildings of the KGB and the former city CPSU Committee and to arrest Dudayev and other members of the Chechen National Congress.

A second encrypted message with the order to "arrest Dudayev" arrived from Moscow at 15:40 on 9 November 1991: "I admonish you concerning personal responsibility for organizing the precise and unconditional execution of the president's edict on imposing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. Take urgent measures to prevent the seizure of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] building. I consider it impermissible for it to be given up. Necessary assistance will be provided. I consider Gafarov's failure to carry out Comrade Barannikov's and my order to be a crime. MVD Minister Dunayev."

The assistance promised in the encrypted message was organized that same day. Several hundred armed men gathered in the Groznyy House of Officers. The raiding parties were led by deputy ministers and several department heads from the Chechen-Ingush Republic. They had all had titles conferred on them in advance, and they had all given Minister A. Dunayev their consent, in principle, to capture D. Dudayev and the members of the presidium of the Chechen National Congress executive committee.

The "arrest," however, went no further than the "consent" and the conferring of titles in advance, and Dudayev's men captured the building itself of the Chechen-Ingush Republic MVD without firing a shot. The press got hold of the encrypted messages, and the president-general's stock as a national hero shot up. The "miscalculation" of the Russian MVD chief in this case bothered a lot of observers precisely because A. Dunayev had begun his ministerial career in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic MVD and had direct personal knowledge of the actual situation there.

Such "miscalculations" on Moscow's part with respect to Dzhokhar Dudayev have strangely accompanied his entire presidential career. Whether they are the result of

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the federal authorities' incompetence and failure to think things through or of a subtly calculated game by certain political clans remains to be figured out. For example, the Chechen opposition claims that more than 100 flights abroad were being made from Groznyy every month. A great deal of secret cargo accompanied the passengers on those flights. The strange thing is that such flights, in close proximity to Mineralnyye Vody, the largest airport in the Caucasus, could not have been made without the permission of Russian authorities.

The press has learned that D. Dudayev knew in advance of plans for the army's actions and the routes and times of its units' movements. He was receiving extensive information from Mozdok until literally the last moment.

It is also known that the Chechen president was kept informed on a rather current basis about many of the Russian leadership's unpublicized affairs.

In any event, Abdulbek Daudov, Chechnya's former minister of internal affairs, claims that in October 1991 he signed an order for D. Dudayev's arrest, but "on orders from above, we were not allowed to do that." According to him, Dudayev had too many powerful protectors in Russia who were also the ones who armed him. Abdulbek Daudov makes no secret of the fact that he has plenty of documents proving Dzhokhar Dudayev's relationship with Russian government and military circles.

Journalists have written a great deal about Dzhokhar Dudayev, but unfortunately they have done so in an extremely oversimplified fashion, portraying him either as a national hero who challenged the Russian empire or as a usurper who established a bloody regime in Chechnya. Unfortunately, he still remains an enigmatic figure. Sometime his meteoric political rise and career will be thoroughly analyzed, and maybe investigators will dig down to the financial, political, and criminal sources that gave rise to the Dudayev phenomenon. Right now one thing is clear: at some stage he decided to take the game into his own hands and play it according to his own rules, ceasing to take orders, and that threw off the calculations of certain influential forces.

"Dzho" assigned himself the role of the "political bull prepared to break through the barriers to freedom." Time will tell the extent to which he broke through, or whether he did so at all, but it does appear that he felt himself to be in the role of a bull in a bullfight. It is hard to say how carefully considered and timely his attempt to create a sovereign Chechen state in actual fact—and not just in declarations—proved to be, but as the leader of his people, Dzhokhar Dudayev clearly lacked the wisdom of the ruler who, according to the Eastern canons, sees what is hidden, curbs his pride, urges circumspection, does not allow ranting, and respects virtues. The main thing is that such a ruler does not allow action to be taken where there is no hope for success, much less incite others to such action.

Predicting the introduction of Russian Armed Forces into Chechnya long before the fact, Dzhokhar Dudayev loved to try to frighten Russians by recalling the Caucasus War that ended 130 years ago, and he invariably emphasized: vast tsarist Russia had to wage its colonial war against the small peoples of the Caucasus for some 100 years. I personally heard the most diverse responses to such thoughts, from the proud: "but it was we Russians who won;" to the modest scholarly opinions to the effect that the tsarist government had never waged that war in earnest, using it as a proving ground and a place to exile dissidents.

Whether that is true is a subject for scholarly debate. The present military action against Groznyy, of course, will prove to have been no easy stroll through the park, but something else is also clear: for Russia, Chechnya is not Afghanistan, and the point in no way lies in the greater or lesser training or bravery of one set or another of defenders of the homeland, the present-day knights of Christianity, or the knights of Islam. Afghanistan after all is a foreign country for Russia; in the minds of Russians the Northern Caucasus is perceived as "our land." Can you imagine Russian literature without Aleksandr Pushkin and Mikhail Lermontov with their Caucasian themes?

Moreover, unlike Afghanistan, the Northern Caucasus is inhabited by many Russians who have no intention of waiting to see how events turn out. Although Russians have no law of blood revenge, they do have "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." Just like the Vaynakhs, they can take up arms to defend their homes and their land and avenge their brothers and friends. Before taking to the warpath, Dzhokhar Dudayev should have carefully considered and weighed everything. No president is good enough to sacrifice his people on the altar of his own power. Unreasonable bravery is fine in a street fight, but in leading a state, wisdom is valued. Every cloud has a silver lining: Dzhokhar Dudayev has demonstrated once again how dangerous it is to give a madman a sword and a dishonorable man power.

### *Kalmyk President on Chechen Situation

*954E0636A Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Mar 95 p 9*

[Interview with Kalymk President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov by Nikolay Dorofeyev: "'I Favor Dictatorship of the Economy'"; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Kalmykia's President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov has always stood somewhat apart from the general run of Russia's political elite. Recall, for example, that he was the first to dissolve the soviets on the territory under his "jurisdiction." Meanwhile, during the October standoff in 1993 he voiced support for the Supreme Soviet of Russia.... Kalmykia's President has done some other well known actions which were often surprising because they were so unexpected if not downright eccentric. But then the events in Chechnya started, in which so many of**

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**Russia's politicians have tried to make a name for themselves. Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, however, kept still. Why? This question led off our interview with Kalmykia's President.**

[Ilyumzhinov] I don't like to repeat myself. Half a year before the events in Chechnya, in March and April of last year, I predicted them.

[Dorofeyev] At the time, I think, you initiated legislation to abolish the Kalmyk Republic's Constitution, Law on Citizenship, and Declaration of Sovereignty....

[Ilyumzhinov] I not only came out with the initiative, I did it in my republic. My reasoning was that the Russian Federation ought to have one President, one Constitution, and one Law on Citizenship.

It seemed to me that the time for that had come. After the elections to parliament in December 1993, which were won by forces utilizing patriotic and great-power slogans, I felt that the Russian people was finally waking up and beginning to feel like a nation. I hasten to say that I also sense myself to be a part of the Russian nation, which is a mosaic that takes in everything. Hence, the rise of Russian national consciousness, chaos in the economy, and unrestrained crime would sooner or later force Russia's President to resort to tough and, if necessary, punitive measures to save the country from destruction.

But this can only be done by maintaining a unified economic space and a common ruble zone, eliminating all customs barriers. This means no silly state formations, paper sovereignties, and local constitutions.

But it seemed to me that if this process began from above, if the Kremlin were to abolish the republic constitutions, remove presidents, and institute rigid authority from above, conflicts would inevitably arise. So might it not be necessary, in order to save the state, the economy, and the people, to initiate the process from below, rejecting paper sovereignties, constitutions, and presidencies, and boost the economy of all Russia together?

[Dorofeyev] Nevertheless, nobody endorsed this good idea of yours.

[Ilyumzhinov] Worse than that. People really tore into me! At home, in Elista, an opposition formed, there were rallies with slogans like "Ilyumzhinov, go home to Moscow!" My colleagues from the other republics began to phone, asking why I was doing this, telling me that sovereignty was our only trump card to "pressure" Moscow and gain benefits and credits.

They didn't understand me in Moscow either. One VIP in the Kremlin phoned and said, "Is there no one more Russian than the Kalmyk Ilyumzhinov? Who do you think you are?" As for lower-rank officials, they also did not mince words. They said, "Kirsan, are you mad? How can a republic renounce sovereignty and a constitution? They'll tear your head off!"

Anyway, I realized that analysts in Moscow do not count initiatives from the regions that are well disposed to the Center. And they don't count on them either. Their thinking is not oriented toward supporting any centripetal initiatives from the regions but rather toward taking out Dudayev, compromising the republic leader, and creating an opposition to the existing authority in a particular territory.

[Dorofeyev] Don't you mean, Kirsan Nikolayevich, that the Kremlin is pursuing the old British colonial policy of "divide and rule"?

[Ilyumzhinov] I can tell you what I came up against in the republic. After my idea was made public, high-placed officials I tried to meet refused to receive me in the Kremlin—and I know that they were receiving representatives of the opposition. And it was the most rabid nationalists among the former party secretaries at that, people who endorsed purely separatist tendencies and called for a "return to China," from whence our people came in the sixteenth century, and whose programs included territorial claims on Astrakhan Oblast and Dagestan.

Not only were they received, these people were given a certain amount of support and money. They even started publishing a newspaper, SOVETSKAYA KALMYKIYA.

What's going on? In Chechnya we're bombing and shelling the separatists into submission, while in Kalmykia we're cultivating them. But for what purpose? At any rate, when I used to hear that someone in the Kremlin was supporting Dudayev, I thought it was just journalists' gossip. But I have learned firsthand that such things are possible....

That's why I advised my people to give up our paper sovereignty voluntarily, so that we wouldn't be forced to in half a year.

At the time, in the spring of 1994, I frankly called on the people of Kalmykia not to become the kind of target which would be utilized for these purposes in half a year.

The way it ended up in our republic is that we quietly abolished our Constitution, Declaration of Sovereignty, and Law on Citizenship. We calmly accepted our Code of the Steppe and began to tend to our economy.

[Dorofeyev] But none of the other republics of the Russian Federation followed Kalmykia's example. Keep in mind also that a few weeks ago a group of regional leaders gathered for a conference in Cheboksary, the capital of Chuvashia, and condemned the Russian government's policies in harsh terms.

[Ilyumzhinov] So what? I view such conferences exactly as I view any "advisory commissions." They are created strictly to do nothing. The same is true of conferences like the one in Cheboksary. In my opinion it is nothing but a talk-fest that produces nothing.

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[Dorofeyev] Of course a great deal more can be done by means of a dictatorship....

[Ilyumzhinov] But why be so afraid of that? A dictatorship is necessary, and I created one in Kalmykia—but all it is is a dictatorship of the economy. In a transition period, I believe, any serious talk of democracy is out of the question. And what we have now in Russia cannot be called democracy. It is ochlocracy—mob rule, anything goes.

[Dorofeyev] Do you mean that the struggle against "ochlocracy" in Russia began with the war in Chechnya? And, typically, you are a man who is known to be a "peacemaker"; you don't even try to influence events.

[Ilyumzhinov] The situation in Chechnya has reached a point where it can be resolved, I believe, by only two men—Yeltsin and Dudayev. Trips by commissions, speeches by deputies, and protests by the public won't get anywhere unless these two put an end to the fighting.

As for me, I have done everything I could about the Chechnya problem. In late April 1994 I spoke face to face with President Yeltsin and asked him to meet with Dudayev. I remember the President consented. I flew to Groznyy and we talked with Dudayev about eight hours. Dudayev expressed willingness to meet Russia's President in Elista or Moscow. Moreover, he said he was willing to sign a Civil Accord Treaty. I returned to Moscow and related the results of my visit to the Russian President's assistants. Then I had a conversation on the matter with Sergey Shakhray. From this conversation, however, I gathered that Sergey Mikhaylovich leaned toward the tougher option. And nobody there wanted to hear what I had to say....

[Dorofeyev] In your opinion, how has the Chechnya situation influenced relations between the Center and the regions?

[Ilyumzhinov] We've gone backwards. Until 1994, sovereignty in the republics was useful only to the regional political elite; tanks on the streets of Groznyy have "brought the idea" down to the level of each person. The logic is simple: if Big Brother crushes Little Brother so mercilessly, I'd better get out. All of Russia's smaller peoples sympathize not with Dudayev, of course, but with ordinary Chechens. And this could have a negative impact on the unification of Russia. The people come to be afraid, that's what's bad!

By the way, I'm convinced it won't stop with Chechnya. There could also be bloodshed in Russia itself, possibly on a larger scale than in Chechnya.... But bloodshed, even if some people take my words to be blasphemous, can be cleansing. You know how they lance boils? Right—and it's the same with states. Of course it sounds terrible. We have to undergo cleansing. It will be followed by an incredible economic upsurge. Do you believe that?

[Dorofeyev] I would hope that your prediction comes true without the first part, the bloodshed....

## Results of Polls on Chechnya War Reported

*954F1713A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 8, 24 Feb-2 Mar 95 p 3*

[Article by Dimitry Chuoukov, analytical center of the "Obshchestvennoye Mneniye" (Public Opinion) foundation: "Democracy Tested in Battle"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Most people in Russia did not support sending Russian troops into Chechnya. Does this mean that democracy in Russia has become so deep-rooted that we are no longer at risk of a step back to a police state?

More than two-thirds of those polled by the "Obshchestvennoye Mneniye" foundation condemn Moscow's military action. In so doing, they are guided not only by the obvious consideration that war is bad and peace is good. Over 50 percent of those polled believe that such action harms Russia's international prestige and is not worthy of a great power. Russian people were absolutely unreceptive to official propaganda with its "time-tested" stereotypes. Only 7 percent voiced their solidarity with General Pavel Grachev, who called Sergei Kovalyov "Russia's enemy" (43 percent rejected this reference).

Perhaps Russian leaders were surprised not only by the actions of soldier's mothers, who helped their sons out of fighting units, but also by society's approval of these actions: three-quarters of the population express silent solidarity with soldier's mothers. An even greater surprise was perhaps the mass-scale sympathy with those soldiers and officers who refused to fulfil orders (only 24 percent condemned their conduct, whereas 53 percent approved it). Moreover, Russian society is quite unreceptive to the thought that these people must be brought to trial (74 percent oppose and only 11 percent approve).

Five years ago when Soviet army units entered Baku and the defense minister ordered a call-up of reserves, their mothers and wives went into the streets of several cities with slogans of protest. Women said something hitherto unprecedented: "If THEY are fighting there, why should OUR boys shed their blood?" At that time it became clear that former notions about statehood, great power and patriotism were being washed away. This did not mean that people had become indifferent to the country's integrity: a year after the Baku events, most of them supported a referendum for the preservation of the USSR and to this day regret its disintegration.

Most of our countrymen are lost in their private lives and are concerned about their and their family's prosperity. It is clear that any Russian will reject a war that proposes that he defend not himself, but some general principle: the war threatens not only his prosperity, but also his life and that of his children. He has not lost his patriotism, but he no longer believes that the expansion

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or preservation of the country's territory should be attained at all costs. Regarding the attitude of a genuine Russian patriot to the military operation in Chechnya, 52 percent of the polled answered that a patriot must oppose this operation, while only 19 percent feel that he should support it.

Some may regard this as an alarming symptom of the destruction of old state consciousness without acquiring a new one. However, others might see in this the embryo of new patriotism that compels a man to love his country not only for its ability to preserve unity and integrity through force, but also for welfare and security which it ensures for each citizen by settling conflicts not through intimidation but through negotiations. However, even if this is how matters stand, do we have sufficient grounds for optimism? Can we believe that mass-scale disapproval of the Kremlin's Chechen action shows that the democratic choice of Russia and her people is final and irrevocable?

For as long as the Chechen war continues, this question will remain open. Moreover, its delay, combined with the economic crisis that is more intensified by the war, may change people's sentiments. There is no guarantee that the image of the enemy in a new (Chechen, Caucasian, Moslem or any other) guise will not be restored. The image of the enemy is a new militarization of consciousness, a new vindication of strength and a new dictatorship. The only difference is that it will rely not on a communist ideology but on Russian nationalism, which like any nationalism, is quite compatible with the elements of the market economy.

Figures prove that this danger is not a figment of our imagination. Indeed, people oppose war, but when you ask them what they feel is a way out of this situation, Russian society is more divided in its opinion: 43 percent support the immediate cessation of hostilities in Chechnya, while 38 percent are for a more resolute use of force for the elimination of the Dudayev regime. However, in the first two months of military actions, the number of the second group did not reduce, but even increased. It can be assumed that the more people become accustomed to this war, the less they are apt to remember who started it and who is to blame for it. The main culprit will be sought and found not in Moscow, but in the towns and villages of Chechnya.

Even today the population of Russia has no particular liking for the belligerent Chechens. Only 11 percent of those polled believe that they are fighting "for a righteous cause" (38 percent are inclined to think that the righteousness is on the side of Russian troops). Mass consciousness did not respond to the opinion of Kovalyov and his supporters, which says that Russian troops are opposed not by criminals but by the armed Chechen people. This viewpoint won only 21 percent of supporters, whereas 47 percent supported the version of criminals. Perhaps this will arouse optimism among some people: allegedly if people do not think that the war is fought against the Chechen people, their consciousness is safely guaranteed against the penetration of the image of an ethnic enemy, hence Russian nationalism and nationalist dictatorship do not threaten us. However, here I see psychological fertile ground to present any war against any people as a war against the criminals of a corresponding nationality.

Of course, these sentiments are being outbalanced today by the common disapproval of the war. Moreover, a society which has tasted political freedom does not wish to return to the past: 54 percent of those polled do not want dictatorship to be established in the country, neither in communist, neo-nationalist, nor in any other form. However, the word "dictatorship" does not grate upon their ears of 28 percent of our countrymen, who are ready to accept it on one or another condition. Moreover, most supporters of democracy are not idealists at all. They prefer democracy only because they expect it to improve living standards. At any rate, only 18 percent of people in Russia would choose democracy, had they been offered a choice between it and the improvement of living conditions. However, two-thirds of the population prefer more tangible things.

## Krasnodar Governor on Adygea Constitution

*954F1655A Krasnodar KUBANSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 1*

[Interview with Ye. M. Kharitonov, under rubric "Interview in Today's Issue: We Remain Neighbors and Friends"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **As is generally known, at a session of the Krasnodar Kray Legislative Assembly a group of deputies raised the question about the fact that, in individual articles in the Constitution of the Republic of Adygea that is to be adopted, an encroachment is made on the rights of the Russian-speaking population. It was decided to hold a summit meeting with the purpose of discussing the problems that arose. That meeting was held in Maykop last Monday. Yesterday our correspondent had a conversation with Ye. M. Kharitonov, Krasnodar Kray administration head, who headed the Kuban delegation.**

[Interviewer] Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, how justified is the opinion that is being disseminated, to the effect that individual articles in the draft of the Constitution of the Republic of Adygea encroach upon the rights of non-Adygs, and that this will have a negative effect in our kray?

[Kharitonov] First of all, the future Constitution of Adygea should not be linked with the life of Krasnodar Kray. After all, we are different subjects of the Federation. We will have our own Charter, and we shall live according to it.

Secondly, it is more proper to speak not about encroachment upon the citizens' rights, but what is happening right now, the fact that, at this stage, certain articles in

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the future Basic Law [Constitution] of Adygea go beyond the confines of the legal field of the Russian Constitution. That is precisely something that can influence the political moods of the inhabitants of the neighboring regions.

The process of constitutionalizing our republic neighbor is not proceeding smoothly. There was a first version of the Constitution, then a second and a third... There was a first reading of it, and then a second one, in the parliament (*Khase*), and there will be a third one. Naturally, in Adygea itself there are different approaches to this document. There is a carefully weighed position (there even exists a group of deputies in parliament that calls itself "For a just Constitution"). There are radicals on both extremes. Properly speaking, this is natural. It is the normal struggle among political forces.

But we ought not to proceed from the fact that both Krasnodar Kray and the Republic of Adygea are completely equal components of a single Russia. The Republic has the right to its own Constitution, so let it adopt that Constitution. But we shall modify the Charter of Krasnodar Kray and adopt it at the Legislative Assembly or by a kray-wide referendum. Possibly, even Adygea will take the Constitution through a referendum, but this is not for us to decide.

[Interviewer] However, there exist in the kray various forces that call themselves patriotic, that would like to "prompt" our neighbors on how they should work on the Constitution, and how to adopt it (only by means of a referendum!).

[Kharitonov] Forces like that also exist in Adygea. Our patriots call them nationalists, and they call ours chauvinists. In a word, "kissin' cousins."

But just imagine what it would be like if it was dictated to us from Adygea how we should adopt the kray's Charter. Would we like that?

Reciprocal consultations are another matter. They are simply indispensable: the life of the kray and the republic are so intertwined economically, politically, culturally, and socially that many questions can be resolved only by working in unison. They should be resolved, and then made part of our laws.

There are not too many subjects of the Federation remaining who have not yet adopted a Constitution or a Charter, including Krasnodar Kray and Adygea. Republic President A. Dzharimov takes a carefully weighed approach to the process of constitutionalization and does not rush the events, but we are even lagging behind our neighbors in the work on the Charter. It can be said unambiguously that, as of today, there exist factors that require clarification from both sides.

[Interviewer] Was that the reason for your trip to Adygea with A. Bagmut, chairman of the Legislative Assembly, *getman* V. P. Gromov, and other representatives of the kray's public and political forces?

[Kharitonov] We went there with the consent of, and even, I might say, on the invitation of our neighbor friends. We attentively, article by article, became acquainted with the draft of their Constitution and discussed it together. Our delegation directed the attention of the Adygea side to a number of conceptual questions. For example, we feel that in a Constitution or Charter of each subject the principle that must be confirmed first of all is the supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and of Russian laws. Those documents must also define that the subject recognizes the unity and indivisibility of the Russian state of which it is a part.

Within the framework of the country's chief Constitution, there is a rather broad field for independent decisions and the independent arrangement of life. With regard to individual decisions (in our kray, for example, those concerning the rules for transporting oil across the territory of the kray, concerning the limitation of migration, concerning the special procedure for land use, etc.), we can enter into conflict with the government. But never with the RF Constitution!

In what we consider to be a poorly thought-out manner, Adygea is called in the draft a sovereign state. A state within a state is political nonsense. And we said that directly to the republic's managers and parliamentarians.

In general, it must be said that things are not simple for President Dzharimov, the government, or the deputies to the Khase: they constantly oppose the extremist forces that are attempting to "push through" articles that contradict the RF Constitution.

[Interviewer] Was the question of the parity between the "titular" nation and "the others" raised at the meeting?

[Kharitonov] Yes, it was. We were convinced that in a republic where more than 70 percent of the population is made up of Russians, that parity is simply necessary. Any decision that encroaches upon the rights of Russian-speakers will not pass: it will be ""sandbagged" by the overwhelming majority of votes. But parity guarantees that a decision that encroaches upon the rights of yes can also be blocked.

[Interviewer] It is a good thing that our delegation agreed with the Adygea leadership in this question. But did our neighbors agree with you in any respect?

[Kharitonov] They listened to us attentively, and in most instances they agreed with us. In particular, with regard to those conceptual questions that I have mentioned, consultations between the parliamentarians in the republic and the kray will continue.

[Interviewer] The press has touched upon the topic of exchanging territories between the republic and the kray, thus making it possible for Adygea to have access to the borders of Abkhazia and Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Does that topic have any foundation?

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[Kharitonov] Yes, earlier the Republic of Adygea posed that question to the kray administration and the then kray Council. The Adygeya side did not raise that question at the current meeting.

[Interviewer] Moscow is deciding the problem of creating a Shapsug autonomy on the territory of Krasnodar Kray...

[Kharitonov] We are unambiguously opposed to having that question decided for us! It is a matter for Krasnodar Kray and its agencies of authority—the Legislative Assembly and the administration. We are the only ones who can decide whether or not there should be a Shapsug autonomy. Properly speaking, as the last two proposals I repeated the words of Adygea President A. A. Dzharimov, that were expressed at the meeting.

[Interviewer] Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, do you consider the meeting to be beneficial and fruitful?

[Kharitonov] Definitely! And when the final stage of the work on the present Charter begins in the kray, we shall definitely invite a delegation from the Republic of Adygea, so that they can read it and give us advice and suggestions. That is things should be done between good neighbors!

### Krasnodar, Adygea Agree on Constitution

*954F1655B Krasnodar KUBANSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 1*

[Declaration: "Joint Declaration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear fellow countrymen, residents of Krasnodar Kray and the Republic of Adygea!

We, the representatives of the legislative and executive agencies of the Republic of Adygea and Krasnodar Kray, met in the city of Maykop and considered the sociopolitical situation in our region.

Kuban is a house that is shared by all the residents o Krasnodar Kray and the Republic of Adygea. Following the spirit of mutual understanding and mutual respect that has developed over centuries of joint vital activity between the Russians and the Adygs, the present generation, despite the large complexities, retains its faithfulness to their father's traditions and behests—to live in peace and harmony.

Our peoples, together, have traveled a complicated historical path and have come to the firm conviction that there is no other path other than to trust one another.

The Republic of Adygea and Krasnodar Kray currently are at the stage of developing and adopting a Constitution and a Charter. The necessary conditions have been created for having the broadest segments of the population participate in these processes. In the course of the work on the drafts, consideration is being taken of the recommendations and comments made by public movements and individual citizens. We shall adopt a Constitution and a Charter that will guarantee the supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the unity and indivisibility of the Russian state system, and will become the guarantor of stability in our region.

We call upon all of you, our dear fellow countrymen, to preserve and multiply the age-old traditions of living together in peace and harmony.

For the Republic of Adygea:

A. Dzharimov, president. A. Radchenko, deputy chairman of the Legislative Assembly (*Khase*)—parliament. A. Dorofeyev, committee chairman, Legislative Assembly (*Khase*)—parliament. T. Beretar, committee chairman, Legislative Assembly (*Khase*)—parliament. A. Rudenko, committee chairman, Legislative Assembly (*Khase*)—parliament. Yu. Udychak, committee chairman, Legislative Assembly (*Khase*)—parliament. K. Dzybov, permanent representative of the Republic of Adygea, to the Krasnodar Kray administration head.

For Krasnodar Kray:

Ye. Kharitonov, administration head. A. Bagmut, chairman of the Legislative Assembly. V. Gromov, committee chairman, Legislative Assembly, *ataman* of the All-Kuban Cossack Army. Yu. Antonov, committee chairman, Legislative Assembly, deputy *ataman* of the All-Kuban Cossack Army. P. Kamagurov, permanent representative of the Krasnodar Kray administration head, to the president of the Republic of Adygea.

### *Krasnodar 1994 Prices, Tariff Rates Cited

*954F1403B Krasnodar KUBANSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 2*

[Article by I. Khromov, chief of the price statistics department of the kray committee for statistics, under the Kray Committee for Statistics Reports" rubric: "Prices and Tariffs"]

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**[FBIS Translated Text] Price increases within kray's economic sectors in 1994 are characterized by the following data (as a percentage of the preceding month):**

| Months | Consolidated consumer price index (inflation index) | including: | | | Index of industrial goods producers' wholesale prices | Freight transportation rates |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | foodstuffs | nonfood items | for-fee services for the population | | |
| January | 110.7 | 110.4 | 107.5 | 133.1 | 108.4 | 119.8 |
| February | 108.5 | 108.6 | 108.0 | 111.1 | 115.5 | 106.1 |
| March | 109.0 | 106.7 | 108.7 | 122.6 | 107.8 | 118.6 |
| April | 108.0 | 107.1 | 106.9 | 117.0 | 110.2 | 101.8 |
| May | 111.3 | 112.5 | 105.7 | 129.7 | 106.5 | 115.0 |
| June | 111.0 | 105.5 | 106.8 | 145.0 | 109.1 | 107.6 |
| July | 104.3 | 99.8 | 104.7 | 115.1 | 111.7 | 107.5 |
| August | 105.2 | 103.8 | 105.0 | 109.3 | 109.3 | 102.4 |
| September | 106.8 | 106.1 | 107.8 | 105.9 | 114.0 | 102.3 |
| October | 108.9 | 109.9 | 109.3 | 106.0 | 112.0 | 106.9 |
| November | 113.5 | 118.3 | 110.8 | 108.5 | 114.8 | 123.4 |
| December | 115.0 | 125.1 | 109.2 | 103.3 | 115.9 | 116.2 |
| Since the beginning of the year | 290.6 | 290.4 | 238.6 | 627.8 | 323.6 | 327.7 |

The price dynamics in 1994 formed under the influence of different factors. On one hand, decline in industrial production, including that of consumer goods, slowed down; on the other hand, a certain structure of demand for different quality goods has formed. The process of price formation in the first half of the year showed a trend toward rising. In July, a sharp decline of the rate of price increases—to 4 percent—was registered. In subsequent months the rate of inflation steadily rose by 1.5-2 percentage points. This was associated mainly with the liberalization in the sphere of for-fee services for the population, accompanied by a persistently high rate of increases in the cost of some categories of for-fee services. The average monthly rate of increases in the cost of for-fee services in 1994 measured 17.2 percent as compared to overall inflation of 9.4 percent. Since the beginning of the year, the cost of for-fee services increased 6.3-fold, and prices overall—2.9-fold.

The rate of price increases with respect to basic foodstuffs in December, similarly to November, was 2.5 to 2.7 times higher than the average rate throughout the year. The most significant price increases over the past two months were registered with respect to daily necessities: butter, milk and fermented milk products, fats and margarine, and hard cheese—by a factor of 1.5-2; eggs, sugar, confectionery items, cereals, legumes, and potatoes—by a factor of 1.3-1.7.

Since the beginning of the year prices for bread and bakery items increased 2.0-fold; butter—4.9-fold; vegetable oil, milk and fermented milk products, and hard cheese—three- to fourfold.

By the end of December, prices for basic foodstuffs in the kray's consumer market were as follows: bread made of highest grade wheat flour—R1,322 per kg; same, made of grade I and II flour—R639; rye-wheat bread—R652; wheat flour—R645; beef—R3,902; pork—R5,075; poultry meat—R4,931; butter—R15,034; vegetable oil—R3,007; milk (per liter)—R1,105; hen's eggs (per 10)—R2,847; sugar—R1,880; salt—R507; potatoes—R1,073; cabbage—R992; onions—R1,250; beets—R1,035; carrots—R1,540; and apples—R1,510 per kg.

By the beginning of January 1995 the monthly cost of the basket of 19 basic foodstuffs amounted to R90,600, taking into account prices at city farmers markets, and increased since the beginning of the year 2.9-fold.

The rate of price increases with respect to nonfood items were more moderate than those for foodstuffs, and amounted to 9.2 percent over December (10.8 percent in November); since the beginning of the year prices increased 2.4-fold.

Overall rise in prices for nonfood items were seriously affected by freeing market prices for fuel, which rose over 1994 by a factor of 26.4, including those for firewood—by a factor of 34.6.

The rate of price increases with respect to for-fee services in the second half of 1994 declined substantially as compared to the first half of the year; in December, the rate of increase was the lowest—3.3 percent. The greatest rate increases in 1994 were registered with respect to housing and municipal services—13-fold, communications services—eightfold, transportation—5.4-fold;

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tourism and sightseeing services—4.9-fold; sanitarium-recreation and consumer service—4.3-fold; in some categories of consumer services, rates increased 4.5-7.5-fold.

This month prices rose swiftly in the food-processing industry, where they increased with respect to almost all monitored categories of products. While overall prices in the food processing industry increased by 20 percent, prices for the output of dairy products industry increased by 86 percent, meat and bread-baking industry—by 22 percent; oils and fats—by 18 percent; sugar—by 11 percent; and the wine-making industry—by 26 percent.

### Kemerovo Assembly Fails To Meet; Lack of Quorum Noted

*954F1529A Kemerovo KUZNETSKIY KRAY in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1*

[Article by Vasiliy Popok, under the rubric "The Political Department": "The Legislative Assembly Did Not Meet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Legislative Assembly failed to meet on 14 January—just as it failed to meet the day before—because there was no quorum. Aman Tuleyev sent a telegram to the Ministry of Finance saying: the legislators certainly are not against the programs worked out by the oblast administration, so send the money. Mikhail Kislyuk, however, said that the Ministry of Finance does not need telegrams; it needs oblast laws on the programs. Kislyuk said that the minister of finance spoke very rudely to him, saying that he would not give a kopeck until the laws were passed.

The deputies tried to meet, but the governor's team stormed out of the meeting hall; consequently the deputies left too. On Monday the two sides explained their positions.

The administration made the following statement, and I quote: "Today Russia and the Kuznets Basin are in a difficult socioeconomic and political situation largely because of the lack of consistent, productive lawmaking." It goes on to talk about "the inability of the leadership of the Legislative Assembly apparat to work constructively, "and behind that they see Aman Tuleyev and his supporters" obviously striving for political confrontation." In short, "the disruption of budget financing of the oblast, which can occur as the result of such destructive political actions, will lead to a worsening standard of living for the oblast's workers."

The representative branch organized a press conference at which they disagreed that the deputies were to blame for the fact that the Kuznets Basin will not get the money. Aman Tuleyev explained the obvious: the Russian budget is being modified in connection with the Caucasus war and other ills; there is nothing more to share. The territories are not even being invited to budget talks, but they will be invited when the government figures out how much of what resources there will be for all of Russia. In light of this, all regions from Chukotka to Kaliningrad are having their budgets cut and will have to live within their means when working on programs.

In connection with these speeches, at least one thought arises: today, just as a decade ago before any "revolutionary changes," we live in feudal dependence on Moscow (while the cities and rayons depend on us, Kemerovo). We have traveled in the opposite direction for 10 years, but we keep coming back to the beginning. Apparently we started on the wrong foot.

### Kemerovo Assembly Fails To Meet Again

*954F1529A Kemerovo KUZNETSKIY KRAY in Russian 26 Jan 95 p 1*

[Article by Vasiliy Popok under the rubric "The Political Department": "Infarction as an Argument of the Authorities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Legislative Assembly was scheduled to meet yesterday, but again those who scheduled it stumbled over the absence of a few deputies. At a press conference, the chairman of the oblast Legislative Assembly listed the names of the missing deputies and the reasons for their absences: Sokolova is hospitalized after an operation;
Lutskiy and Arshinin are in the hospital for infarctions;
Kruglyak and Artyukhov are being treated in Moscow; and
Filatov is away on work.

There are not enough healthy—or even just slightly ill—deputies to give the session legal power. (If you recall, last November a session was postponed because of a shortage of just five deputies. It is true, however, that in that case the reason for their absence was not illness but a request by the governor.)

It will hardly be possible to hold a session on 31 January either; sick people do not recover in a week. Realistically a session could be held after the Legislative Assembly's by-elections on 5 February, which is when the Legislative Assembly is supposed to be replenished with six new "people's choices."

The situation appears to be clear, but the oblast administration and 10 deputies from the "Kislyuk Party" discern a malicious intent. In the morning, they assembled in the hall where the session was supposed to take place and delivered angry speeches. A draft of another declaration to the people was passed around. The declaration said the "official reason" for not holding the session was that the deputies were sick, but the people who wrote the declaration believe the real reason is as follows (I quote): "We officially announce that the deputy corps of the Legislative Assembly, with its current membership, is unable to work normally, and we consider it necessary to hold elections for the missing districts. In our opinion, the agenda for the next session

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should include questions on the relations of the Assembly's leadership and other deputies with the oblast administration. We demand that the leadership of the Legislative Assembly stop making futile, broad-based policy for the Kuznets Basin in the Legislative Assembly."

At the beginning of Tuleyev's press conference it was not known whether "Kislyuk's people" had signed this declaration. Several of these people believed that there had been enough declarations and it was time to try something else, for example "ruble pressure," which limits the number of deputies working in the oblast Legislative Assembly on a permanent basis since these deputies were the main rebels. Immediately it was made clear, however, that there are not adequate legal rights for a "ruble attack." In general they limited themselves to just discussing the situation.

At the press conference Tuleyev announced that he was not really against the 5 February by-elections, although he thought it would have been better to combine them with the March elections for the representative branch in the cities and rayons because it would cost less. He is not opposed to discussing mutual relations between the two branches of government either. In fact, he has already prepared an outline of a report on this subject. He believes, however that this "delicate issue" should be considered last and thinks it would be better to first discuss issues on which they can reach agreement.

At Tuleyev's meeting with journalists, there was new evidence that a session's formal approval of socioeconomic programs developed by the administration does not at all mean automatic financing from the federal budget, if for no other reason than the fact that there is no federal budget, and there will not be one for a long time. The State Duma and the government are contemplating where the country can get money to survive, but they have not found it yet. Again, Tuleyev accused the administration of political hacking, saying that it is instigating all kinds of "letters from the workers," assembling all kinds of meetings and conferences, and composing various declarations. In short, it is orchestrating an agitation-propaganda campaign (including the election campaign, on behalf of "its" candidates) instead of repairing the furnaces in Novokuznetsk, Prokopyevsk, Kiselevsk, Tashtagol, Sheregesh, and Yashkin, where residents are usually freezing cold despite the oblast administration's assurances to the contrary.

We will limit our report on the latest round of the conflict between the oblast Legislative Assembly and the oblast administration to this. It is perfectly clear that there are many more rounds to come. This may be unpleasant, even irritating. Consensus without conflict, however, is worse because that shows that one of the branches of government is victorious, thus eliminating the possibility of effectively monitoring it, which, judging by some of the actions of our oblast administration, is very necessary.

## Kemerovo Governor Sues Assembly Chairman

*954F1529C Kemerovo KEMEROVO in Russian No 6, 9 Feb 95 p 5*

[Article by V. Genkina under the rubric "Legality, Morality, and the Law": "Press Conference on M. Kislyuk's Lawsuit Against A. Tuleyev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Last week in the Leninskiy Rayon court, the trial of M. Kislyuk, head of the oblast administration, against A. Tuleyev, chairman of the oblast Legislative Assembly, to defend Kislyuk's honor and dignity, began under the chairmanship of Judge P. Frolov.**

**The essence of the lawsuit is Kislyuk's personal claim against Tuleyev concerning a statement made on 12 October 1994 in the presence of a group of deputies and others invited to a session of the Legislative Assembly (which was not held): "Here are the specific people to blame for wasting and stealing the people's money: Kislyuk, Mikhail Borisovich..."There followed the names of Loparev, Slastenkov, Malykhin, and others in the context of the speech, but only M. Kislyuk was offended and demanded satisfaction.**

**After the first court session A. Vedernikov, legal advisor first class, candidate of juridical sciences, and trial lawyer from Tomsk who is representing A. Tuleyev at the trial (M. Kislyuk is represented by Ye. Nikitina, chief of the legal division of the oblast administration), held a press conference. He expressed his view "of the particular judicial procedure."**

A. Vedernikov stated, "I do not think that the accusation against Kislyuk is an accusation that he committed a crime because the criminal code does not envision such crimes as 'plundering' and 'stealing' (that is the phenomenon but not the concrete action of, for example, theft or abuse of position). I think that 'plundering and stealing public money' is a situation—it is the atmosphere—which has developed in the administrative organs of the oblast. Under the Russian Federation president's edict, the top man bears responsibility for the situation in all organs related to the state budget. Any case of irrational use of public money, not to mention for mercenary purposes, by those empowered to manage the oblast administration should be on the conscience of the top executive."

Furthermore, A. Vedernikov went on, Aman Gumirovich accuses the entire administration, not individual representatives of it. Now S. Loparev, deputy head of the administration (unexpected news: as of 6 February he finally vacated this position—author's note), is not demanding satisfaction from Tuleyev for his offended dignity. Why is that? It is because he himself avoided punishment through the amnesty that fortunately covered him but which still does not remove his guilt. Nor did P. Fink, head of the Sibir Joint Enterprise, demand 15 million rubles [R] from Tuleyev for his offended honor, as M. Kislyuk did. He knows that his hands are not clean either. The oblast procurator's office

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is now preparing a case concerning the financial actions of this gentleman and the company he heads, and as the report that the investigator on this case submitted to the court indicates: "Transactions were carried out with participation of representatives of the oblast administration."

The lawyer continued: "Malykhin, the president's representative, is also guilty, in Tuleyev's opinion, because he sees that the authorities are systematically stealing and he is not taking steps. So he keeps silent and does not take offense.

"In court today I proposed to Kislyuk's representatives that they start a lawsuit for offended honor and dignity against Davydov, deputy procurator general of Russia, for the incriminating information which he is disseminating because Davydov writes: 'According to your declaration it has been established that theft of public property is occurring in Kemerovo Oblast.' The chief of the Main Administration for the Fight against Economic Crime of the Russian Federation minister of internal affairs, who submitted a document which is in the trial, also writes: 'Based on the audit that was performed, improper use of the budget and theft of money was confirmed in Kemerovo Oblast.' He further reports that the materials were sent to the Russian procurator general to 'determine the need for investigation.' What does this refer to? It is clear that this cannot be clarified at the local level, at the level of oblast procurator A. Pokhirko, where misfortunes and terrorization abound.

"It is definitely a very complex situation. The court has a certain document, the findings of an inspection of the conversion of a dormitory at No 7 Nogradskaya Street into a five-room apartment. Officially, more than R10 million was spent on its restoration, but unofficially they say it was R200 million. M. Kislyuk now lives there, but his name does not appear anywhere in the document. There are references to the 'apartment renter,' 'party in the contract,' etc.

"'Who is the apartment renter? His name is not even written here!' the judge exclaimed. The situation is the same with the oblast procurator's report: according to his information, there are no cases open in the procurator's office except the 'Istomin case' (and as we know, he was killed and can no longer answer for anything). I found an explanation of the very complex position of oblast procurator A. Pokhirko in the answer of the deputy procurator general. It says there that Pokhirko was given a strict reprimand and scheduled for early certification.

"By the logic of the plaintiffs, obviously, this is how the trial should go: M. Kislyuk (or his representative) says, 'You told me that I am a thief. Is there a verdict that I am a thief? No, there isn't! That's that! The presumption of innocence—my suit should be granted!"

"Esteemed citizens, the presumption of innocence applies only to a criminal trial, not a civil one, to say nothing of a public political one. It means that in a criminal trial no one has the right to say on behalf of the state that you are guilty until the verdict has gone into force. Tuleyev was speaking as a politician, as a representative of his own voters, those who voted for him for both the Soviet of the Federation and the oblast Legislative Assembly. He was giving an assessment of events which he had seen. To make it clearer I will give a parallel. A man is walking down the street and sees that Ivanov is killing Petrov. Well, can you say he does not have the right to tell anyone about this until there is a verdict against Ivanov for killing Petrov?

"What is the lawful way out of this situation? To deliver a decision for one side or the other, one way or another, will not reduce the tension in the region at all. In addition to a political solution there should be a legal, law enforcement solution. This means that all the facts presented in Aman Tuleyev's 30-page statement must be checked, but not at the level of the local procurator's office, of course. Without the **reliable** conclusions of law enforcement organs, however, it is impossible to decide the question of how well founded Aman Tuleyev's accusation that Mikhail Kislyuk was responsible for the **situation** which he called 'plundering and stealing public money' was."

A. Vedernikov answered journalists' questions.

## *Nizhniy Novgorod 1994 Statistics Cited

*954F1391A Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKAYA YARMARKA in Russian No 2, Jan 95 p 6*

[Economic report by Olga Kozhevnikova, chief economist of the Information and Analysis Branch of the Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Committee for State Statistics: "Money, Money, Products, Products"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Financial results of the activity of enterprises and organizations of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast for the period January-November 1994 were summarized in January 1995. Enterprise profits over this period are estimated as amounting to R2.1357 trillion. This figure exceeds the index for the same period of 1993 by a factor of 1.8.

According to the results for the 11 months, 251 enterprises showed losses totalling R73.8 billion. As compared with October, the November figures showed a decrease in both the absolute value of losses and in the number of unprofitable enterprises (by 15). The percentage of unprofitable enterprises diminished over the month from 17.2 to 16.2 percent.

As of 1 December, the indebtedness of oblast enterprises to various creditors amounted to R5.5 trillion, while their debtor indebtedness was assessed at R4.4 trillion.

### Industry

In 1994 the industrial enterprises of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast produced output valued at R10.7619 trillion. Volume of industrial production in monetary terms

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exceeded the 1993 index by a factor of 2.7. The entirety of this increment was due to increased wholesale prices of producers (3.1-fold). Actual production output was reduced by 29.5 percent, including a drop of 14.6 percent in December (as compared with December 1993).

Of the 165 most important production output varieties taken into periodic accountability consideration in 1994, a drop was noted for 136 of them—47 of these being a drop of more than half.

Production decline was seen to the greatest extent in production-technical output, while the production volume of consumer goods fell 12.7 percent over the year. The drop in production of nonfood products and alcoholic beverages comprised 8.9 and 8.8 percent, respectively, food products—20.3 percent.

Production decline in the oblast food industry was caused primarily by reductions in deliveries from agricultural enterprises. Some 10 percent less meat was sold than in 1993, 19 percent less milk, and 17 percent fewer eggs.

**Foreign Economic Relations**

In January-December 1994, enterprises and organizations of the oblast shipped $50.373 billion of production output to countries of the near abroad and the Baltic countries through direct contacts, while receiving products valued at $155.5 million. Imports comprised 30.9 percent of exports.

The export structure by commodity profile appears as follows: products of oil refining—51.4 percent, automobiles—5.6 percent, trucks—3.2 percent, newsprint—6.9 percent.

The main importers were Germany, delivering products valued at $29.6 million, Austria—$12.7 million, Hong Kong—$12.1 million, Italy—$7.3 million, United States—$9.5 million, and the Netherlands—$10 million.

The main products imported: clothing ($18.2 million), mechanical equipment ($19.8 million), electrical machinery and equipment ($1.471 billion), sugar (7,876 tonnes at $2.7 million), medicines (191 tonnes at $5.1 million), optical instruments, measuring and monitoring devices ($13.9 million).

**Transportation and Communications**

A reduction in freight shipments for all varieties of transportation was observed in 1994, due to failure of freight consigners to present output for shipment and the insolvency of many freight receivers.

The Gorkiy Railroad shipped 18.0037 million tonnes of freight—73.9 percent of the January-December 1993 level. Suburban trains made 56,269 trips—1,207 trips fewer than for the same period last year. This was due to rolling stock shortages. Some 193 electric trains were dispatched late over the January-December period.

Motor vehicle transportation accounted for the shipment of 13.7 million tonnes of freight—60.1 percent of the January-December 1993 level. These shipments were effected mainly by privatized enterprises (92.6 percent). Some 1.045 billion passengers were transported in 1994. This was effected primarily by state enterprises (96.6 percent). Suburban bus transportation completed 469,569 trips—96.8 percent of all scheduled trips.

Civil aviation aircraft delivered 2,100 tonnes of freight (30.0 percent of the January-December 1993 level) and transported 176,100 passengers (61.3 percent).

Some 785,400 tonnes of freight were shipped through the Nizhniy Novgorod river port in 1994—32.0 percent of the previous year's level, and 1.1249 million passengers were transported (66.4 percent). The drop in volume was related to increased transportation rates.

Public-use communications enterprises rendered services to the populace amounting to R31.694 billion.

**Agriculture**

According to preliminary results from agricultural enterprises themselves, they will have finished 1994 with a loss of R19 billion. This includes 290 farm enterprises (40 percent of the total number) whose activity will have resulted in losses of R52 billion, and 422 (60 percent) that will have ended the year with profits estimated at R33 billion.

**Sales of Agricultural Output**

The following table shows agricultural production output sold by all categories of farms to procurement organizations as of 1 January 1995:

| | 1994 (tonnes) | 1994 percentage of 1993 level |
|---|---|---|
| Grain | 168,900 | 72.0 |
| Potatoes | 8,600 | 17.0 |
| Vegetables | 22,300 | 40.0 |
| Livestock and poultry (live weight) | 94,000 | 75.0 |
| Milk | 424,000 | 64.0 |
| Eggs | 502.1millioneggs | 67.0 |

Higher prices and the opportunity to obtain cash are leading to expanded agricultural output sales by agricultural enterprises at markets (fairs), at their own stores, and through other channels.

The following table shows sales of agricultural production output for 1994 through unrestricted channels:

| | 1994 (tonnes) | 1994 percentage of 1993 level |
|---|---|---|
| Grain | 82,300 | 40.0 |
| Potatoes | 46,100 | 97.0 |

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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Vegetables | 14,900 | 115.0 |
| Livestock and poultry (live weight) | 53,100 | 139.0 |
| Milk | 90,500 | 163.0 |
| Eggs | 180.5millioneggs | 2.9-fold |

**Prices**

The free index of consumer prices for goods and services, one of the most important indices characterizing the inflation level, amounted in December of last year to 117.4 percent of the November level in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.

On the whole, price increases for all food products came to 22 percent in December—the highest level (except for January) over the course of the entire previous year.

The rate of price increase for nonfood products in December 1994 was half that observed for food products. Nonfood products increased by 10.4 percent, on average, across the oblast.

Costs of paid services to the populace increased 16.7 percent in December.

The average cost throughout Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast of the selection of 19 basic food products came to R95,275 per month as of the end of December, an increase of 19.2 percent over the previous month. In the city of Nizhniy Novgorod, this selection increased in price 21.7 percent on a monthly basis, constituting R103,073.

The greatest increase in prices in December was noted in the food industry sectors.

Producer prices for industrial production on the whole since the beginning of the year increased by a factor of 3.1.

It should be noted that in January-November 1994, the growth of wholesale prices surpassed the growth of consumer prices. On the whole over the year, however, due to the high rate of growth of prices for goods and services in December of last year, the growth of producer prices turned out to be somewhat lower than that seen in the consumer market.

Rates for freight shipments during December 1994 tripled as compared with the rates for December 1993, including a 2.8-fold increase in railroad transportation, 2.7-fold increase in motor vehicle transport, 3.5-fold increase in pipeline transport, and 3.4-fold increase in transportation over internal waterways.

**Environmental Protection**

According to report data from the Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Committee for Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources, 39 concentrated accidental discharges were registered in 1994, of which 34 were into surface and subsurface water reservoirs. The amount of contaminant discharge and emissions was 30.4 percent less than the previous year, 30.6 percent less with respect to discharges into surface and subsurface water, and 75 percent less for emissions into the atmosphere.

Damage caused as a result of accidental discharges and emissions was assessed at R221.9 million.

One out of every five enterprises surveyed during the accounting year exceeded the norms for discharge of contaminants into the water and emissions into the atmosphere. Suits were filed against oblast enterprises in the amount of R20.7 billion. Some 319 responsible officials and citizens of the oblast were subject to administrative liability, the amount of fines totalling R2.172 billion. Twenty-two cases were handed over to investigative organs. One individual was held criminally liable.

It should be noted that 2,100 violations in the sphere of protection of natural resources, the plant and animal world, and fish reserves were registered over the past year—50 percent fewer than the previous year. The main portion of these violations (94.3 percent) are attributable to fish reserves. Some 1,900 responsible officials and citizens were held administratively liable. Two cases were handed over to investigative organs and suits were filed against violators, amounting to R27.1 million.

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## Kazakhstan

### *Agreement on Establishing Central Asian Bank of Cooperation, Development

*954F1476A Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 2*

[Text of Agreement Among the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on Establishing the Central Bank of Cooperation and Development]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The states participating in the present Agreement, hereinafter called the Parties,**

**proceeding from the provisions of the Treaty on the Creation of a Unified Economic Space among the Parties;**

**guided by the interests of preserving trade and financial relations and developing joint production facilities;**

**and recognizing the need to organize and carry on multilateral interstate account settlements on trade, nontrade, and other operations envisioned by intergovernmental agreements of the Parties;**

**have agreed on what follows below.**

**Article 1**

1. Form a joint bank, the Central Asian Bank of Cooperation and Development (hereinafter, the Bank). The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan are the founding members of the Bank.

2. The management organ of the Bank is the Bank Council, whose members include one authorized representative from each of the Parties. The Bank Council's decisions are made in the manner defined by the Bank Charter.

3. The account settlements conducted through the Bank are handled in freely convertible currency or national currencies or using a special means of payment determined by the Bank Council.

**Article 2**

The location of the Bank is the city of Almaty. The Bank is a legal person. The Bank may participate in international financial and banking organizations and unions.

The Bank's activities are regulated by the present Agreement and the Bank Charter, which is an inseparable part of it.

Relations between the Bank and the country where the Bank is located are determined in accordance with the legislation of the given state and the appropriate agreement.

**Article 3**

The following functions are entrusted to the Bank:

—organizing and handling multilateral interstate account settlements on trade and other operations envisioned by intergovernmental agreements;

—assisting in organizing joint ventures and expanding their activity regardless of the forms of ownership;

—extending credit for the Parties' strategic programs;

—financing objects of regionwide significance;

—studying and analyzing the Parties' economies and preparing proposals and recommendations for the Parties' banks.

**Article 4**

1. The Bank's initial capital stock in the amount of 9.0 (nine) million U.S. dollars or the equivalent in a different currency (by decision of the Bank Council) is formed through the contributions of the founding members of the Bank in amounts determined by the Bank Council.

2. The amount of capital stock may be increased by decision of the Bank Council.

3. The total capital stock increases when a new state is accepted as a member of the Bank. The total, method, and time periods of the new Bank member's contribution are determined by the Bank Council with the new member's approval.

4. The Bank may have special funds created by decision of the Bank Council.

**Article 5**

1. Day-to-day payments between the economic subjects of the states are carried out on a bilateral and multilateral basis and regulated by their national laws.

2. The exchange rates of national currencies for mutual account settlements of the Parties are determined by the Bank Council.

The Parties submit information on the exchange rates of the currencies set by the national (central) banks no later than the day after the exchange rates of the currencies change.

**Article 6**

1. Upon concluding trade-economic agreements for the next term and within the framework of total commodity turnover under intergovernmental agreements, each Party will seek to ensure the balance of receipts and payments from the other Parties who are members of the Bank within this term. In the process, the creation (or use) of possible reserves in national or other currency as well as the possibility of obtaining (or paying off) a credit may be taken into account.

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2. Account settlements on nontrade operations will be conducted on the basis of intergovernmental agreements on account settlements on nontrade payments.

**Article 7**

The Bank may open correspondent accounts for other states which are not members of the Bank for them to participate in interstate account settlements in the manner and under the conditions determined by the Bank Council.

**Article 8**

Other states which share the objectives and principles of the Bank's activity may join the present Agreement. The conditions and procedures for accepting new Bank members are determined by its Charter.

**Article 9**

1. The present Agreement may be changed only with the consent of all the Parties.

2. Each Party may refuse to participate in the present Agreement by notifying the Bank Council of this at least 6 months in advance. Throughout this period, the relations between the Bank and this Party must be settled on the basis of their mutual obligations.

3. The present Agreement goes into force the moment internal state procedures are fulfilled in accordance with the laws of the Parties.

Completed in the city of Almaty on 8 July 1994. In three original copies, each in the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian languages; all the texts have equal force.

[Illegible signatures:] For the Republic of Kazakhstan; For the Kyrgyz Republic; For the Republic of Uzbekistan

## *Kazhegeldin on Country's Economic Priorities

*954E0662A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 23 Feb 95 p 5*

[Interview with A. Kazhegeldin, by A. Sukhonos: "Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Prime Minister of Kazakhstan: 'A Visitor is Welcomed By Deed...'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The entire world knows the space center at Baykonur. Oil and gas from Mangyshlak and Emba are used not only in the CIS countries, but also in developed Europe. Kazakhstan is an exporter of coal used for energy purposes, petrochemical products, and ferrous and nonferrous metals. Our land and its mineral resources, which constitute the republic's industrial and agricultural potential, are so rich in everything that it is impossible to list them... However, in recent years Kazakhstan has weakened sharply in all its 12 priority areas. The country has been seized by a very severe economic crisis, which has been aggravated by inflation. But the republic is not giving up. Its government is seeking a correct way out of the "stalemate" situation and is simultaneously blazing a trial into the world market and strengthening integration with Russia and the other CIS states. DELOVOY MIR correspondent Anatoliy Sukhonos discusses all these things with Akezhan Kazhegeldin, head of the Kazakhstan government.**

[Sukhonos] Akezhan Magzhanovich, could you please describe for our readers the current economic situation in your country. The mass media report that in Kazakhstan, as in the other CIS states, it proved to be impossible in 1994 to overcome the production slump. As compared with last year, the net material product dropped by one-third, and the overall volume of industrial output dropped by 25-26 percent. The miners of Karaganda and Ekibastuz are striking, and the Karaganda Metallurgical Combine is "lying on its side." The national income has fallen by half, and you cannot last for long on loans. And there is something else: where should one look to find the primary cause of your current problems?

[Kazhegeldin] In early February, at an expanded session of the Cabinet of Ministers, we discussed the republic's socioeconomic development in 1994 and the basic directions to be taken in the economic policy in 1995. Actually, last year, and especially in the first half of the year, the republic got into a difficult situation.

To what has already been reported in the mass media, I will add: more than 20 percent of the country's enterprises continue to operate at a loss. We lagged behind last year's level in oil extraction and the production of products resulting from oil refining, in the rolling of nonferrous metals, and the production of tractors and mineral fertilizers.

The market is insufficiently saturated with TNP [consumer goods] and food products. The number of head of sheep and goats dropped by 29 percent, as compared with 1993; and the number of head of cattle, by 18 percent. That made a large shortage in meat and dairy products, and ready-to-cook and sausage products. The same thing can be said about bread and pasta products.

But, nevertheless, there are signs of an improvement. In January we observed a slight rise in industrial production as compared with December 1994. There is a tendency toward an increase in commodity turnover. In order to strengthen these phenomena, which are as yet not very tangible, it is necessary first of all to resolve the problem of chronic nonpayments. Because we have not been able to overcome that problem, the country has failed to receive 54 billion *tenge* of profit. Hence the considerable shortfall in receipt of taxes and the deficit in the state budget.

As for the reasons for the slump in industry and the APK [agroindustrial complex], they are the following: the deformed system of production, with a developed extractive sector and agrarian raw-materials sector, which were oriented to absolutely anything other than their own

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needs or the needs of our population. Under conditions of the openness of the market and the bringing of the prices of energy carriers closer to the world prices, there has arisen in Kazakhstan an overproduction of individual types of output. At the same time the sales market for our output was narrowed by the CIS space, and the consumers—both the domestic and the foreign ones—began to be discriminating with regard to the qualitative, price, and other parameters.

In agriculture, animal husbandry based on expensive fodders is still ineffective. Despite the large volumes of grain production, we have a low harvest yield. As in the industrial branches, and in particular in coal mining, our agriculture has been deprived of centralized subsidies for fertilizers, agricultural machinery, harvesting, and the processing of grain, meat, and milk.

[Sukhonos] How, then, does your Cabinet of Ministers intend to overcome its heritage from the past? And what is the macroeconomic forecast for the development of the republic's economy, the budget, and the monetary and credit policy in 1995?

[Kazhegeldin] The market forces that have been liberated inspire optimism. In late 1994 we were able for the first time to have a nondeficit budget. For this year, the inventory of income and expenses has been drawn up as a nondeficit one. In this instance we were helped both by our domestic reserves, and by the financial support of the EBCD and the IMF. Our main task is to curb the inflation that is undermining the financial system and production. We have taken a number of unpopular steps and raised the prices of grain and a number of other products. After all, the grain subsidies used to eat up millions of budgetary funds, and that could not continue indefinitely. I think that we are beginning to see signs of macroeconomic stabilization. Whereas, immediately after the introduction of the *tenge*, the daily increase in prices was as much as 1.5 percent, in November-December 1994 it dropped to 0.4-0.34 percent a day. The goal of our concept for 1995 is, together with the National Bank, to reduce, within the first half-year, the inflation to 0.2-0.25 percent a day.

Simultaneously we shall continue to form a legal basis for market innovations. For example, the Supreme Council adopted the general part of the Civil Code and the Law "Foreign Investments." We have prepared a number of very important legislative drafts: "Bankruptcy," "Mortgage," "Pricing and Antimonopoly Policy," "The National Bank," a Tax Code, and others.

Unfortunately, we are lagging behind Russia with regard to the rate of reforms and in the creation of a property market and a capital market. And we have to catch up with Russia. This perhaps will facilitate our task: there already exists an example in reforming the economy.

[Sukhonos] Kazakhstan in its foreign-economic activity combines two reasonable principles: cooperation with the business circles of the EU and the countries of the Mideast and the Pacific Ocean region; and closer integration with Russia and the other CIS countries. Whether or not we want this, if the interests of the Western companies are "being infringed upon," they immediately "react." The most recent example: immediately after the announcement that the Caspian Consortium made up of Russia, Kazakhstan, and [illegible word] is beginning to work building the first section of a petroleum pipeline between Novorossiysk and the Tengiz hydrocarbons deposit, the Shell Company, which is participating in developing the Kazakh petroleum deposits, stated it is lowering its investments to one-tenth of the previous amount. Don't you think, Mr. prime minister, that the expanding cooperation that Kazakhstan has with Russia and the other CIS states will cause other frictions?

[Kazhegeldin] Probably our partners in the Tengiz project have forgotten that Kazakhstan is a sovereign state and has the right to choose partners for itself. Nevertheless I think that this "demarche" is, more likely, a misunderstanding and in a certain period of time everything will return to normal. Our cooperation with the Agip and British Gas companies and with Gazprom RAO in exploiting the Karachaganak Petroleum and Gas Concentrate Deposit, on the other hand, provided the opportunity to acquire yet another strong investor. The Canadian Propac System company has announced that it will become the supplier of technological equipment for a unit to process gas concentrate in Karachaganak.

Obviously, at some stage the frictions with Western partners during the restoration of integrational ties with Russia are possible. But the foreign firms should not forget that our economy is 80-percent "tied in" with the Russian economy, and Russia has always been and will continue to be partner No. 1 for us. And the ties will be restored both at the intergovernmental level and at the regional and interbranch level. I can give recent examples. They include the agreement of the border rayons of Russia and Kazakhstan that was signed in late January in Omsk. Its purpose is to eliminate the obstacles in moving the goods that were produced at the expense of local resources. The Sotrudnichestvo [Cooperation] Russian-Kazakhstan Consortium has been created with the attraction of private capital. Its purpose is to form a corporation from the largest PO [production associations] in the two countries in the area of the oil-refining and chemical industries, the APK, and second-generation technologies.

[Interviewer] Akezhan Magzhanovich, in the East a guest is always a pleasure. Nevertheless, by and large, which entrepreneurs and businessmen would you call into the republic by means of DELOVOY MIR? Which businessmen from Russia would you, as the head of the government, want to see among the partners of the Kazakh business circles?

[Kazhegeldin] The folk saying is that a guest is welcomed by deed, rather than by empty words and bragging. I

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would call into the republic any efficient and reliable representative of small, medium-scale, or large business. There was a time when we encouraged ""lotto players" and "pedlars." Things turned out all right. Today the MP in our foreign trade and the services sphere give odds to similar enterprises in state trade and services. It is the same situation with joint enterprises. The fact that in 1994 we succeeded in considerably increasing the export of Kazakh output is largely to the credit of the SP [joint ventures], of which we currently have more than 2000 in the republic.

I think that the next thing on the agenda is the creation of corporative joint-stock enterprises of the type of the transnational Interugol company, the founders of which are the Ekibastuz miners, the Sverdlovsk power workers, the Chelyabinsk metallurgists, and the Omsk anthracite processors. I have been told that very nice amounts of money have already been collected from the sale of Interugol shares. They are enough for the joint development of the Bogatyr pit at the Ekibastuzugol PO and for purchasing, at the Orsk Machine-Building Plant, machinery for a new concentration plant.

I would like to make use of this opportunity to invite, by means of your respected newspaper, everyone who may be beneficial for mutually advantageous cooperation. As Kazakhs say,"*Khosh keshkeldeniz*!" And, as Russians say, "*Dobro pozhalovat*!" [Welcome!].

### *Businessman Urges President To End Discrimination Against Russians

*954F1554A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Feb 95 p 9*

[Article by Kozykorpesh Yesenberlin, Alma-Ata, under rubric "Neighbors," "recorded by Beket Aubakirov": "What Is Needed Is Not Incantations, but the Ability To Find Compromises"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Kozykorpesh Yesenberlin, 40 years of age, graduate of Kazakh Polytechnical Institute, candidate of sciences. In 1994 he joined the government, heading the State Committee on Property. He left that position after the collective resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers and currently heads the Aziya-lizing [Asia-Leasing] national company. Early this year, as one of 150 Kazakh entrepreneurs, he signed a letter to President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in which it was proposed to abolish the articles in the Constitution that legalize discrimination against the "nonindigenous population" of Kazakhstan. The authors of the message spoke out against the belittling of the importance of the Russian language, and also called upon the president to introduce private ownership of the land. Kozykorpesh Yesenberlin has been subjected to vicious attacks by jingoists who accused him of betraying the interests of the Kazakh nation.**

As a practical kind of person, for a long time I have wondered whether the people have been shouting loudly about protecting the interests of the people have anything at all that resembles a program. How, exactly, do they imagine the future prosperity of the Kazakhs: by means of the crowding out of all the "nonindigenous"? Or is it the other way around—by means of their humble and silent work for the "main nation"? Or is it possible that the friends of the homeland have a third alternative that is not so absurd? Unfortunately, I have been convinced many times that these loudmouths are simply incapable to making any serious analysis of the situation.

In general, the circumstance is that we Kazakhs have always valued eloquence: the ability to impress people with our brilliant metaphors has given us not very good service. There has been formed practically a class of phrase-mongers who do not have either serious knowledge, or the ability to evaluate soberly themselves or the world around them.

When it was fashionable to compose historical, philosophical, and journalistic odes to internationalism, in exchange for which those who composed them were given apartments, bonuses, and high ranks, those people were inspired to extol the friendship of nations. Now what is esteemed is Kazakh patriotism, and those same well-placed voices, with the same ardor, and with recognizable intonations, are broadcasting a message that is directly opposite.

A person definitely has the right to change his convictions. For some people this is a dramatic process... But the genuineness of certain representatives of this camp—if you will pardon me for the crude comparison—resembles that of a shaman who falls into a trance from his own incantations, from "pumping himself up" with emotions...

But when you talk with that kind of person calmly, without trying to cause a conflict, and, most important, without the public being present, it turns out that he is completely capable of perceiving common sense, understands the vulnerability of his position, and is definitely not unwilling to make compromises.

I repeat once again that I am not a theoretician, but a businessman. And I, like many of my entrepreneur associates, have been waiting and waiting for wise, noble words and actions from our scientists and writers. We waited specifically for them to appeal to the president and the parliament to eliminate from our constitution the obvious injustices with respect to the republic's non-Kazakh population. But those words and actions did not follow.

Meanwhile the situation has been becoming increasingly alarming. During recent years approximately a million persons have already left Kazakhstan. This process is increasing: in 1994 the migration reached the 400,000 mark. In certain rural rayons there is an almost complete lack of highly skilled smiths, mechanizers, mechanics, and electricians. There are not enough teachers in the

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schools and institutions of higher learning, and not enough doctors in the hospitals.

As for the "economic" reasons for these departures, I consider this kind of explanation of the migration to be self-deception. The Russian standard of living does not really differ so much from the Kazakhstan standard of living that people want to sell for a song their apartments or homes, to tear themselves away from the places where their fathers and grandfathers had lived, and to leave into the unknown.

The pernicious consequences that migration has for our republic is understood, it would seem, by everyone. For all its vast territory, Kazakhstan even today is considerably underpopulated. And what if half of its 17 million inhabitants leave? That prospect is becoming increasingly real. After being left alone, we will not be able in even the most elementary way to protect our vast borders...

Many of those who have already left are being changed increasingly, by force of circumstances, into "internal emigres" and the favorites of the authorities. If I were in the position of a person who is unsure about the future of his children in this land, I also would prepare myself a beachhead for moving away: I would transfer some funds to the new homeland and would buy a few things there ahead of time.

This is a dangerous tendency, that divides us into "our own people" and "outsiders." Whether or not we want this, Kazakhstan in the foreseeable future will not become a state with a single nationality. In order for this to happen, as has been demonstrated by world experience, the country's population must be, as a minimum, 80 percent homogenous ethnically. Then (and that also is not without problems) the minority would learn the language of the majority; that language, with complete justification, would be declared to be the state language; and the statement in the constitution relative to the basic nation that had made its self-determination would appear to be justified.

We have another situation, and other national proportions. The only person, however, who would want them to change at the expense of the mass migration of the nonindigenous inhabitants is a madman. What, then, remains for all of us?

What remains for us is a prospect that is not bad at all: everyone can live together, can have equal rights, and can build a democratic civil society. Kazakhstan is not very similar to an overpopulated communal apartment. With our vast areas, our natural wealth, and our land, that is capable of feeding not 17 million people, but three times as many—there is enough bread and work for everyone. These are not starry-eyed conjectures, but a completely pragmatic view. It is other paths that lead to conflicts, the worsening of the crisis, and massive departures.

People my age, and I personally, have frequently heard directed to us and have read in the press the expressions "*shala-Kazakhs*"and "children of the asphalt." The implication is that a person who has grown up in a mountain village is a patriot to a much greater degree, that it is only he who is truly in pain for his nation, or is completely aware of its problems. Yes, my generation of people in their forties grew up in the city. Our parents put us in Russian schools, assuming that the native language that we had taken in with our mother's milk would never be taken away from us. Everything proved to be not so simple. But I am convinced that the arguments about who loves his nation more are fruitless. What we need is not incantations, not oaths to be true to the homeland, but active assistance and the ability to find compromises and see tomorrow.

Kazakhs, unlike their Russian, Ukrainian, and German brothers, do not have a state system outside the confines of our common republic. So, will we ever find understanding from our brothers if we propose a program of supporting and developing the Kazakh language and culture? But when I learn that, when a person is given a job or enrolled in an educational institution, or is promoted to a managerial position, the "national factor" floats to the surface (and who does not know that this actually happens?),I become ashamed.

It is only by acting together that we today will be able to build anything on this land. Together, without division into indigenous and nonindigenous, or into guests and hosts. Even then a large number of problems will remain—economic, social, and cultural—but each of us will have hope. And hope is half the victory.

### *Investment-Privatization Funds Detailed

*954F1454A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 2*

[Unattributed article: "Investment-Privatization Funds: Who Is Who in Figures. (What Used to Be Secret Becomes Open)"]

**[FBIS Translated Text] Up until recently, information on the number of coupons accumulated by investment-privatization funds was, in essence, a confidential matter. As we have learned, after lengthy and heated debates within the management of Goskomimushchestvo (GKI) [State Committee on Administration of State Property], this committee nevertheless felt it necessary to make this information public. It was provided to our editorial office by the recently ratified deputy chairman of the GKI, and one of the long-time and active authors of KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, T. Yesirkepov, and is today being presented for the attention of the reader.**

On 20 January 1995, the investment funds had accumulated 725,032,533 coupons, which comprises 39.27 percent of all the coupons received by the citizens of the republic. Various funds accumulated different numbers

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of coupons. Out of 170 licensed IPF [investment-privatization funds], 20 funds had collected a total of 424,403,034 coupons. One fund in this group held an average of 21.2 million coupons. Altogether, they had collected 58.54 percent of all the coupons surrendered by the public to the IPF. This group included: "Butya-kapital" (71.6 million coupons), "Altyn den" (37.8 million), "Auyl" (30.6 million), "Turan-invest" (27.0 million), "Alem" (26.5 million), "Dikhan (25.1 million), "Astana-invest" (24.1 million), "Apogey" (18.4 million), "Tutynyshy" (17.2 million), "Mumaygazinvest" (16.9 million), "Bytymak" (16.2 million), "Soyuz" (15.71 million), "Prominvest" (12.4 million), "Bereke" (12.6 million), "Novoye pokoleniye" ["New Generation"] (12 million), "Burabay" (11.6 million), "Rost-fond-KRAMDS" (11.0 million), "First investment" ["Pervyy investitsionnyy"] (11.0 million coupons).

A second group, which numbers 19 IPF, accumulated from 5 to 10 million coupons each. Altogether, they had collected 145,117,950 coupons, which comprises 20.02 percent of their overall number. On the average, there were 7.6 million coupons for each fund. This group included: "Kenes-invest" (9.9 million coupons), "Servis-invest," "Vostokmebelyinvest" (9.5 million), "Almaz-Komir-Gaz," "Munay-invest" (9.1 million), "Vash vybor" ["Your Choice"] (8.5 million), "Almas-avtoinvest" (8.1 million), "Batys-benzin-invest" (7.8 million), "Alem-invest" (7.5 million), "First Industrial IPF 'NUR'" (7.5 million), "Paritet-invest" (7.4 million), "Alem-bobek" (7.4 million), "Matay-fond" (7.3 million), "Khleb-invest" (7.1 million), "Aktobe-invest" (6.3 million), "Karatal-invest" (6.3 million), "Ak-Zhaik" (5.6 million), "Kair-dostar" (5.4 million) and "A-invest" (5.2 million coupons).

Another 52 investment funds collected 127,658,309 coupons, i.e., each one received from 1 to 5 million coupons. On the average, each fund accumulated 2.4 million coupons in this group. The group included: "Metall-invest" (4.6 million coupons), "Alvatu-invest" (4.6 million), "Abylay-khan-invest" (4.4 million), "Asad-invest" (4.1 million), "Silikat-invest" (4.0 million), "Begat-invest" (4.0 million), "Initsial" (3.9 million), "Kuat-kapital" (3.8 million), "Semey-invest" (3.7 million), "Temirmunay-invest" (3.7 million), "Aliya-invest" (3.5 million), "Madi-invest" (3.5 million), "Khazar-invest" (3.4 million), "Vostok-kapital" (3.2 million), "Karavan" (3.1 million), "Sham-invest" (3.1 million), "Soyuz" (3.0 million), "Turkestan-invest" (2.9 million), "Ugol-invest" (2.8 million), "Sipan-invest" (2.8 million), "Akmerey" (2.8 million), "Aktsept" (2.7 million), "Arko-invest" (2.6 million), "Guldengen aymak" (2.5 million), "Investzholdary" (2.5 million), "Avto-polis-invest" (2.5 million), "Leginvest" (2.3 million), "Irtysh-invest" (2.2 million), "Kapital-invest" (2.2 million), "Alfiya-invest" (2.1 million), "Ansat-invest" (2.1 million), "Nefte-produkt-invest" (2.0 million), "Karakhan-kapital-invest" (2.0 million), "Ortalyk-invest" (1.9 million), "Otan" (1.8 million), "Promis-invest" (1.7 million), "Seymar-invest" (1.7 million), "Zhezkazgan-invest" (1.6 million), "Invest-kapital" (1.6 million), "Alisa-soyuz-invest" (1.5 million), "Karatau-invest" (1.4 million), "Munay-kapital" (1.4 million), "Altyn-kazyna" (1.3 million), "Central IPF" (1.2 million), "Almanat-invest" (1.2 million), "Industriya-invest" (1.2 million), "Akzhol" (1.2 million, "Karaganda-invest" (1.1 million), "Avia-kapital" (1.1 million), "Kapital-invest" (1.1 million), "Alau-gaz" (1.1 million), "Asyl-invest" (1.0 million) and "Akku-invest" (1.0 million).

**Structure of funds based on the number of privatization-investment credits collected by IPFs**

| Amounts of charter funds, in tenge | Number of licenses IPFs | Number of collected PICs [privatization-investment coupons] | Relative share in % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Up to 100,000 | 15 | 523,180 | 0.07 |
| From 100,000 to 500,000 | 37 | 9,027,770 | 1.24 |
| From 500,000 to 1,000,000 | 27 | 18,303,290 | 2.52 |
| From 1,000,000 to 5,000,000 | 52 | 127,658,309 | 17.61 |
| From 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 | 19 | 145,117,950 | 20.02 |
| Over 10,000,000 | 20 | 424,403,034 | 58.54 |
| TOTAL | 170 | 725,032,553 | 100.00 |

The fourth group included funds which had accumulated from 500,000 to 1,000,000 coupons each. Altogether, they had collected 18,303,290 coupons, which comprises 2.52 percent of all the coupons collected. This was an average of 678,000 coupons for each fund in this group. This group included: "Kommerts-kapital" (989,000), "Bazis" (968,000), "Saryarka" (926,000), "Benzin-invest" (887,000), "Kyz-Zhibek" (840,000), "Taraz-invest" (809,000), "Shymkent-invest" (740,000), "Ozat" (718,000), "Kontrakt-soyuz" (714,000), "Alisher-invest" (686,000), "Kuat-invest" (663,000), "Zoloto-almaz-invest" ["gold-diamond-invest"] (652,000), "Bastau" (647,000), "Nur-invest" (643,000), "Irtysh-benzin-invest" (625,000), "Altyn-gasyr-invest" (618,000), "Baykonur-invest" (610,000), "Zhanashyr-invest" (602,000), "Balamaz-invest" (594,000), "Umit-invest" (556,000) "Manakbay-invest" (552,000), "Udachnyy byvor" ["Successful choice"] (550,000),

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"Narodnyy soyuz" (545,000), "Vozrozhdeniye" (525,000), "Narodnyy fond" (515,000), "Sana" (505,000

The fifth group was comprised of funds which had accumulated from 100,000 to 500,000 coupons. This group included 37 funds. Altogether they had collected 9,027,770 coupons, which comprised 1.24 percent of all the collected coupons. On the average, each fund received 244,000 coupons. Among the funds in this group are the following IPFs: "Blok-invest" (490,000), "Gornometallurgicheskiy fond" ["Mining-metallurgical fund"] (475,000), "Sapar-invest" (441,000), "Aksay-invest" (425,000), "Yelimay-invest" (423,000), "Altyn-invest" (405,000), "Zharasym-invest" (328,000), "Sindikat-invest" (366,000), "Aynur-invest" (360,000), "Akbol-invest" (359,000), "Sotsialnaya zashchita" ["Social protection"] (352,000), "Kazna" (321,000), "Bagdar" (313,000), "Sezar-invest" (309,000), "Real-kapital-invest" (298,000) "People's IPF 'Politekh'" (298,000), "Daulet-invest" (284,000), "Salkyn-Saz-Senim" (280,000), "Slavyanskiy kapital" (278,000), "Yekibaskomirinvest" (272,000), "Sauda-invest" (258,000), "Temo-invest" (235,000), "Zhas tulpar" (231,000), "Adil-invest" (228,000), "First IPF Senim" (227,000), "Bayantau" (221,000), "Akmola-invest" (216,000), "Muzyka pribyli" ["Music of profit"] (208,000), "Zhetysu" (202,000), "Zhetysay-invest" (202,000), "New economic policy" (192,000), "Alpha-invest" (187,000), "Turgay agroprominvest" (187,000), "Ineks-invest" (175,000).

The final, sixth, group is comprised of funds which have accumulated the least number of coupons. It includes investment funds which have collected from 90,000 to 100,000 coupons. There are 15 such funds. Altogether, they have collected 523,180 coupons. On the average, each fund received 35,000 coupons. Among such funds are: "People's IPF 'Yedinstvo'" (83,400), "Yevrasiya" (65,150), "Butya-Kazkommertsbank" (64,220), "Temir-tau-invest" (54,100), "Vostok" (45,900), "Khalyk-kapital" (42,080), "Tulpar-invest" (39,400), "Adaldyk" (34,680), "Ak-orda-invest" (31,340), "Cholpan" (19,110), "Aziya-invest" (65,150), "Toleu" (12,790), "Otechestvo" ["Homeland"], "Myrzashol-invest" (7,890) and "Ken-invest" (370).

On the whole at the present time a rather high level of concentration of coupons in the hands of a small number of funds has been achieved. Only 20 funds have accumulated almost 58.54 percent of all the coupons surrendered by the population. Another 19 funds have collected 20.02 percent of the coupons. As a result, the relative share of these two groups of funds accounts for almost 80 percent of all the coupons surrendered by the citizens of the republic. Most probably, these funds will become the main subjects of the republic's finance market.

At the other end of the spectrum, there are 79 investment funds, which represent almost half of the IPFs operating in the republic, which have accumulated only 3.83 percent of all the collected coupons. In the future, these funds can hardly create competition for the funds in the first group. Most likely, those funds which have collected from 500,000 to 5 million coupons will be able to compete with them. They have the chance to do so. After all, more than half of the coupons held by citizens of the republic have not yet been surrendered.

## Zhukeyev on Summit, Defense Initiatives

*95UM0286A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 95 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Tulegen Zhukeyev, secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, conducted by staff correspondent Aleksandr Tarakov: "There Is No Alternative to Common Sense"; date and place of interview not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] **In an interview with our correspondent, Tulegen Zhukeyev, secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan Security Council, comments on the set of documents from the Almaty summit pertaining to defense and peacekeeping initiatives.**

[Tarakov] "The Almaty summit smells of gunpowder," remarked KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Indeed, a substantial number of the documents had to do with military policy and defense initiatives. Was that the distinctive feature of the latest meeting of the Commonwealth countries' leaders?

[Zhukeyev] The conclusion that the agenda of the Almaty meeting smelled of gunpowder is so improper that I do not even care to comment on it. At the same time, it shows a lack of sufficient information, which is due to the fact that the Commonwealth's institutions did not properly acquaint the press with the summit's subject matter and top-priority areas. Because of that, a number of reviews of the summit put their emphases in the wrong places and offer tendentious assessments of it.

Military problems by no means predominated. Of the 13 main issues that were raised for consideration, only two pertained to such matters. The first had to do with air defense (the establishment of a united system), and the second had to do with the Collective Security Council. It is another matter that the Collective Security Council proposals included a number of points such as "Procedural Rules," or a few lines to the effect that it is necessary to formally register the treaty. All these points were set out on separate pages, which is why they are considered to be independent documents. They were included in a single package, which it was proposed be signed automatically.

The main content of the current summit consisted in reaching agreements on the adoption of the Basic Principles of Customs Legislation and on the work of the collegium of the Interstate Economic Committee. The Appeal to the Peoples of the Commonwealth and the World Public in Connection With the 50th Anniversary of the Victory Over Fascism, and the pact that in the

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process of discussion came to be called the Memorandum on the Support of Peace and Stability in the CIS (this proposal was submitted by N. Nazarbayev) were very important from the political and moral standpoints.

The concept of protecting external borders. I also consider that it greatly stretches the point to classify that issue among the purely military topics. After all, it should be regarded primarily in connection with the customs space and the protection of the CIS countries' economic interests.

There was also a purely military report, by the commander of the Border Forces, on the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border, but that is a current matter discussed at every second meeting of the heads of state.

For the CIS states, the Collective Security Treaty has lasting importance from the viewpoint of ensuring the security of each country individually and all of them together. What was once a single strategic military space was broken up, and today none of the newly formed states is capable of fully solving the problem of its own security through its own efforts alone. That is because such security is determined not only by the existence of a nuclear missile potential but by a combination of many factors: economic potential, scientific and technological accomplishments and intellectual capacity. Without the development of those areas it is impossible to achieve serious success in military development.

The years 1992 and 1993 passed under the banner of creating national armed forces. Kazakhstan has always favored cooperation in this area. And that is the optimal way, since the idea of self-sufficient defense is hard to implement. Even from the standpoint of the national interests of each of our countries, collective efforts are preferable, since it is easier to achieve parity and equality in mutual relations on the basis of multilateral, rather than bilateral, relations (the principle of consensus). Only a collective approach, which presupposes the equalization of conditions and the possibility of making compromise decisions, is capable of strengthening our positions. Whereby no one dominates, no one imposes his will, and even a large state reckons with the wishes of its allies.

The threat of global confrontation between the two politico-military blocs has disappeared, but the likelihood of local conflicts that may injure us to one degree or another has not been reduced to zero. A number of conflicts along the Commonwealth's frontiers confirm once more that the underestimation of that factor may sooner or later affect the general and political development of the newly independent states, including the Central Asian region. And if someone places the emphasis on bilateral agreements out of a fear that joint efforts may lead to the re-establishment of a geopolitical association that is imperialist in nature, I strongly object: it is precisely collective principles that will enable us to prevent that. You will agree that it is more difficult to conduct a dialogue as equals with a stronger neighbor on a bilateral basis.

[Tarakov] Tulegen Tlekovich, now let us look directly at the documents, since they were not "deciphered" in the final press conference or the official materials about the summit.

[Zhukeyev] Unquestionably, the key, most important document, which reflects the philosophy of our common views of the prospect for cooperation, is the Concept of Collective Security of States That Are Parties to the Collective Security Treaty. From it naturally flow the more detailed Basic Guidelines for the Deepening of Military Cooperation, which are expressed in imperative form. These two agreements acquire political resonance, as it were, in the form of a general document, the Declaration of States That Are Parties to the Collective Security Treaty.

In principle, it would have been possible to adopt just one document, the Basic Guidelines. But a certain procedure was developed. There is a conceptual document that defines the basic principles of a political nature. There are the basic guidelines, which are cloaked in a general legal form and which formulate the sides' commitments (of a general nature). And there is the declaration of intentions, which attests to the fact that the heads of state support the aforementioned agreements. And if the declaration is an expression of the spirit of our cooperation and a statement of its basic principles, the concept is a working document. In fact, its final part states: "The provisions of the concept will be added to, clarified and improved as cooperation among the participant states undergoes further development and strengthening, and a new system of international relations is formed." And the Basic Guidelines could be called a tool that will be used to achieve current and medium-range objectives. For example, the concept strategically defines the three-stage establishment of a collective security system. In this analogy, the Basic Guidelines are more oriented toward tactical concerns.

[Tarakov] In considering issues pertaining to border forces, the CIS leaders were less in agreement. Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan expressed special positions. Which problems aroused the most heated debates, and what arguments were heard from the dissenting sides in this connection?

[Zhukeyev] The concept of protecting external borders with the border forces of the Commonwealth states took a rather lengthy time to work out, and it was adopted by the heads of the border forces. The level of foreign ministries and political leadership was a different matter. Experts are one thing, but the level of a state decision presupposes, first and foremost, political advisability.

Ukraine. One should note that its attitude toward the border concept is, on the whole, positive. That country's leadership agrees that generally agreed-upon approaches to the protection of external borders are needed. But Ukraine has its own particular view of the problem, which was put forward as an alternative to the proposed

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concept. And since its counter initiative was made public too late, when the leaders were already in Almaty, there was no time left to try to reconcile the two drafts. Therefore, a general agreement was reached that a reconciled document in which Ukraine's proposals would be taken into account insofar as possible would be the base document.

[Tarakov] Can you describe Ukraine's position more specifically?

[Zhukeyev] The draft was submitted to the secretariat. But in general terms I understand that Ukraine is to some extent unprepared today for collective efforts, in the belief that it is protecting its own external borders effectively enough—I am referring to those sections that adjoin states that do not belong to the CIS.

However, that's a productive course, since the version proposed by Ukraine does not contain any fundamental differences from the main document. It merely contains somewhat different emphases.

On the part of Azerbaijan, no alternatives or conceptual objections were presented. But what remains an open question was raised. That country's leadership stated that 132 kilometers of its border with Iran had been seized by Armenian military formations. In that situation, to sign a collective document would mean reconciliation to the fact of annexation—that is the view of that country's leadership.

Turkmenistan's creed is the primacy of bilateral agreements. That republic rarely joins collective agreements of this nature. Some people may not like that line, but it is the choice of a sovereign state.

[Tarakov] The question of an appeal to the U.N. Security Council by the presidents of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan concerning a settlement of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border was included as an additional item on the agenda. What is that message about, and what are its main motives?

[Zhukeyev] The document was prepared in advance. We considered it necessary to make a request to the United Nations that our military units be present in Tajikistan not just as the forces of neighboring states—that gives the Tajik opposition reason to accuse us of interfering in internal affairs—but as "blue helmets," as international peacekeeping forces under the aegis of that authoritative organization.

First of all, the status of "peace patrols" is a more politically correct form of presence. On the other hand, then it would be possible to count on partial financing by the United Nations.

[Tarakov] Yet at the same time there is discussion of creating Tajik border forces and of the CIS countries' material and technical contribution to that effort. What, specifically, would the neighbors' help, including that of Kazakhstan, consist of?

[Zhukeyev] If we consider the Tajik-Afghan border to be an external border of the CIS and, moreover, it is not far from Kazakhstan, can we be indifferent to our neighbor's concerns? Of course, that in no way means that I am in favor of involving our forces or resources in an internal Tajik conflict. Absolutely not. Assistance from the states that belong to the Commonwealth and have signed the Collective Security Treaty is a moral duty and an obligation of allies.

The reality is this: Tajikistan is undergoing an extremely grave political and economic crisis, and it is unable to form its border forces by itself. It most likely has plenty of human resources, but soldiers have to be equipped, armed and trained. That is why it is necessary that all members of the coalition contribute what they can.

How will Kazakhstan's support be expressed? Possibly in funds for the centralized purchase of uniforms or other resources. It might be in the form of favorable rates for the transportation of cargo, facilitative credits offered in the form of a long-term state loan, or other forms of assistance.

[Tarakov] Now it would be interesting to learn how the pact became a memorandum.

[Zhukeyev] The underlying explanation for the change in the document's form lies in a certain political motivation. For some, the very word "pact" evokes associations that are not very good. Although, I will tell you, that is a fabricated argument. No matter what terms we use—a pact, an alliance—the point is not the terms but the content and whether the commitments are fragile or binding.

Either merely general approaches are declared, or specific commitments, which imply a certain responsibility, are undertaken.

Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed a pact on the maintenance of peace and stability in the CIS for consideration by the heads of state, but the document was adopted by majority vote as a memorandum.

But the initial form went further in obligating the states to maintain internal stability and develop democratic processes in relations among themselves. Similar documents were adopted previously, but here, at a new state of integration, we once again undertook the initiative to establish stronger mutual guarantees.

But, to our regret, because not all of the CIS states have friendly relations with one another (on account of territorial claims, separatism, etc.), the participants in the meeting insisted on different wordings, sometimes disregarding the basic principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter and the Vienna documents.

In this connection, some states acted with a view to their domestic political situations. For example, Armenia signed the memorandum with reservations, stressing its

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special opinion that the rights of Armenians in Nagornyy Karabakh should be properly protected.

But there were no profound, fundamental disagreements.

In fact, the substantive part was even strengthened. Shevardnadze submitted a proposal concerning the rebuffing of aggressive separatism. It was included in the final version in the form of a rejection of separatism.

[Tarakov] Nursultan Nazarbayev's proposals concerning a worthy commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the victory over fascism were successful.

[Zhukeyev] Yes, the heads of state readily supported the proposal to fund, out of their budgets, trips by war veterans to meet with their former comrades-in-arms. Moreover, President Yeltsin agreed that not only citizens of Russia but soldiers from all our states who had forged the common Victory should be awarded Orders of Marshal Zhukov.

Our president expressed yet another idea—to appeal to the leadership of Germany on behalf of the CIS heads of state to hold a wreath-laying ceremony at the monument to Soviet soldiers in Treptov Park in Berlin on 9 May.

Those are noble, humane acts reflecting a good historical memory.

[Tarakov] Finally, what are your general impressions? Was more expected of the Almaty summit? On the basis of the latest summit, can one speak of a deepening of integration in the CIS?

[Zhukeyev] It is probably not quite right to "place landmarks" on the basis of the results of summits. Integration is a continuous process. Its vector has been determined, and its direction has been identified. But what occurs in the capitals is the formulation in terms of international law of agreements that have been reached in the context of continuous consultations and exchanges of expert opinion.

In speaking of Almaty, we recall that it was here that the fate of the Commonwealth was decided in December 1991.

As of the present, the priorities have been set, and the mechanisms of economic cooperation are being created very successfully. Mutual understanding was also evident in the politico-military area. Periods of mutual suspicion and mistrust were overcome here. The evidence of that is the achievement of agreement on the creation of a unified air-defense system, and fact that Ukraine, which had previously avoided such steps, supported that decision. Granted, if one thinks about it, it is merely the acknowledgement of reality, since no single state, even Russia, is capable of creating an up-to-date air-defense system on its own.

Someone will grumble at this point that we've had our fill of sovereignty and are now creeping toward one another. I do not support such attitudes. First of all, they are fundamentally wrong; and second, they reflect intellectual and political bankruptcy. We are building an independent state and a democratic society, and against that backdrop, fears and doubts are kindled—is it the right thing to do? What is much more sensible is to take pragmatic steps within the framework of rational thinking, and where joint decisions are possible, to undertake them more boldly.

More complex mechanisms and relations have been set into motion in major politics, and they cannot be oversimplified. But at the same time, there is no alternative to rational decisions and no alternative to common sense. And I have the feeling that a fundamentally new breakthrough in political attitudes occurred in Almaty.

[Tarakov] A final question. The Kazakh capital has handed the baton to Minsk. The general mood of politicians is optimistic: what was not singed in Almaty will probably be adopted in Belarus. Do you share that optimism?

[Zhukeyev] Geography is not the most essential factor in determining the effectiveness of summits. Everything depends on the expression of the sides' will and their readiness at a given moment to reach consensus.

Moreover, certain issues have been artificially dragged out—as I see it, out of short-range, ephemeral considerations. Because sometimes the new international bureaucracy thinks up new work for itself and seeks the possibility of prolonging its existence. Sometimes the longer it takes to prepare documents, the more consultations, trips, etc. are required. But thank God, the bureaucratic style does not typify the work of the Commonwealth's bodies, and lately a tendency toward constructive dialogue and the brining of positions closer together has manifested itself more and more distinctly. Therefore, from the Minsk summit we can expect further advances in integration initiatives.

## *Serikbayev on War Science, Military Reform

*95UM0320A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Mar 95 p 2*

[Article by Kim Serikbayev, top scientific expert with the Supreme Certification Board of the Republic of Kazakhstan, under "Army and Country" rubric: "Military Science Needs Support"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The first stage of the military reform has ended. As is clear from the decree of the president "On Measures to Strengthen Military Discipline and to Strengthen the Fight Against Violations of the Law in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan," however, the course of reforming the army is proceeding with great difficulties.**

The reasons involve more than just the poor supply situation of our army and so on. In my view, there is also

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the underestimation of the role of science in the development of the military or, more accurately, disregard for it. By way of example, I will refer to one of the recent television broadcasts dedicated to military reform. In response to the question of the leader about the role of science in the establishment of our army and whether the republic has scientists who are involved in military science, Deputy Minister of Defense Aytkali Gusmanovich Yesengulov said:

"Marshals Zhukov and Rokossovskiy and Col. B. Momyshuly were not candidates of science but they were outstanding military leaders...."

What can you say? Of course it is an undisputable fact. But the leader probably wanted to find out how well conceived and scientifically founded is the process of the organization of the armed forces and development of the military policy of the young sovereign state; what the military-scientific potential of the republic is and to what extent it is being involved in the resolution of the indicated problems. I think that the response did not fully satisfy either the organizers of the television broadcast or the viewers.

As for us military professionals, such a narrow understanding of the role of military science in the development of the armed forces is worrisome. It is one thing if this was a hasty and improvised response. But what if this is the established ideology of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense?! In such a case, how does it intend to carry out the instructions of the president on the need to establish and develop military science? In one of his addresses back in 1992, Nursultan Nazarbayev stressed: "We are a sovereign and independent state and questions about the guaranteeing of security must be the cornerstone in the overall structure of the formation of domestic and foreign policy. For this reason we need an up-to-date army. And such an army can be established by having a solid scientific base founded on experience and up-to-date views on the development of the military."

In his decree, the president called for the presentation by 1 February 1995 of a concept for educational and social-legal work in the armed forces for approval. We note that the institute of deputy commanders for educational work was introduced two years ago but no concept was developed. Why not?

An analysis of the style and methods of educational work in the forces after the disintegration of the Soviet Union showed the need to undertake fundamental measures and to introduce a new institute. The president, having approved a proposal from the defense department, familiarized himself with a draft statute on the institute of officer-educators and expressed the idea of the necessity of developing a document specifying the forms and methods of educating Kazakh patriotism.

The concept is a scientifically founded document generalizing the previous positive experience of educational work and proposing new forms and methods of military-patriotic education. A working group was established that was supposed to present the first version of this nationally important document by May 1993. And the fact that there was a delay in the development of the concept and other legal documents regulating the combat activities and daily life of the troops indicated once again the underestimation of the role of science in the development of the army. Some officials of military departments are probably continuing to apply a method that has not been justified: they deal with the education of service personnel only in the formations and they confine educational measures only to holidays.

As a person who has dedicated a significant part of his service to military-scientific research, I would like to expand somewhat the understanding of the role of science in the armed forces.

The experience of different states shows that not a single practical task of military development has been resolved without fundamental theoretical studies. I think that the main task is the determination of the optimum numerical strength, composition, and structure of our armed forces. In other words, what kind of army do we need?

The law "On Defense and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan" and the military doctrine answered this question. At the same time, life suggests the necessity of making some corrections and additions.

In this connection, I cannot approve the proposal on the adoption of a new military doctrine (see KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 27 December 1994), especially written by one author, Leonid Bakayev, despite the respect that I have for him. In the first place, the military doctrine is a document of national importance reflecting the longer-term interests of the state. Military specialists as well as scientists, politicians, and jurists take part in the development of such a doctrine. In the second place, the military doctrine of the Republic of Kazakhstan clearly sets forth the peace-loving nature of the foreign-policy course of our young sovereign state and rather broadly reveals the tasks and means for the prevention of war. This is why it was approved by the Supreme Soviet in December 1992 and affirmed by the president in February 1993.

It is my profound conviction that the justification for the adoption of a new military doctrine must be substantial changes in the international situation that dictate the need to make dramatic changes in the foreign and domestic policy of the state. In other cases, the doctrine must be supplemented (refined) by other documents: edicts, decrees, orders, statutes, and so on. Hence I think that the idea of the need to adopt a new doctrine is, to put it mildly, inadequately substantiated, especially if one considers that the basic principles of the military policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan were approved by the world community.

New conditions also present new tasks to military science: the participation of the Armed Forces of the

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Republic of Kazakhstan in providing for the collective security of the states of the Commonwealth; the expeditious and purposeful conversion of the military facilities of the military-industrial complex; and the participation of troops in natural conservation and the restoration of ecological damage as a result of military activities.

In the stage at hand, in general, or military science must develop in the following basic directions: military-historical, military-technical study of the combat activities of the troops taking into account the peculiarities of our region, and, finally, training of scientific and scientific-pedagogical personnel.

In short, military science is called upon not only to prepare scientific personnel but also to resolve important state tasks. Unfortunately, today it must be said that we cannot fully utilize the very rich arsenal of military-scientific thought from the Great Patriotic War as well as from the postwar years. At the same time, we have the example in which an officer of the Republic of Kazakhstan does not have the possibility of receiving a dissertation that he wrote on a closed subject, because it was done at one of the higher military educational institutions in Moscow. It is possible that these problems will be resolved later on. But for the time being, in organizing military-scientific work, we should consider the following wise saying: "Have faith in God but do not make a blunder yourself." This is especially so when the number of scientists in the republic dealing with the military problem does not exceed the number of fingers of one hand.

In this connection, one cannot fail to note the prompt reaction of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Security Committee to the existing situation. Military and special higher educational institutions of these departments have been reformed and have begun to train officers with a higher education and a base is being established for the development of scientific research work: postgraduate courses are being opened, practical scientific conferences are being held, and ties are being organized between educational institutions and the troops and agencies. The themes of the dissertations of postgraduate students are being selected on the basis of the needs of the troops and special services. The heads of higher educational institutions and their deputies for scientific work have established businesslike contacts with the Supreme Certification Board of the republic. All of this inspires confidence that in the near future the agencies, services, and troops of these departments will receive the necessary scientifically founded recommendations and proposals for practical work. It would be desirable for other military departments to take such steps as well, for there is not a single representative of the Ministry of Defense among the officers coming to postgraduate courses (more than 40 people).

Nor can one see any inclination to recognize the principle of the continuous training of the military professional, because to this day the military boarding schools remain on the balance of the Ministry of Education, even though they train personnel for the armed forces.

And one other thing. Wartime and peacetime experience indicates that for the making of the most nearly optimum decision on military reform it is necessary to perform scientifically founded calculations. At the same time, as practice shows, some decisions are made hastily without adequate study.

I will state several proposals whose realization, in my opinion, will make it possible to establish a solid basis for the development of science guaranteeing the security of the state and contributing to the strengthening of its defense potential.

All military professionals, including those in the reserves, should support the president's idea of opening a Military Academy and taking the most active part in its realization. The Military Academy along with the training of officers of the highest echelon must be the focal point for military-scientific research.

It is expedient in the structure of the Ministry of Defense to establish without delay a main directorate for higher educational institutions, military science, and training outside of the troops. Precisely this directorate must be a center for the development of military science. One should keep in mind that in the former Soviet Union the indicated problems were handled by more than 10 directorates of the Ministry of Defense, special departments of the military districts, and many military scientific research institutes.

The proposals of Academician M.K. Kozybayev on the opening of a military department in the History Institute require study. This would help to accelerate research work in the field of the military history of Kazakhstan, would provide for a good link between history and the present day, and would have a great influence on the military-patriotic education of the population, especially young people.

As for the Supreme Certification Board of the republic, it is prepared to provide methodological and practical assistance for the development of military science, which needs serious support.

In connection with the fact that it is impossible to publicize all questions involving defense and security in the open press and some officers have already prepared scientific work, the need arises for the establishment of a special journal.

An editor's office could be opened through the combined efforts of the three departments Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and National Security Committee and the journal could be named PROBLEMY OBORONY I BEZOPASNOSTI [Problems of Defense and Security].

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### *Call-Up of Reserve Officers Decreed

*95UM0287A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 7, 18 Feb 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Reserve Officers Who Have Not Been Through Military Service Are Being Called Up to the Armed Forces for a 2-Year Term"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the understaffing of primary officer posts which has developed in the republic's Armed Forces, the Cabinet of Ministers decreed, in one of its January decisions, the call-up of 1,765 reserve officers who have not been through military service.

They will be called up based on military record specialties or related, appropriate civilian military specialties according to a special List of Military Record Specialties for this year.

Officers with specialties related to indoctrination and social-legal work will be the largest group called up—380 people who will be distributed among the five arms of service; 350 officers are being called up to the Air Force, and 135 to communications.

## Tajikistan

### *National Economic Performance Analyzed

*954F1646A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ Supplement) in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 6*

[Column by Boris Filippov, special correspondent for EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ: "You Have To Keep Your Eye on the Market. Economists Seek Way Out of Deep Crisis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The huge loss inflicted by the civil war of 1992-1993—15 trillion rubles—was made worse by the breakup of traditional economic ties between the republics of the former USSR, the financial crisis, and the introduction of national currencies in the CIS countries.

Compared with 1990, production output in Tajikistan's industry fell by 60 percent in 1994; it was down by about a third in agriculture, by half in construction, and by several times in the operation of transport enterprises.

If national income is evaluated in 1993 prices, it fell by 26.3 percent.

Sunny Tajikistan was once considered one of the most dynamic republics in Central Asia, with a relatively high standard of living. Judging by the situation in Dushanbe now, however, the country makes a pathetic impression. All the state stores are drab and empty. Knowing that there's nothing to buy there, hardly anyone goes there. The selection of private stores and shops is not very good.

Homes are not getting heat, and electricity is intermittent. City transport stops running after dark. Material difficulties are made even worse by rising crime.

Average wages and salaries stand at barely 25,000 rubles per month, with the maximum at 64,000. No one can receive more in cash, because any legal earnings above that amount are automatically deposited to citizens' accounts in savings banks. The picture would be incomplete if we said nothing about the fact that wages and salaries go unpaid for months at a time.

The transportation enterprises are in difficulty. The main problem is that the equipment is worn out. Transport idleness is rising year by year, while freight haulage and passenger transport are declining. Delivering goods to many rayons can be compared to a long, dangerous expedition.

The growing moral and physical obsolescence of production equipment is made worse by the steadily rising cost of raw materials, supplies, fuel, and energy; given the low rate of use of production capacity, this makes many Tajik-made goods, which are not of the best quality anyway, absolutely uncompetitive.

Because of the decline in the republic's export potential, moreover, the range of exported commodities has narrowed, and cotton and aluminum have acquired qualities of "commodity money." But things are not going well even in regard to the production of these items. Until this year, the marketing of cotton and aluminum outside the republic was the concern of dozens of state and commercial organizations. At the same time, completely inadequate funds are being allocated to the production of, for example, cotton. As a result, the "white gold" harvest declined from 800,000 tonnes to almost 200,000 tonnes, and aluminum production amounted to only 200,000 tonnes. The earnings from exports of these products are mostly sitting in foreign bank accounts.

The scourge of the republic is the exodus of qualified worker cadres, engineering-technical personnel, doctors, teachers, and scientists. In the past two years alone the republic has lost over 230,000 persons, including 123,000 specialists with a higher and secondary education. These are mainly Russian-speaking citizens.

Can Tajikistan get out of the crisis and build a stable market economy? Doctor of Economic Sciences R. Mirzoyev, one of the republic's leading specialists, thinks it can. He believes Tajikistan possesses exceptionally important factors which can foster its economic development. The relatively small country's combination of abundant minerals, raw materials, and water, hydropower, and labor resources along with unique natural and climatic features, constitutes the foundation on which to build a strategy of development and achieve the republic's financial and economic independence.

To accomplish this, the regulating role of the state has to be used. This is proved by the development of economically dynamic countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, and the Arab Emirates.

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Mirzoyev thinks that the government has to establish strict control over exports of raw materials and imports of food.

It is essential to establish our own national currency with a floating rate of exchange under the strict control of the National Bank. It is also essential to prohibit the circulation of foreign currencies in the country.

Mirzoyev believes it is extremely desirable to strictly control the domestic market. With complete freedom and state support for small and medium-sized private firms in trade and services, their success is guaranteed. Gradually converting from exporting raw materials to exporting finished goods, and, conversely, converting from importing finished food products to importing raw materials, will also have a positive effect on the national economy.

The first measures designed to solve the economic crisis are spelled out in the Tajikistan Republic's economic and social development plan for 1995. It translates into orienting all participants in material production toward achieving planned volumes, which will make it possible to stabilize the economy this year.

Calculations show that the gross domestic product in the coming year could grow by a third over last year. And this is the absolute minimum necessary to prevent the complete and final collapse of the national economy.

### *Background of Prime Minister Karimov Examined

*954F1646B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ Supplement) in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 6*

[Article by Vladimir Berezovskiy: "Nothing Scares the Premier. The Ideas and Principles of Dzhamshed Karimov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since his November victory in the presidential elections, Emomali Rakhmonov has nearly completed reorganizing the government. The ministries of trade, industry, construction, resources, and foreign economic relations, and several state committees have breathed their last. The creative intelligentsia, however, have given a hostile reception to the combining of the former departments of culture, press, and information, the State Committee for Sports, State Television and Radio, and the agency that protects authors' rights, into one ideological "agrobusiness," whose prospects are quite vague.

One striking thing is that E. Rakhmonov's countrymen from Kulyab have strengthened their positions. Yakub Salimov, one of the leaders of the People's Front, whose units kicked the guerrillas of the opposition out of Pyandzha, has kept his portfolio as minister of internal affairs. Tolbak Nazarov, the 50-year-old former vice president of the Academy of Sciences who managed the presidential campaign, heads the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The head of state's apparatus has also been turned over to Kulyabian Izatullo Khaysev. The state counselor for cadre policy is from Dangara, where the President was born.

Fifty-four-year-old Dzhamshed Karimov, a graduate of the Moscow Technology Institute of Light Industry, was appointed prime minister. He comes from Dushanbe scientific circles and is considered a major specialist in labor resources. Back in "those" years he served in turn as head of the Scientific-Research Institute of Economics, the State Planning Committee, and the Dushanbe City Party Committee. In May of 1992, the Islamists' rally marathon toppled Karimov's government. The premier himself was taken hostage; several times he was tormented and even taken up onto the log frame, where they used to saw people alive. Until recently, Karimov served as trade representative to the Czech Republic and was Rakhmonov's economics advisor.

The new premier is convinced that the country needs its own currency. The Russian ruble makes it difficult to maneuver and holds back mass privatization and destatization. Karimov thinks that cotton, aluminum, and gold will make it possible to enter world markets and get credits from Russia and the West. Meanwhile, Tajikistan is recalling its securities and guarantees which were so lavishly handed out by the National Bank and the former government.

Responding to a question from a local journalist, Karimov said that nothing scares him, and he will be decisive. There is actually nowhere to retreat; the republic is poised on the brink of a precipice. According to the latest figures from the International Monetary Fund, the annual national income per inhabitant fell to 400 dollars—only one-eighth of Estonia's, for example.

## Turkmenistan

### *Government Leaders Protest Perceived Media Attack on Niyazov

*954F1662A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 8, 22 Feb 95 p 13*

[Letter to the editor, under rubric "Letter to the Editor in Chief": "Turkmen Authorities Object"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear Editor,

In February your newspaper published an article by Oleg Moroz, under the title "Presidential Autocracy." [For a translation of this article, see pages 1-5 of the FBIS DAILY REPORT SUPPLEMENT; CENTRAL EURASIA, FBIS-SOV-95-038-5, dated 27 February.]

The crux of the article, and, incidentally, the conclusions expressed in it, are simple and uninvolved: all the presidents of the CIS countries, first of all, are inferior, and, secondly, it turns out, not just the presidents. And so—maybe it is "the khans and shahs," or "the lords and

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the grand princes"—depending, so to speak, on the geographical context. And also (what impudence!) they made so bold as to "provide themselves with a complete set of the appropriate symbols—a seal, an anthem, a flag..."

There is no sense in quoting O. Moroz any further, and we do not want to. Because the entire article is nothing but a set of unproven accusations, insults, and ordinary lies and loutishness.

It is only in this way, and no other way, that one can qualify the author's statements that pertain to Turkmenistan—the existence of fantastic amounts of money in accounts in foreign banks, hundreds of citizens who disappeared without a trace or who were shot to death, some kind of sounding of public opinion relative to the restructuring of the state model... Where does all of this come from? Where is even the slightest hint of proof? All that there is, is bashful expressions such as "apparently," "it is said," and other hypothetical expressions that abundantly accompany the "factological" material.

The journalist's right to self-expression, his right to independence in the choice of topics, arguments, and items to be professionally analyzed and presented to the audience are indisputable, but they must be balanced by responsibility, by the constitutional and ethical duty to answer for the cited facts, statistical data, and assertions. It is here that there exists a dividing line between pure journalistics and dirty propaganda, between the author's position and a place that has been bought in an agency of the press or over the air in conformity with a social, group, or caste order. This is like an order to commit murder: the money justifies the crimes.

It is very offensive that the vicious, completely tendentious material presented in a manner which, in form, is loutish, and, in content, provocational, was published in such an authoritative and, on the whole, respected publication as LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. Loutishness is a behavioral category. If a respected newspaper finds place in its editorial makeup for persons with traits like this, it is that newspaper's sovereign right. But loutishness and slander that are implemented through a medium of mass information is already a socially censurable and legally punishable deed. Who issued the right to mock the expression of the will of the nation in an independent state? Who issued the right to cite facts that do not exist in real life? Who issued the right in vain and despite the norms of international law to desecrate the social and state system in the countries that are members of the United Nations?

Turkmenistan is an open state and society. Those who want to learn about it, manifest a legal journalistic interest and obtain that opportunity, as is attested to by items published both in the Russian press and elsewhere. They are not always identical in tone. Sometimes they are polemical. But they reflect, rather than distort, our life, in which, naturally, there are problems, unresolved questions, and mistakes. In Turkmenistan they are not hidden from anyone, and especially not from ourselves. We are only inspired by constructive critical evaluations and conclusions. But we cannot fail to be indignant at the ill-intentioned attempts to lie, to slander, and to express wishful thinking.

It would not be worthwhile to direct attention to publications such as this if there were the assurance that this is not an active political measure, the goal of which is not only to torpedo the process of national consent within Russia itself, but also to evoke anti-Russian moods abroad, to intensify the various centrifugal tendencies, and to besmirch both peoples and politicians.

Dear editor, we appeal to you, in the sincere hope that your newspaper's editorial position does not have anything in common with the ideology presented in Mr. O. Moroz's article, and we are counting on the certainty that our letter will be published and will receive an adequate reaction from a publication that still enjoys a good reputation among the readers of sovereign Turkmenistan.

Respectfully,

S. Muradov, chairman of the Turkmenistan *mejlis*. O. Aydoydyyev, Kh. Ishanov, B. Obezov, V. Otchertsov, B. Sardzhayev, M. Razhapov, R. Saparov, B. Sikhmuradov, deputy chairmen of the Turkmenistan Cabinet of Ministers. Nasrullakh ibn Ibadullakh, Turkmenistan's *kaziy* Moslem. Father Andrey (Sapunov), Dean of the Orthodox Churches of Turkmenistan.

[Editor's note] By publishing O. Moroz's article, "Presidential Autocracy," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in no way proposed to analyze in detail the activities of each of the twelve presidents of the CIS countries. The central idea in the article was that the position of president is a special state position which, for the time being, has acquired almost nowhere on the territory of the former Union the status that that position has in the countries with developed democracy. The author supported that thesis with numerous facts taken from various mass media, which is something that, generally speaking, is customarily done in publications of a generally informational, survey nature. The facts mentioned, including those pertaining to Turkmenia, we repeat, were cited many times by various mass media and, consequently, are generally known. Therefore such a sharp reaction as that of the authors of the letter from Ashkhabad to the latest reproduction of those facts—this time in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA—leaves a strange impression. There is the sense that the Turkmen leaders are keeping an extremely irregular—if one does not express it in other terms—watch on the items published in the periodical press of the far and near abroad that pertain to their countries. If one speaks, however, about the substance of the letter, for us it is completely clear that the letter was sent from a country where there is a complete lack of a civilized attitude toward statements made in the press.

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## Uzbekistan

### *"Birlik' Chairman Reviews Parliamentary Elections

*954F1460A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 2*

[Article by Abdurakhim Pulatov, chairman of the "Birlik" people's movement, doctor of physico-mathematical sciences, and political emigre, under the rubric "Prognosis": "Uzbekistan Enters the Social Upheaval Zone: The Fate of 'Erk' Awaits 'Vatan tarakkiyeti'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the "Freedom House" report for 1994, Uzbekistan is declared an unfree state. But the need to improve its image and, the main thing, the need for Western aid (it has already begun to come in) all the same forced President Karimov to take certain steps in the direction of toning down the regime. Among other things, a few political prisoners were released. The presidential entourage is aggressively spreading rumors on the soon-to-come liberalization of society. The newly appointed minister of foreign affairs is trying to convince the Western countries, above all the United States, that Uzbekistan intends to follow the path of democratization.

At first glance, the parliamentary elections recently held in Uzbekistan were a tangible step in that direction. For the first time they were conducted on a multiparty, or rather biparty basis. However, just as the experts of the "Birlik" [Unity] people's movement predicted, the elections turned out to be a political spectacle. Essentially, ordinary Soviet elections were held in Uzbekistan. The People's Democratic Party created on the basis of the republic organization of the CPSU was the main participant in the event. And the participation in the elections of a second party, "Vatan tarakkiyeti," which was created by the authorities to replace their previous partner, the "Erk" [Freedom] party, had no impact on the situation.

This conclusion was suggested just from a study of the slate of candidates for deputy. Formally, everything was completely democratic—2 or 3 candidates were nominated for each deputy seat. But the soviets, who like the parties were given the right to nominate candidates, illuminated the essence of the matter very well: the soviets nominated only their own, that is to say, members of the NDPU [People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan], with the exception of 3 or 4 nonparty members (obviously so as not to violate the tradition of the bloc of communists and nonparty members).

Exactly one-third of the candidates were khokim—heads of local administrations. As was to be expected, no problems arose for the local "tsars" who ran in the districts under their jurisdiction. The results could also be predicted in advance in places where candidates who were representatives of the higher echelons of power and managers of large enterprises were nominated. Candidates from "Vatan tarakkiyeti" whom no one knew did not have any chance of ending up in parliament, if the authorities had not "ensured" the election of several representatives of this party.

Candidates who were equal in "weight" were nominated in some places in order to create the appearance of a fight. To avoid misunderstandings in the column "National Make-Up," only Russians were nominated as candidates in certain districts, and only Koreans in one.

There is an obvious parallel between "Vatan tarakkiyeti," by which the illusion of multiparty elections was created, and the "Erk" party, which played a similar role during the 1991 presidential elections. I think that a fate similar to "Erk's" awaits "Vatan tarakkiyeti."

The leaders of "Vatan tarakkiyeti," despite their small representation, will undoubtedly like playing the role of the second party in parliament. They understand very well, of course, the service they are providing for the existing regime. So it will not be surprising if the party's leaders in time begin to demand, among other things, greater independence and an appropriate share of power.

That is exactly what once happened with the "Erk" party. Created by the authorities themselves to counterbalance the radical-democratic organizations, at first it was satisfied with merely material leavings, but after Karimov allowed its chairman to participate in the presidential elections in late 1991 as his rival, the party's leaders began to lay claim to certain posts in the power structures. This was unacceptable to the communists, who had never even entertained the idea of even a partial division of power with anyone. So the "Erk" party was quickly disbanded. Incidentally, it was after this that its leaders began to be radicalized.

I think that the "Vatan tarakkiyeti" leaders, who are familiar with the recent history of the country's party life, will not soon "thrust themselves forward." And in fact the authorities, who have learned from bitter experience, will keep their "child" on a tighter leash.

It is possible, however, that this time the regime will choose a different path: formally sharing power. But this will be a temporary phenomenon, since the struggle for power, which exists even within the one ruling party and is usually based on clan or region, will soon become an interparty struggle given the existence of two party structures.

Thus, "Vatan tarakkiyeti" will after some time move toward the opposition. Then Karimov will face a choice: permit the existence of a legal opposition, or disband "Vatan tarakkiyeti" as was done before with "Erk."

Obviously, Karimov will choose the second scenario, although the nature of the impact could be different than before.

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When in June 1992 the first wave of repression after receiving independence befell "Birlik," the situation in Uzbekistan was altogether different than now. Three years ago the economic situation was deteriorating, but it was still tolerable. The people were politically disoriented. Enjoying a monopoly on the mass information media, the communists headed by Karimov, who had recently been fierce opponents of preserving the Union, claimed that they deserved credit for the country's security and that only they could preserve stability and lead the people to a happy future. In those conditions, the reprisal against the opposition took place before the eyes of a society which was essentially silent and supported the regime. Now, though belatedly, there is awareness that an economic paradise is not only not getting closer, but on the contrary, it is moving further away at a disastrous rate. People's patience is running out and the regime can no longer count on their voluntary support. Those who tie their hopes for change to the elections will soon discover the latest deception and begin to act. There have already been demonstrations by entire work collectives with economic demands. Now the protest will most likely become widespread and, in addition, political in nature.

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